662.001/3–1452: Telegram

No. 67
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

secret

4510. Following is text of draft US reply to Soviet note.2 Comments follow separately.3

  • “1. The Government of the US in examining note of Sov Govt of March 10 has been motivated by desire to bring division of Germany to an end and to conclude lasting and just peace treaty. This has been fundamental objective of US and Western Powers since beginning of occupation. It is obviously an objective which lies close [Page 174] to the hearts of German people. Working in intimate consultation with freely elected spokesmen of the German people in Federal Republic and in Berlin, the US and its Allies have put forward or supported a number of proposals designed to achieve this primary objective in orderly and practical manner.
  • “2. Certainly it is the firmly held position of US Govt that no treaty can be imposed on German people but that the peace terms must be worked out in agreement with representative all-German Govt. The US Govt notes the agreement which Sov Govt has now expressed with this thesis. In the circumstances it is clear that it is premature to talk about the terms of possible peace treaty with Germany. It would indeed be cruelly misleading to engage in discussions of peace treaty until a constituent assembly had completed its work and laid the foundation for formation of an all-German Govt. The US Govt accordingly does not intend to enter into detailed discussion of Sov Govt’s draft at this stage. As regards the Sov Govt’s specific proposals for inclusion in peace treaty, the US Govt notes that the Sov Govt will be ready when the time comes to discuss also other possible proposals in respect of this problem.
  • “3. In this connection the US Govt cannot be reminded of the seven fruitless years of discussion with Sov representatives about an Austrian treaty. It would be an encouraging augury for future discussions about a German treaty if the Sov Govt were to respond favorably to the new proposals for an Austrian treaty contained in the note of US Govt of March 13.
  • “4. It is clear to the Govt of the US that an all-German Govt can only be achieved through the holding of free elections throughout the four zones of Germany and Berlin. If such elections are to be held; adequate conditions of freedom must be created in all zones of Germany now, rather than after the unification of the country. The belief of the US, French and UK Govts and of the Govts of the Federal Republic and of Western Berlin that such conditions of freedom do not obtain in the Sov Zone and in East Berlin has been contested by the Sov Govt. It was precisely to resolve this issue and determine the facts that the GA of UN, at the request of the US and other govts created the Commission to investigate relevant conditions throughout Germany. The Allied High Commission for Germany and the German Authorities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin have agreed to afford this Commission the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its task. The Sov Control Commission and the German Authorities in Sov Zone and in Eastern Berlin have so far declined such facilities. In order to prepare the way for the essential first steps, the Govt of US will accordingly be glad to learn whether the Sov Govt now agrees that the UN [Page 175] Commission should be assisted to fulfill the duties assigned to it by the GA.4
  • “5. The Western Powers and the Federal Republic have repeatedly made concrete proposals for the holding of free and democratic elections throughout Germany under international supervision. The German Federal Parliament has recently enacted an electoral law for all-German elections, which has been communicated to the Chairman of the Sov Control Commission for Germany on Feb 22, 1952.5 None of these proposals was acceptable to the Soviet Gov nor has it made in its note of March 10 any proposals of its own regarding conditions under which all-German elections would be held. It is to be hoped that in the light of the report of the UN Commission—should the Soviet Govt grant it the necessary facilities—this stalemate may be resolved and conditions created which would permit all-German elections to be conducted, supervised and safeguarded.
  • “6. It remains for the US Govt to say that the present note has been prepared not only in full collaboration with the Govts of the UK and France but also after a full exploration with the representatives of the German people in the Govts of the Federal Republic and of Berlin. They, too, look to the Sov Govt for some sign of support for the essential first moves which have been proposed in order to bring about all-German elections.”
Acheson
  1. Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared with President Truman, Bohlen, Perkins, Matthews, and Sargeant. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
  2. Document 65.
  3. Telegram 4525, Document 69.
  4. On Feb. 11 the U.N. Commission To Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany convened at Paris. On Feb. 22, the Commission asked the Allied High Commission and the Soviet Control Commission to arrange meetings in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, respectively, to discuss elections. The Allied High Commission replied on Mar. 1 that it had made the necessary arrangements in the Federal Republic and West Berlin for the period Mar. 15–23, but no reply was ever received from the Soviet Control Commission to this or two subsequent requests. For the texts of the Commission’s letter and the Allied High Commission reply, see Documents on German Unity, vol. II, pp. 55 and 58; for the report of the U.N. Commission on its investigations in the Federal Republic, dated May 1, 1952, see United Nations General Assembly, Document A/2122/Add. 1; an extract from the report is printed ibid., pp. 84–85. Documentation on the work of the Commission is in file 320.11.
  5. For text of the letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, see United Nations General Assembly, Document A/2122/Add. 1, p. 56; for the electoral law drafted by the Bundestag on Feb. 6, see ibid., pp. 44–46.