Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

662A.00/7–952: Telegram

No. 555
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Washington, July 17, 1952—12:36 p.m.

253. Reurtel 107, rptd London 26, Moscow 8, Paris 32, Berlin 14.² Pending receipt comments from Moscow and elsewhere, Dept has fol gen reactions proposal that protest be made in Moscow against Sov harassment in Ger due lack of results from AHC and Kommandatura protests.³

While FonMins agreed if necessary deliver follow-up protests in Moscow intent was as we see it to obtain positive results and not merely achieve possible propaganda effect. Neither nature present harassments nor prospects achieving results appear warrant use of Moscow protest now. Linse case excluded from consideration here because of special factors involved including Berlin public opinion and morale.

Fol considerations pertinent:

1. Transmitting protest soon after note on Ger unity⁴ might cancel out some of anticipated effects of note by making it appear we are attempting sabotage chances arranging four-power mtg.

2. Protest along lines suggested para 4 reftel wld duplicate similar charges in note on Ger unity.

3. Argument in para 3 reftel that failure previous notes achieve results underscores our impotence may be even more applicable to high level protest to Moscow if it fails produce results.

4. This raises fundamental question, namely whether protest shld be designed obtain solution of situation protested, or score propaganda point, or both. These objectives likely to be mutually exclusive, since need for Sov opportunity to save face wld probably require secret handling of matter if actual withdrawal of harassment sought.

5. Since present harassment relatively minor and Berlin’s welfare and security apparently not immed threatened, perhaps Moscow approach shld be held in reserve for more serious situations and more drastic harassment that may develop. Such protest wld presumably have stronger impact if coordinated with effective countermeasures. To expend such ammunition at this stage and repeatedly wld inevitably result in diminishing returns now affecting AHC and Kommandatura protests.

6. It is recalled that Roberts of Brit FonOff in Paris mtg with the Secy⁵ made point we must take care that protests at governmental level do not give Chuikov opportunity thereafter to disclaim responsibility and refer HICOM and Berlin Commandants to Moscow when future protests are made.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Montenegro and cleared with Lewis, Hillenbrand, Kellermann, Riddleberger, Matthews, Barbour, Bohlen, and Jessup. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
2. Document 553.
3. On July 21 the Embassy in Moscow reported that it was opposed to carrying protests to a higher level unless the United States was ready to take countermeasures. The Embassy stressed that local Soviet officials should be held strictly responsible for their actions and countermeasures should be taken accordingly. (Telegram 138 from Moscow, 662A.00/7–2152)
4. Document 124.
5. Presumably this is the meeting referred to in telegram 924, Document 540.