Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762A.5/7–1552

No. 554
Notes on the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Berlin Committee, July 11, 1952¹

top secret

July 11, 1952

present

• State:
  • Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
  • Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis
  • Mr. Daniel W. Montenegro
• Defense:
  • Admiral Austin (Navy)
  • General Elmore (Army)
  • General Harris (Air Force)
  • Mr. Charles Noyes (Office of Secretary of Defense)
• CIA:
  • Mr. Frank Wisner
  • Mr. Hugh Cunningham

General Harris reported that a detailed airlift plan should be ready next week.

General Elmore said that plans were being coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Bohlen inquired regarding the effect of placing EUCOM under General Ridgway’s command on the JCS’ request that the Berlin garrisons not be under NATO Command. General Elmore said this matter was under study.

General Elmore stated that JCS action seeking to unify the Berlin Command had been postponed until after the Secretary’s visit to Berlin but would now be undertaken.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Lewis reported on the status of the Berlin stockpile as of June 14, indicating that the 6-month balanced stockpile, except for industrial materials, was virtually completed, it being anticipated that the required 6-month coal level would be attained in August. He mentioned that a long cable from HICOG (Bonn’s 82 of July 7, 1952²) indicates that British and HICOG studies of the 12-month stockpile problem, nearly completed, are in substantial agreement, and conclusions appear to be very close to those reached in studies made independently in the Department. HICOG estimates that a 12-month coal supply could be built up by April, 1953 if no significant Soviet interference with transportation develops.

It was stated that the Military Defense report should be ready next week. Consultations with the British and French are being prepared.

Mr. Lewis informed the Committee that a cable on general implementation of NSC 132/1,³ contemplating bilateral and multilateral discussions, is now in preparation.

Implications of the Linse kidnapping and courses of action that should be taken in that regard were then discussed.⁴

Mr. Bohlen made reference to Berlin’s cable of July 10 which interpreted the kidnapping as a Soviet effort to affect Berlin’s morale, and rejected the use of local retaliation because of superior Soviet capabilities in the area, raising instead the question of possible retaliation elsewhere.⁵ Mr. Bohlen pointed out that the interdepartmental committee studying economic reprisals had in a preliminary report reached rather pessimistic conclusions in respect to the availibility of means of economic retaliation on a global basis, and he added that it appeared likely that the committee’s final report would not be more encouraging.

The main question, Mr. Bohlen stated, was whether a protest should be made in Moscow. He referred in this connection to Mr. McCloy’s comments on the declining effectiveness of protests in Germany and recommendation that protests be made to the Kremlin. Mr. Bohlen expressed his skepticism regarding the wisdom of such a course of action, in view of the even greater disadvantages of demonstrating the ineffectiveness of protests at that level. The kidnapping incident, however, belonged he thought in a category distinct from the harassments against which protests have been lodged to date and may merit strong representations to the Kremlin. A strong protest has already been made in Berlin. It may be advisable to have the High Commissioners make the next protest. Ambassador Kennan’s comments have not been received.

Mr. Wisner briefly gave Linse’s background, mentioning that Linse was the economic expert in the Committee of Free Jurists, and probably second only to Friedenau, chairman of the Committee, in importance. The Committee, Mr. Wisner pointed out, carries on a very effective campaign against the Soviet and East German authorities by exposing their abuses of authority, illegal activities and misdemeanors generally, carefully documenting and effectively publicizing its findings in each case.

Mr. Wisner made the significant point that Linse’s importance to the Soviets was such that his abduction could be considered justified from their point of view quite independent of their continuing campaign of harassment and intimidation. On the other hand, things tend to become fused because of public reaction. This incident has acquired great importance because of its flagrant character and the position and activities of Linse himself. It has become a test case in the eyes of the aroused Berlin population and city government. Retaliatory and defensive measures are being demanded. The impression that American authorities have been reluctant to react vigorously has already caused considerable deterioration in the Berliners’ attitude toward us; failure to act now would have still more damaging consequences. Feeling in West Berlin has rarely been so strong, as the mass meeting of 25,000 in front of the City Hall demonstrated the other day.

Adding to the psychological gravity of the situation is the fact that the communists have for some time been intimating they would take action of this type, Eisler having given particular attention to this. The East German press has for some time been stressing West Berlin’s use as a base for espionage activities, and particular mention has been made of the Committee of Free Jurists. There is a strong possibility that Linse’s kidnapping was intended to discourage attendance at the convention of Free Jurists scheduled for this month in Berlin.

Mr. Bohlen asked what action would be considered effective. He discussed the question of level of protest. As a protest to Dengin has been made in Berlin, normally the next step would be a protest to Chuikov. Should the next be addressed to Moscow? There are the related possibilities of an approach to NATO and increased publicity. A protest made in Germany would be quicker, more clean-cut (tripartite agreement would probably be attained with greater ease), but would not have the same resonance as a protest to Moscow.

Mr. Lewis pointed out the danger that a protest to Moscow would give Chuikov “an out.”

Mr. Wisner took issue with Berlin’s appraisal of its own capabilities for countermeasures, stating that responsible and reliable sources there had outlined considerable local capabilities in this regard. Among these are the following:

1. Action against the 10,000 known SED members in West Berlin, including possible denial of unemployment compensation and other benefits and privileges of such individuals.

2. Sudden search and arrest of SED functionaries in West Berlin.

3. Arrest of KPD leaders in Western Germany.

4. Arrest or other measures against known East-West traders, acting in behalf of the Soviets, located in West Berlin and the Federal Republic. These people could be placed in “protective custody.”

5. A protest by Bishop Weskamm of Berlin and surrounding Land Brandenburg (Linse is a Roman Catholic).

6. The barring of East Zone lawyers whose activities now extend into West Berlin.

7. Building up a fund for the purpose of exposing the perpetrators of acts such as Linse’s kidnapping and securing information and undertaking other action which might lead to his release and the release of other victims of similar action.

Admiral Austin underlined the advisability of having a protest made at once by the High Commissioners, to be accompanied by spontaneous and stimulated demonstrations in Western Germany.

Having the High Commissioners protest, Mr. Noyes remarked, would leave another “court of higher appeal” (representations to the Kremlin). The time expended in awaiting a Soviet reply in Germany could be used to advantage in obtaining British and French agreement to send a strongly worded protest to Moscow. There is need to strike while the iron is hot.

Mr. Wisner observed that he thought that Mr. McCloy should be informed that the Germans (in West Berlin, and the Federal Republic if it is decided to undertake simultaneous operations in the latter) would raid SED (or KPD) offices and make arrests, and not the Allies. Publicity should be given with the right twist, emphasizing action as judicial and not as retaliatory. (For this reason such action as closing completely the Soviet controlled Rundfunkhaus in West Berlin and barring the activities of East Zone lawyers should be avoided). One of the most effective measures, not of a direct retaliatory character, which should be undertaken is the creation of a “liberation fund,” for which an appeal could be made for international contributions.

Mr. Bohlen asked in this connection if statistics on Berlin abductions were available or could be drawn up. The CIA representatives said they would look into this matter.

Mr. Wisner went on to suggest that if it were decided to deprive SED members in West Berlin of their unemployment benefits and other payments such funds might be employed to swell the liberation fund, and to finance protective measures for others in danger of being kidnapped.

Mr. Bohlen asked if there might not be a need for tripartite approval of such measures in the Berlin Kommandatura.

Mr. Noyes stressed the importance of taking protective measures and asked whether action should be taken here to urge measures such as the issuance of automatic weapons to the Berlin police.

Mr. Lewis outlined the measures now under study and mentioned the legal and other considerations which must be taken into account.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Noyes spoke in favor of using UN Committees to publicize the case.

Mr. Wisner pointed out that in using publicity we must be mindful of its possible effects in keeping people from going to the Free Jurists meeting in Berlin scheduled for this month. On balance, however, Mr. Wisner and the other members of the Committee considered that publicity should not be withheld or subdued for this reason.

Mr. Bohlen summed up the Committee’s views as follows:

There is agreement on the advisability of asking Mr. McCloy to seek action by the High Commission to send a vigorous protest to Chuikov at once, with maximum publicity. While awaiting a reply discussions should be undertaken with the British and French in regard to a protest to Moscow. Meanwhile, known communists and others “implicated” in the kidnapping should be arrested in West Berlin (this would be good for the morale of Berliners and West Germans generally).… Mr. Bohlen added that the Voice of America was already stressing the Linse case.

Because of possible developments in the next few days, a date was not set for the next meeting. Members agreed to get in touch with one another Wednesday or Thursday to arrange for a meeting possibly late next week (July 17 or 18).⁶

Note: Berlin’s cable No. 76 of July 11,⁷ reported on Mr. McCloy’s visit to Chuikov and the impression Mr. McCloy received that Chuikov was “extremely cordial and sincere” and would do something about Linse if it were within his power. Because of this, Bonn was not advised to make an effort to send a strong High Commission protest to Chuikov; instead, Mr. McCloy’s views were requested regarding the desirability of strong representations in the light of the circumstances. (Department’s No. 182 to Bonn⁸).

1. Drafted by Montenegro on July 15.
2. Not printed. (762.6/7–752)
3. Document 547.
4. On July 8 Walter Linse had been kidnapped from West Berlin.
5. Reference is to telegram 62 from Berlin. (762A.00/7–1052)
6. The next (sixth) meeting of the Ad Hoc Berlin Committee was held on Aug. 1 and the Linse kidnapping was only briefly discussed. Ausland’s notes on this meeting are in file 762A.5/8–452.
7. Not printed. (762A.00/7–1152)
8. Not printed. (762A.00/7–1552)