762.0221/8–2952: Telegram
No. 561
The Secretary of
State to the Office of the United
States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1
priority
1031. Re Bonn’s 914 rptd Moscow 45 Berlin 128 Paris 237.2 Dept can well understand certain amount of confusion produced by numerous recent tels from here and elsewhere re Berlin access and ways for us meet problem. We had hoped ourtel 870 to Bonn rptd Berlin 104 London 1291 Paris 1057 Moscow 1823 wld help clear up confusion by outlining detailed plan of action which while necessarily sketchy re longer-range moves wld at least provide logical sequence based both on success or failure of prelim steps and extent to which Sovs meanwhile further tighten screws on Berlin.
Seems clear from reftel present differences between our thinking result mainly from differing evaluations as to when Berlin issue poses potentially serious threat and from your lack of info re comprehensive study of countermeasures which has been going on here.
As pointed out para 2 ourtel 870 we do not regard Rothensee situation as posing such threat because of impact on Berlin’s economy and morale, but because it impairs our ability achieve staggered stockpile and because Sovs may now be tempted, in face our limited protests not backed up by any action, to apply further blocks on Berlin’s communications. We fear such may be case irrespective of points made penult para urtel 914, but rather on account of analysis similar that contained your excellent tel 717 rptd Berlin 91 [Page 1296] Moscow 28 Paris 179 London 2334 and our belief that, with exchange of notes re Ger unity getting nowhere, Sovs probably increasingly inclined step up harassment of Berlin. Fact that Sov Zone brown coal now reaching West Berlin constitutes extra gravy for economy and stockpile does not alter this analysis.
As also noted ourtel 870 study of comprehensive countermeasures will not yield practical results in terms of Allied decisions for many months, and we think it wld be most unwise defer further action on our part meanwhile solely for this reason. Study being prepared here does not include measures confined to Ger, and possible steps it covers are clearly of type which our allies wld not accept until Berlin communications gravely threatened, such as by quasi or full blockade. We fear therefore you are perhaps counting too much on this side of picture at least in terms of immed future. Shld be noted this connection that our allies in fact agreed to program of limited (i.e. to Ger) countermeasures both at time of full blockade and also since then to meet periodic Sov harassments, without first requiring study of and agrmt on comprehensive global program.
Though countermeasures confined to Ger admittedly limited and hence of questionable efficacy, we believe past record speaks for itself. In particular, we have not refrained from such steps before out of fear they might precipitate further Sov interferences. As Dept recalls it, last action we took re Rothensee was technical level protest delivered Aug 9 demanding additional train paths by Aug 12. Dept wld certainly hope, despite considerations advanced Berlin’s 281 rptd Bonn 3145 and similar analyses, that we are ingenious enough devise some practical way of hampering Commie barge traffic. Unless we can agree on some such countermeasure in near future, we fear Sovs likely decide that west unprepared back up words by action and, as suggested above, try further harassments.
Dept gathered from urtel 717 that Brit and Fr HICOMers had reacted favorably your suggestion of gen approach (i.e. point 2 of suggestions given urtel 914) .… Dept continues believe this idea shld be pushed strongly, and that Sov failure give any satis re Rothensee presents favorable opportunity, particularly if accompanied or preceded by local countermeasures as suggested above. Action to withdraw proposal wld seriously prejudice possibility of getting Brit and Fr agrmt and thus be tactically unwise.
[Page 1297]On realistic basis, suggest also we shld not lose sight of probability that whatever US Govt and HICOG try to do re Berlin communications is likely get watered down considerably as result necessity obtaining tripartite positions and actions. For this reason, consider it important for us to proceed as vigorously as possible with hope of ending up with some progress forward. If we start out on negative and defeatist basis, we will not get far.
For above reasons Dept therefore requests you study problem further and especially contents ourtel 870, which resulted from serious consideration here. Still feel it important to push proposed immed measures (Rothensee countermeasures and gen approach) while awaiting your comments and those of other addressees on additional suggestions.
- Drafted by Morris and cleared in draft with Riddleberger and Williamson. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.↩
- Supra.↩
- Document 559.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 558.↩
- Telegram 314 reported on the technical problems involved in hampering Soviet barge traffic. (762.0221/8–1552)↩