662 001/3–1752: Telegram
No. 72
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Germany (Hays)
to the Department of State1
2012. At close of today’s mtg Francois-Poncet asked Chancellor for an expression of his views re Allied reply to Sov note. He said these wld be most helpful to Allies in formulating their reply which wld be subj of further consultation with Chancellor before it is despatched.
Adenauer replied that it was important to avoid holding a four-power conf just for sake of mtg since such conf now wld be senseless and endless, and cld slow down integration and creation of Eur Def Community. On other hand, it was equally important to avoid a complete turn-down as this wld have bad psychological effect in Ger and Allies shld not themselves block possibility of achieving some positive results however remote they might seem at present. To Chancellor an interesting phase of Sov note was its appeal to Ger nationalism. He referred particularly to paras dealing with former Nazis and ex-Gens and creation of a natl Ger Army. Whereas Nationalist movement in Ger was worthy of little attn as it had little substance to it, such movement wld gain in importance if openly supported by USSR.
He believed that Allied reply shld be designed to bring to light real intentions of Sov Union and shld put two questions to it:
- (1)
- Since Sovs envisage necessity for creating an all-Ger Govt which pre-supposes free elections, are they now ready to give UN Comm same facilities in East Ger as it has been granted in West Ger?
- (2)
- What is meany by Sov requirement that Ger shld not enter into any coalitions or alliances directed against any power which took part in war against Ger? Wld this provision exclude Ger from Schuman Plan, EDC, And all moves toward peaceful integration of W Eur?
Altho Chancellor said note shld not refer specifically to Oder-Neisse Line, he wanted to take this occasion again to make clear that no Ger Govt cld accept it as definitive frontier. Fed Rep had agreed that solution of problem of its eastern frontiers should be later sought preferably in agreement with a Free Poland and that in meanwhile friction with Poland over this question shld be avoided [Page 183] in hope of later creating more favorable atmosphere for settlment.
Kirkpatrick pointed out that ref in Sov note to Potsdam was ambiguous and asked whether reply shld not point out that Potsdam did not define either Oder-Neisse Line or Koenigsberg settlement. Chancellor was inclined to think this wld be useful.
In conclusion Chancellor agreed with HICOMs that whatever happened it was essential that work here on contracts and in Paris on EDC shld not be slowed down in any way but on contrary shld be expedited.
- Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.↩