Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.00/11–953

No. 592
Notes on the Sixteenth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Berlin Committee, October 29, 1953¹

top secret

October 29, 1953

Present:

• Department of State
  • Mr. Lewis, Mr. Carlson, Mrs. Dulles, (GER)
  • Mr. Bickel (S/P)
• Department of Defense
  • Mr. Parringer (Office of the Secretary of Defense)
  • General Vittrup and Colonel Davids (Army)
  • Captain Iverson (Navy)
  • General Harris (Air Force)
• CIA
  • Mr. Bross
• HICOG
  • Mr. Harris (Economic Adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner)

1. Berlin Government:

Mr. Lewis stated that as a result of Mayor Reuter’s untimely death, the Berlin Government is in a transitional period, undergoing certain changes whose eventual outcome cannot be clearly foreseen. Our aim in this period has been to seek to hold the coalition together if possible and to maintain the unity of Berlin’s democratic forces. We wish to avoid any trend which could lead to the splitting of Berlin into two bitter rival political camps and thereby weaken Berlin not only internally but also its influence upon the Soviet Zone. Fortunately our reports indicate that there is a fairly widespread awareness of this danger among a considerable number of party functionaries. The parties seem to favor continuation of the grand coalition, although each wants to gain an advantage in the negotiations to form the new government. Herein lies a certain potential danger if the functionaries become overly concerned with partisan purposes.

Mr. Lewis said that if the coalition cannot be maintained, we favor advancing the date of popular elections (now scheduled for late 1954) rather than see the CDU–FDP try to govern with a 5 seat majority. Dr. Walter Schreiber was chosen Mayor on October 22nd by a narrow margin over the SPD candidate Suhr. Since then Schreiber has been seeking to form a government and at the moment is encountering some difficulty.

Mr. Lewis observed that it has been clear from the date of Reuter’s death that we could not expect any replacement who could measure up to his stature and experience. We doubt that the Berlin government will be quite as forthright and strong, even if the coalition continues, unless someone develops into an outstanding leader. This, of course, could happen although it is probably too early for such signs. We have no doubt that the basic spirit of resistance in the Berliners will continue, but the question is, if they should need inspiration in a long crisis, to what extent the remaining leaders can provide the type of inspiring example and symbolism which Reuter provided. The Communists are well aware of the effect of Reuter’s absence and they are seeking to capitalize on it by trying, sometimes subtly and sometimes openly, to encourage an internal political struggle in West Berlin.

2. Refugees:

Mr. Lewis said that the number of refugees entering Berlin since September 1 had slowly but consistently been increasing each week. 3,863 entered last week (or a little over 500 a day). At the same time the number of recognized refugees being flown out to West Germany for settlement has been slowly declining (2,078 were flown out last week). This decline is due to the continuing inability of the West German Laender, chiefly Baden-Wuerttemburg and North Rhine Westphalia, to accept promptly full quotas assigned them owing to a shortage of camp space. The refugee processing system in Berlin remains efficient and the airlines are prepared to fly out more than they are now.

Mrs. Dulles reported that Dr. Middelmann, an official of the Refugee Ministry in Bonn, had recently expressed the belief that the refugee influx may soon increase considerably.

3. Status of Soviet Tactics re Berlin:

Mr. Lewis stated that there is at present still no new major or general harassment of Berlin or western access thereto. There were a few cases this month, however, of apprehensions by Communist authorities of West Berliners on the Berlin–Helmstedt autobahn. These apprehensions seemed to have been aimed at trucking companies. In two cases neither the driver nor the vehicle has been seen since. In the third instance the truck driver was given an irrelevant medical test and allowed to continue his trip. These cases are not of any special importance in themselves but they serve to remind us of the possible type of harassment which the Vopo might use at a future date.

Another potential harassment of freedom of movement, in this case of East Germans traveling to Berlin, is to be found in increased Vopo checks on such trips. The Vopo have customarily exerted such control at railway stations. They have now instituted checks on the trains themselves and S-bahn schedules have been changed to involve stops at certain zonal stations outside Berlin. These checks have thus far not affected the frequency or adequacy of service in Berlin nor are there reports as yet of serious interference with the travel of East Germans to Berlin.

Perhaps more significant is a possible Soviet trend, of recent vintage, to turn interzonal matters over to the GDR. There have been several recent examples which point to such a trend:

(1) In August the Soviets ceased stamping Warenbegleitscheine (bills of lading) and these papers for certain Berlin goods transiting the Soviet Zone suddenly began to be returned with GDR stamps. Thus far the GDR has been stamping more Warenbegleitscheine than the Soviets did but we do not take much comfort from this phenomenon.

(2) In September HICOM made a second request of the Soviets to agree to the abolition of interzonal passes, thereby restoring freedom of movement between zones. The Soviets rejected the request evading their responsibility under Four Power agreement and later indicated that passes were in the hands of the GDR and suggested the issue be settled by East-West German talks.

(3) In September the Berlin Commandants requested the Soviets to restore the automatic telephone service between East and West Berlin, which the East Sector had disrupted in May 1952. The Soviets replied that telephonic communications had long ago been turned over to the Soviet Sector authorities who are competent independently to conduct negotiations with West Berlin agencies.

Our Berlin authorities are carefully watching for further indications that this is the trend of the future. If so, presumably the Soviet aim is to:

(1) Promote the prestige of the GDR.

(2) Try to force us to recognize the GDR at least indirectly.

(3) Provide an easy out for the Soviets in answering Allied complaints.

(4) Encourage East-West German talks and seek to give the impression that the Western Powers and the Federal Republic are blocking all progress by refusing to negotiate issues through East-West German talks.

If this is the Soviet aim, we must act carefully to thwart it. In general we believe we should not object ipso facto to East German authorities operating as agents or clerks of the Soviets. We should make it clear, however, that we hold the Soviets strictly responsible if and when difficulties occur and make their responsibility abundantly clear to the public.

. . . . . . .

4. Berlin’s Place in Any Security Guarantee:

Mr. Lewis stated that in considering any general security arrangements or guarantees in relation to the Soviets, GER intends to keep in mind the special situation pertaining in Berlin and the effect of any general guarantees upon Berlin’s future. We should never give the Soviets any idea that we are precluding the use of force to maintain Berlin or access to Berlin. The Soviets must continue to be encouraged to retain the idea that serious interference with Berlin may have serious repercussions.

5. Air Saftey Talks:

Mr. Lewis said that our representatives in Germany had reported by cable that they agreed with Washington that the air safety talks should be terminated. Two despatches on the subject had just been received in the Department but there had been insufficient time to read them before the Ad Hoc Committee met.

6. Airlift Planning:

Mr. Lewis reviewed the latest reports on airlift planning and called attention to HICOG’s query as to whether the US should agree at the present stage of negotiation to supply the difference between a full-scale airlift and the sum of the British and French contributions if our Allies cannot increase their share. He said that our initial reaction was that the US should not at this time indicate to our Allies that we would pick up the balance for a full-scale airlift but that on the other hand we should face the fact that the US will probably have to pick up this balance if a blockade occurs and we should plan accordingly.

General Harris indicated that this might be done by using two sets of figures, one at tripartite negotiations and one for the US alone.

Mr. Harris stated that General Tunner believed that it would probably be easier for the US to carry out an airlift unilaterally without any contributions by the Allies.

General Harris pointed out that the US Air Force has other global commitments and that the US contribution to the airlift should be kept to the minimum necessary.

Mr. Lewis stated that the British and French contributions were of considerable value for psychological reasons.

Mr. Harris said that the British and French take their commitments to contribute to the airlift quite seriously and that these commitments have been discussed at the cabinet level. He pointed out that British and French representatives were now contacting their governments as to whether the contributions could be raised but the outlook was not optimistic. He said in the event that a full-scale airlift was instituted, it was the intention to use exclusively air fields in the British zone and that this might interfere with the present deployment of the British Air Force in Germany.

Colonel Davids questioned the figure of 12,000 tons daily as the requirement in a full-scale airlift and asked if the increase from 8,500 tons to 12,000 tons was really necessary since the Berlin population had only increased 4 or 5%.

Mr. Harris replied that the expansion of the Berlin economy rather than only the rise in population had accounted for the 12,000 ton figure.

7. Review of NSC 132/1:²

Mr. Lewis stated that at the NSC Planning Board meeting on October 22nd we recommended two changes designed to clarify and strengthen parts of the Berlin policy paper and we are now recommending one further change. None of these changes are designed to alter in a basic or major way the policy which the paper sets forth and which we believe is still sound. The NSC Planning Board seemed to approve the policy set forth in NSC 132/1, which will be reviewed again by the NSC on November 25th.

The changes which we have recommended are:

(1) A new sentence after the first sentence in paragraph 6 on page 3:

“Efforts to maintain and strengthen Berlin’s economy and morale should be continued in accordance with the commitments regarding Berlin’s welfare and security undertaken by the United States, United Kingdom, and France in the Tripartite Declaration of Paris of May 27, 1952.”³

(2) A new paragraph after paragraph 21 on page 12 as a part of Section “C” (Courses of Action in the Event that a Blockade or Harassing Measures Tantamount to a Surface Blockade are Imposed):

“Consideration should be given to the use of force to break the blockade but in any event action should be taken only if agreed upon with the U.K., and France and after consultation with the Federal Republic.”

(3) Following is to be added to the end of paragraph 12 (page 8) of Section “A” (Courses of Action in the Event That Western Access to Berlin is not Seriously Impeded):

“In addition to such preparations, even when access to Berlin is not seriously impeded, the United States should consider the use of appropriate reprisals to counter specific Soviet harassment or interference with means of access, or Soviet failure to correct promptly conditions affecting access including provision of satisfactory alternative facilities.”

8. Countermeasures:

Mr. Bross inquired as to the status of the planning of countermeasures or reprisals to be used in the event of Soviet harassment or interference with access to Berlin. He said that probably most reprisals would have to be taken outside of Germany.

General Harris said that a list of possible countermeasures or reprisals would be of considerable value.

Mr. Lewis stated that in the past, planning of countermeasures had been very difficult because of the reluctance of our Allies to commit themselves in advance to any specific reprisals. He said that we would request HICOG to supply us with a list.

9. Financial Appendix to NSC 132/1:

Mr. Lewis reported that the NSC Planning Board had concurred in a request from the Bureau of the Budget for a financial appendix to NSC 132/1 which would give a picture of what funds might be needed to support Berlin in the future, what programs are currently underway, and a brief statement as to what has been done in the past. Mr. Lewis stated that in general four-fifths of the cost of aid to Berlin is borne by the Federal Republic while prior to the recovery of Germany most of the expenditures were carried by the US budget.

10. Aid to Berlin—Fiscal Year 1955:

Mr. Lewis said that some resistance from the Bureau of the Budget had been encountered in attempting to secure future aid for Berlin. He stated that he had stressed three main points: (1) that there were still sound economic reasons for aid; the number of unemployed was symptomatic of this need, (2) that aid was necessary for political reasons, and (3) that since Berlin was a special situation and not a part of the Federal Republic, the question of aid to Berlin could not be viewed in the same light as aid to any other part of Germany. There was sometimes a tendency to overlook the fact that the Berlin economy was at quite a different level from that of the Federal Republic. In fact the circumstances were so different in Berlin from those in West Germany that dealing with Berlin problems was almost like being concerned with a different country.

Mr. Harris said that there were sufficient reasons on economic grounds alone for continuation of aid and a good political case in addition. He pointed out that the Federal Republic has been steadily increasing its share of aid and this year will be bearing 87% of all aid to Berlin if the US contributes its expected share. The Federal Republic has done this despite the fact that it is under considerable political pressure to aid other areas in Western Germany. In addition, there is pressure from some West German business circles, who do not wish the Berlin economy to receive extensive aid for fear of competition. He said that truly remarkable progress had been made on the economic front in Berlin. Unemployment had been considerably reduced and would have been decreased even further if unrecognized refugees had not entered the labor market and if some 17,000 West Berliners had not been forced out of their jobs in East Berlin. With continued aid we might expect to decrease unemployment by as much as 50,000 in another year. If this aid is not forthcoming, however, and if we permit the economic situation to deteriorate and unemployment to start rising again, it will be much more costly to rectify the situation. A continuing high rate of unemployment may have strong political repercussions. Mr. Harris recalled that Mayor Reuter had discussed this situation with him on the Thursday before the Mayor’s death and had expressed great concern over the need for immediate strong efforts to reduce this problem. On this occasion Reuter said, “I know my people and I cannot go on indefinitely year after year telling them that the situation is going to improve if eventually it does not improve. The result of this trend will be loss of hope and therewith the will to resist which has kept Berlin alive.” Reuter predicted that unemployment would increase this winter, largely for seasonal reasons, and that therefore it was all the more imperative to try to reduce unemployment at once, if possible by as much as 50,000.

Mr. Harris pointed out some of the problems which he has faced in connection with the stockpile. He said that shortly there would be no American official left in Germany other than himself who was familiar with the stockpile problem. In addition to lack of experienced personnel, there were constant problems in connection with the rotation of perishable stockpile items and it was necessary to check frequently to be certain that the German authorities were taking required action. It is expected that the stockpile will be completed by the end of 1953. As far as the raw materials portion of the stockpile was concerned, this work which involves thousands of contractors, may be completed by April 1, 1954. Mr. Harris believed the Berlin authorities were more interested in funds for employment and work relief than in stockpile activity. They are prepared to accept the hardship which a blockade would impose but they find it difficult to cope with chronic economic problems.

1. The notes for this meeting were taken by Carlson. The notes were attached to a letter from Lewis to Conant, dated Nov. 9, which called the High Commissioner’s attention to paragraph 8. Attached to the source text was a letter from Lewis to General Timberman, dated Nov. 9, transmitting to him a set of the notes.
2. Document 547.
3. See Document 537.