Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.0221/11–1753

No. 593
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Liaison Officer of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Mautner)¹

confidential

[Berlin,] Undated.

Subject:

• Commandants’ Meeting with Mayor Schreiber at General Timberman’s Residence, November 14, 1953 at 1730 hours.

Present:

• General Timberman
• General Coleman
• General Manceaux-Demiau
• Mayor Schreiber
• Dr. Klein (Protocol)
• Mr. Keeble
• Mr. Syragos
• Mr. Mautner

(1) After being welcomed by General Timberman, Mayor Dr. Schreiber stated that he hoped that the fruitful and close cooperation which had existed in the past would continue.

(2) He had been a supporter of the major coalition and still considered himself one. He had been forced to take the steps he had taken by the political circumstances but had still kept open five seats for the SPD in his cabinet, and he would keep these open another week for them to return.² Even after the expiration of this limit and a completion of his Senat [Cabinet?] as a minor coalition he would continue to keep looking for a major one if such can possibly be accomplished. The SPD could re-enter it if it chose to. It should not, however, expect any further concessions. None would be forthcoming. The unfortunate final outcome had been brought about to a large extent by the interference of the small functionaries of all parties and others who in no way could be expected to have the broad background and vision necessary to act usefully in the creation of a good government.

(3) Dr. Schreiber explained the political line he would follow: He was a strong adherent of Adenauer’s foreign policy which for him might make cooperation with the Western Allies even easier than it was for Reuter. He would obviously continue the line of promoting Berlin’s political freedom, of the united front against the Soviets and of the struggle for Berlin’s independence.

(4) His government program, although not yet approved by his Senat colleagues, was one of:

(a) Continued work on the tremendous social welfare problems.

(b) Special considerations for Berlin’s economic problems. He considered himself very qualified in this respect as pre-1933 Economics Minister of Prussia.^*

(c) He would place special emphasis on increase of Berlin’s tourist traffic. Before the war Berlin sheltered 200,000 foreign visitors yearly from a total of more than a million out-of-towners. These gave work to 72,000 persons. Last year Berlin was visited by only 32,000 foreigners and as a result the branches connected with the tourist trade have only 23,000 persons employed.

(d) In this respect the Mayor welcomed the HICOMer’s move to relax the interzonal pass requirements, even if so far the step was more political than practical, at least as far as it concerned Berlin.³ Nevertheless, it took the initiative from the Soviets.

In order to benefit the tourist trade in particular and the Berliners in general, it looked now as if the requirement for interzonal passes for air travel should be relaxed. These passes were useless, did not concern the Soviets and should be done away with. It would help Berlin greatly. (To this General Timberman replied that such a move was being studied at the Kommandatura and that a solution might soon be found.)

(e) Dr. Schreiber then hoped that a way might also be found for Allied and other foreign tourist vehicles to drive to Berlin via Helmstedt. (I do not believe the Mayor is familiar with the complexities of the vague agreements on autobahn travel, nor on the other questions concerning Berlin’s “status”. Reuter had seen the agreements and discussed the problems with General Mathewson; nobody else among the German leaders has, as far as I know.)

(5) General Timberman then explained that he and his colleagues, but especially he as American, were somewhat worried about the future of the Senatorship for Credit Affairs.

To this Dr. Schreiber replied that he had been most reluctant himself to part with Dr. Hertz. In fact had asked Dr. Hertz, in the name of the Senat to continue in his function as Hauptwirtschafter for the Emergency Work Program (the voluntary supervisory function Hertz has held up to now), provided the SPD permitted him to do so. The Credit Department would be headed by Dr. Hertz’s deputy, Busack, but would probably be placed under the supervision of the Economic Department (Dr. Eich). It was, however, not intended to diminish the importance of the Credit Department as such.

(6) Concerning elections, Dr. Schreiber stated that despite rumors and speculations it had been considered best to continue without attempts to call for new elections. Unless unforeseen events occurred, elections would not come before the normally set time at the end of the Senat’s term of office, the end of next year.

(7) The Reuter foundation had launched a butter distribution program. Unfortunately, the wires had been very much crossed on this. The past week had not been one designed for coordinating matters well. Dr. Schreiber had been under the impression Senator Bach had talked over the program with the Allies. It was a clear principle that all matters of political importance undertaken by the allies should be discussed with the German authorities but it was an equally clear principle, which he would strictly adhere to, Dr. Schreiber stressed, that German moves would be coordinated with the Allied authorities.

The program had been stopped. Dr. Schreiber would carefully consider the proposals and send them up with his recommendations to the Commandants.

(8) After all parties expressed their satisfaction about the cooperative atmosphere, the meeting broke up with a toast to the success of Dr. Schreiber’s difficult task.

1. The source text was transmitted as enclosure 1 to despatch 366 from Berlin, Nov. 17.
2. Mayor Schreiber’s efforts to form a grand coalition (CDU–FDP-SDP) following his election as Mayor had failed and the FDP and CDU had decided to attempt to govern without the SDP.
3. In this connection, Dr. Schreiber mentioned the visit of Mrs. Dulles and the fact that apparently a different meaning existed for the German word “Investitions Kredite” and the American “Investment Credits”. “Investitions Kredite” indeed, were not urgent requirements, namely credits for capital equipment, real property. For “Investment Credits” which included credits for liquid funds, raw material, payment of wages and so forth, on the other hand he could assure, were needed badly in Berlin. The city could use a Billion. Dr. Schreiber was glad that this misunderstanding could be explained before any harm had been done. Washington apparently had gained the erroneous impression that “Investitions Kredite” were the same as “Investment Credits” and were not needed in Berlin. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. For text of Conant’s letters to Semyenov, dated Aug. 26 and Sept. 17, and the latter’s reply, dated Sept. 1, concerning German travel restrictions, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 21, 1953, pp. 391–392 and ibid., Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 490–491.