Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.0221/9–1752: Telegram

No. 563
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State¹

secret

Bonn, September 17, 1952—2 p.m.

1198. I feel that as result of (1) position which I took while in Berlin² and (2) Sov lifting of harassments affecting Dreilinden,³ time for new decision is upon us. So that Dept fully understands what I mean it will be necessary to recapitulate a bit.

Our view re Berlin crisis was set forth in our 914 to Dept Aug 29 (rptd 45 Moscow, 128 Berlin, 237 Paris, 167 London⁴). In short it was that, given our local vulnerability and our inferiority in local retaliatory powers, we shld tread softly re Berlin until we had an assessment of total weapons and reserves at our disposal.

In its 1031, Sept 3, to us rptd 131 Berlin, 239 Moscow, 1239 Paris, 1540 London⁵ Dept rejected our suggestion and in short asked that we proceed with retaliatory measures while awaiting a survey of capabilities.

Accordingly I adopted a vigorous course during my visit to Berlin. Except for my Autobahn drive to and from Dreilinden check point, this vigor found expression, of necessity, in talk. Whether statements I made and my showing of flag on two miles of Autobahn caused Chuikov to lift harassment I do not know. Sov decision may have been wholly unrelated to anything I did in Berlin. Fact remains however that Dreilinden stretch is now open—for how long we do not know—and that press associated this turn of events with my actions in Berlin.

Question now is: do we accept status quo, or do we press for further rectification of Berlin situation. If we do not ask this question of ourselves, Sovs presumably have it much in mind. I suspect Chuikov and his superiors are watching what we do or do not do in next few days with keen interest, feeling that this short space of time will show whether we will be satis with crumb of comfort which they have yielded to us or whether position which I took in Berlin was seriously intended and will have solid support.

I believe that we shld act within next few days to maintain initiative and seek rectification of other grievances.

By this I mean to follow Dept’s injunction to do more than simply protest, altho I am as matter of course protesting every provocation.

As to what action we can take, I went over matter exhaustively with Mathewson while in Berlin and have been pursuing it since return. Two most likely countermeasures within our own territory in Berlin are seizure of Sov barges and imposing obstacles in access to Rundfunkhaus in Brit sector. Even these seem to me ineffectual.

Strongest case we have, in my opinion, is MP patrols on Autobahn. As indicated in our 1003 to Dept (135 Berlin, 53 Moscow, 264 Paris, 180 London⁶) high-handed Sov action in stopping these patrols is a direct affront to our mil, its prestige and its freedom of movement on a primary communications channel with Berlin. As such it impinges upon vital principle of unrestricted US mil access to Berlin and from Berlin to zone. I believe therefore that this particular harassment, altho seemingly trivial, is in its implications more important to American Govt than other irritations affecting West Berliners. If we cannot maintain our own prestige and respond promptly and vigorously to even slightest infringement of rights on Autobahn Sovs will have begun eat away at very basis of our position in Berlin.

I therefore recommend that we seek re-establish patrols on Autobahn as next step in retaliatory measures demanded by Dept. It seems to me essential in doing this that we shift issue away from frivolous considerations introduced by Chuikov re nature of MP organization and legal rights to patrol and come to rest on firmest issue available to us in whole Berlin problem—that of access.

As I read Deptel 1168 (Berlin 7, London 1767, Paris 1423, Moscow 280)⁷ Dept is in substantive accord with me on this score. However, it does not raise question of what we do should Sovs bar passage to MP patrols without arm bands and other distinguishing insignia and traveling in ordinary jeeps. Thinking ahead on this proposal, it seems to me that our course shld be along the following general lines—provided Mathewson, Heidelberg and Pentagon go along with broad concept.

We maintain right of MP patrol on Autobahn. However, if Sovs will not accept that, they will have choice of an alternative: a regular mil unit exercising our right of access, but incidentally performing Autobahn courtesy functions. Need for this latter was highlighted by Babb case.⁸

. . . . . . .

I have traced this course through to most pessimistic end. However, it is my belief that Sovs will back down at an early stage if we are cool and determined. We shld of course give Sovs clear intimation when we embark on such a course that we mean business. Problem naturally arises of Fr and Brit reaction to this. I am not sure that they wld be willing to go along with such a course of action. If Dept agrees with me, then it is perhaps best that we do not submit them to strain of facing up to Sovs and that we proceed about this business on our own. I see little hope of dealing effectively with Sovs if at every turn we are hamstrung by our allies.⁹

Donnelly

1. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, Paris, and London.
2. Regarding Donnelly’s visit to Berlin, see telegram 472, supra.
3. On Sept. 11 Soviet harassments affecting Dreilinden ceased.
4. Document 560.
5. Document 561.
6. Not printed. (762.0221/9–552)
7. Not printed. (762.0221/9–552)
8. On Sept. 8 Elmer Babb, who was driving a truck carrying X-ray equipment to Berlin, ran into a ditch on the Autobahn and was detained for 3 days by Soviet officials.
9. On Sept. 18 Kennan cabled his strong support for the position taken by Donnelly in this telegram. (Telegram 516 from Moscow, 962.50/9–1852) On the same day however, Gifford stated his serious doubt about the wisdom of proceeding unilaterally in Berlin. (Telegram 1595 from London, 662.001/9–1952) In view of this disagreement the Department of State cabled the Embassy in London on Sept. 19, asking that Donnelly, Kennan, Dunn, Gifford, Perkins, and Morris who would all be in London for the Chiefs of Mission meeting, Sept. 24–26, discuss the problem and try to arrive at a joint view. (Telegram 2008, 662.001/9–1852)