Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/3–1154: Telegram

No. 669
The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Paris, March 11, 1954—2 p.m.

Coled 179. Following is analysis main deviations of present negotiating positions of French and Germans from Council of Europe recommendations for Saar settlement:

1. French proposal (Embtel 3278² by giving Council of Ministers of Council of Europe permanent responsibility for defense and foreign affairs of Saar, takes Saar settlement out of framework movement toward six-nation European community and thus eliminates very basis of “European solution”. Permanent solution recommended by Council of Europe report placed Saar within this framework by placing it under EPC institutions when created.

Furthermore, by thus eliminating subordination of Saar to supranational six-nation institutions, French position makes it very difficult for Adenauer to make economic and institutional concessions which Council of Europe report requires of him. Indeed French position makes it virtually impossible for Adenauer to argue that intention is really to make Saar into a true European territory of which Germany will have equal access, and thus to offset criticism that solution in fact permits France maintain special position in Saar for indefinite period.

2. Hallstein’s statement (Coled 176³) does not refer to temporary institutional arrangements for Saar suggested by Council of Europe report, but Germans tell us that in their view even during transitional period prior creation EPC, Saar Commissioner should be responsible to institutions of six-nation community and not to Council of Ministers of Council of Europe. Not clear whether Germans would agree to a modification of Council of Europe report to provide that Saar territory would become European immediately, provided French would accept a modification putting institutional arrangements within six-nation framework from first day.

3. Council of Europe report provides Saar should be autonomous but not have status of separate state. It therefore proposes that Saar be represented equitably in European common assembly but have only non-voting membership in Council of Ministers of CSC, EDC, EPC and Council of Europe. Adenauer has always insisted it would be undesirable as well as politically impossible to permit Saar same status as member states. We understood French had accepted this view. New French proposal, however, gives Saar full status of independence by giving it voting membership in Council of Ministers.

4. On currency question Council of Europe report provides French franc to continue in Saar until European currency is created; French proposal makes no mention of European currency. Statement of intent to work out European arrangements is important to Adenauer even if they are never concluded. French should be able to accept reference to eventual European currency arrangements as suggested by Council of Europe report. This would be consistent with Mayer’s statements in Washington in 1953 and also with provision Franco-Saar conventions that they are intended to pave way for European status. On the other hand, German suggestion that a special currency be created for Saar is politically impossible for French to accept as well as not feasible technically.

5. Council of Europe report provides for maintenance Franco-Saar common market and progressive establishment of “corresponding relations” between Saar and Germany. Again it would appear Adenauer needs a clear statement that eventual fulfillment of equal access is objective of Saar settlement. French proposal emphasizes maintenance of “status quo”, and avoids any reference to establishment “corresponding relations” with Germany. Hallstein’s statement, on the other hand, emphasizes the attainment of equal access and makes only passing reference to need for “progressive” application.

6. Adenauer insists Saar Agreement cannot contain any reference to tripartite guarantee to support statute during peace treaty negotiations or to FedRep acquiescence to this guarantee being made. Council of Europe report and French proposal both mention such guarantee. It may be possible to avoid reference to this point in treaty and still give French the substance of assurance they seek in manner suggested in paragraph 3 Coled 168.⁴ In conference in 1953 Mayer had previously indicated that he believed it would be possible to accommodate Adenauer on this point as did Robert Schuman in his letter to Adenauer of December 23, 1952 (Paris Embtel 3672, December 26, 1952⁵).

7. Council of Europe report provides that following approval of statute in Saar referendum, no restrictions will be placed on right to form parties, associations or newspapers. Embassy understands from Maurice Schumann (Embtel 3277⁶) French interpret “free” referendum as meaning pro-German parties would be admitted prior to referendum. If so, this is important French concession; but in accepting Council of Europe proposals Adenauer has capitulated completely from his previous stand that new elections with party freedom must be held in Saar before European statute submitted for approval.

French paper raises another problem by subjecting party freedom to “it being understood that (such parties, et cetera) could not call into question the statute adopted”. This restriction is similar to one in present Saar constitution on which controversial bans on pro-German parties have been based. It is, however, possible that Schumann interprets this qualification as meaning only that statute once adopted cannot be modified unilaterally by Saar regardless of outcome any particular election.

8. Council of Europe report provides that control of Saar coal mines shall pass to Saar. French proposal provides for maintenance present arrangements whereby French share control of mines equally with Saar. German position is that control should be shared among Saar, France and Germany on 60–20–20 basis. To prevent this issue from becoming obstacle to pre-ratification settlement, however, Hallstein’s statement proposes problem be postponed to post-ratification conference.

9. For similar reasons, Council of Europe report proposes question of lifting sequestration on former German steel mills and financial institutions be postponed until after EDC ratification; Hallstein’s statement agrees. French paper makes no mention of this question, which is, however, serious political issue for certain German interests.

Comment: Above represent only major points of difference on Saar between French and Germans. It is clear that neither side has gone far enough to accommodate itself to the minimum position acceptable to the other. Situation seems to demand a compromise very close to present principles of Council of Europe report. We therefore propose continue to insist for present in all conversations with officials of either side that they are being highly unreasonable in their deviations from Council of Europe report and to avoid going into detail of possible solutions. Obviously final solution will differ in some respects from Council of Europe report, but until real as distinguished from trading positions become clearer I believe this is essential approach. With negotiating positions of French and Germans rather clearly stated for first time, I suggest we should now coordinate views with those of UK. Aldrich may wish to determine, in particular, whether UK is seeking to influence solution so as to provide for direct UK participation through Council of Ministers of Council of Europe.

Embassy concurs.

Bruce

1. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London and Bonn.
2. See footnote 3, Document 667.
3. See footnote 3, supra.
4. Coled 168 proposed that the United States and the United Kingdom could give France a separate guarantee of any Saar settlement rather than guaranteeing it to both the Federal Republic and France. (762.022/3–454)
5. Telegram 3672 transmitted the translation of a letter from Schuman to Adenauer dated Dec. 21, 1952. (762.022/12–2652)
6. Document 667.