Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

No. 484
Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, February 15, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

secret
USDEL MIN/10
February 15, 1954
  • Present: The Secretary
  • Special Advisers
  • Advisers

1. Press Reaction

Mr. Tyler reported that the conference had received relatively lighter treatment in the French press. Most papers headlined the fact that the conference would end on Thursday. They described the tight deadlock on the Austrian State Treaty giving sympathetic treatment to the Western position and attributing the deadlock to Soviet intransigence. Most papers commented to the effect that the Soviets will not give ground on any question which might involve withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria or Germany. However, the neutralist Combat appeals to the West to be more patient with Molotov.

[Page 1108]

A review of the French press indicates that the attitudes of the various groups in France, both inside and outside the government, have become more firmly drawn on the question of EDC and Indo-China.

Mr. Boerner said that the Austrian Treaty discussions were the top story in the West German press. The majority of the papers held little hope for a successful outcome of the conference and placed the blame on Molotov for the extreme nature of the Soviet demands. However, the SPD papers are still critical of Adenauer, particularly his efforts to push the EDC, and still see some “positive elements” in Molotov’s proposal for European security.1 One SPD paper even suggested that the problem of German unification should be placed before the UN and concerted effort made to obtain agreement there.

With respect to the East German press, the general coverage of yesterday’s discussions were extraordinarily factual. Mr. Boerner added that he could not recall an instance in the East German press of a more factual reporting on any subject in which the East and the West were directly involved.

Mr. Jackson stated that the U.S. press all emphasized the sudden “surprise move” to achieve the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty. Most papers commented on the high degree of unity among the Western Ministers. The stories filed by the wire services last night all write off the conference as foredoomed to failure because of Molotov’s intransigence.

The Secretary pointed out the relationship of the negotiations on Austria to the German problem. It seemed to him that the experiment in trying to get Soviet agreement on the Austrian Treaty disproves the theory that we could obtain an end to the occupation in Germany or the withdrawal of troops. Even when the West offered the Soviets their own plan for Austria, the Soviets turned it down. The Secretary noted that this was a powerful argument which could be used in connection with German unification issue.

Mr. Boerner then reported that the German press had engaged in mixed reporting as to a possible meeting between the Secretary and Chancellor Adenauer. Some papers had stated that Adenauer plans to come to Berlin to see the Secretary and to make a major speech aimed primarily at the East Germans. Others stated that the Secretary intended to see Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn at the conclusion of the conference. The Secretary remarked that he could shed no light on this particular subject as yet. However, he was concerned regarding the necessity for some statement by the West reassuring the Germans of its continuing interest in Berlin. There [Page 1109] was the danger that unless the West strongly re-affirmed its interests, the disillusionment following the conference might lead to Berlin’s withering on the vine. There then followed a discussion of this problem in which it was noted that the UK and France are vacillating and weak on this point. Efforts at the working level to get French and British agreement to a reaffirmation of the tripartite declaration of March 19522 have been unsuccessful. It was the consensus that we should press the UK and France further on this point and that in the end they would probably agree to a strong statement.

  1. FPM(54)46, Document 516.↩
  2. Presumably a reference to the tripartite Foreign Ministers declaration on Berlin, May 26, 1952, Document 538.↩