Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/3–1752: Telegram

No. 71
The Chargé in France (Bonsai) to the Department of State ¹

secret priority

Paris , March 17, 1952—8 p.m.

5648. From McCloy for Byroade.² Believe Sov note should be viewed as presenting us with opportunity for consolidation of Allied policy as well as clarification of it to Ger people and Sov Govt. Sov introduction of national Ger army, free production, release of Nazis and Grotewohl’s attitude on Saar³ have stirred many reluctant elements in France and England to merits of EDC plan. On the other hand, emergence of note at this time is an indication of strength of this policy and should inspire all with a confidence that has heretofore been somewhat lacking. Therefore, I believe reply should embody a bold statement of our objectives so that Germans, Sovs and other nations may clearly see road on which unification of Ger, peace treaty, and stabilization of forces can be reached. Suggest reply should commence by saying Sov note and its tone point to need for a clear statement of Allied policy which is as follows:

(1) We are just as anxious and determined to bring about peace and stability in world as Sov Union. Indeed our actions have given evidence of a far greater sincerity in this respect than has Sov postwar policy.

(2) We actively seek unification of Germany and a definitive peace treaty with Germany and intend to continue our pressure to achieve these objectives. We are gratified that recently Sov Union has evinced such an interest in unification of Germany and apparently places such great importance upon it.

(3) However, we intend to continue with our policy of building a strong Eur community capable of preserving and developing and extending its freedoms within its area and capable of defending itself from aggression or subversion from without. Germany is a west nation operating under a rep form of govt and must be free to enter into such a community. This objective is a desirable one in itself and would be sought even were it not for fact that Sov postwar policy has accented the importance of such a community, witness Czech coup d’état and Korean attack.

(4) We intend to create this community in such a manner and on such a basis that it will constitute only a defense against the attacks on the freedom and welfare of its people and with no element or possibility of aggression itself. When so established and the present imbalances removed, we will be quite prepared to discuss with Sov Union basis for permanent peace via disarmament or whatever other measures may seem desirable.

Believe advisable to throw in ref to Aust treaty delays and statement to effect that if our policy in re to free elections and free conditions under which parties may form and campaign in Germany remains the same and that we feel no good purpose to be derived from commenting upon particular paras of their proposed treaty. We will be prepared at proper time to comment on them and suggest some clauses of our own.

Above are purely my personal views. I have not discussed them with Adenauer, but he telephoned me just before my departure for Paris urging that he be given opportunity to sit down with a few important people, as he put it, to think out proper form of reply to Sov Govt.⁴ He indicated he had not made up his mind as to proper reply in all its aspects and wanted to exchange thoughts with those who were composing reply before any crystallization of drafts. He suggested this could best be done in Paris on his arrival here, but he emphasized that he wished to do it on an informal basis, sitting around table with others with similar responsibilities. He asked me to stay in Paris until his arrival, but I must be in Bonn tomorrow for UN commission.⁵ Would like your views as to whether you feel my presence in Paris with Adenauer at this time would complicate matters. I do not think he has made similar request to other HICOM’s. Will be in Bonn tomorrow.⁶

Bonsal

1. Repeated to Bonn and to London for Spofford.
2. McCloy was in Paris for discussions with General Eisenhower on the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in Western defense.
3. On Mar. 14, in a declaration of governmental policy, Grotewohl had stated that separation of the Saar from Germany was illegal, that it was an integral part of Germany, and that it must be placed solely under the authority of the German Government. For an extract from the declaration, see Documents on German Unity, vol. II, pp. 62–63.
4. For a further expression of Adenauer’s views on the reply to the Soviet note, see telegram 2012, infra.
5. McCloy was holding a luncheon for the U.N. Commission on Mar. 18 at the Schloss Enrich.
6. On Mar. 18 McCloy was informed that the Department of State wished to avoid concentrating the spotlight on the talks in Paris and hence it would be wiser for him to remain at Bonn. He was also advised that the reply to the Soviet note should be free from any suggestion of polemics or propaganda so the draft would contain, perhaps in the first paragraph, only a strong reference to the continuing U.S. policy of European integration. (Telegram 2108 to Bonn, 662A.00/3–1752)