Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203
No. 477
Memorandum for the Record, by the
Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)1
February 14, 1954
Mr. Roland de Margerie telephoned to me at 9:30 this morning to say he wished to call urgently to show me a proposal which Mr. Bidault was considering submitting to the Berlin Conference, with respect to Agenda Item 2 (Germany and European Security). Mr. de Margerie had previously spoken to me about this possibility. (See Attachment 1, Memo of Conversation.2)
Accordingly, Mr. de Margerie called on Mr. Merchant and myself at the U.S. Headquarters at 10:15 a.m. and gave us a copy of the French text of the proposal on European Security which Mr. Bidault was thinking of tabling. (Rough translation by U.S. Delegation is Attachment 2). Mr. de Margerie explained that the Molotov proposal on European Security3 had struck no responsive echo in terms of French public opinion, and in fact had had a poor reception. On the other hand, the situation with respect to the French Parliament was quite different, and there was a great deal of insistence that the West take a positive stand with respect to European security rather than simply refuse to accept the Molotov plan.
After we had read the Bidault proposal Mr. de Margerie asked for our reaction. Mr. Merchant and I said we thought the proposal was extremely dangerous on a number of grounds. In the first place, it was not a document which could be just tossed in lightly to the four-power conference, and as far as the United States was concerned, it would require most careful study because there were certain implications, notably in paragraph 4 on page 3 (of unofficial [Page 1094] translation) [which] raised very real constitutional considerations for the United States.
Furthermore, and of great importance, was the fact that Molotov’s proposal on European security had fallen flat in terms of Western opinion, and by inserting a new proposal which was broad and fuzzy in many details, we would risk taking the focus off the fundamental and basic fact that the Molotov proposal was preposterous, thereby injecting some apparently new and different ideas which Molotov would most certainly exploit. For example, he might say there were now two proposals for security and that after the Foreign Ministers left Deputies should meet to reconcile them. This kind of tactic would confuse public opinion, take the heat off the Soviets, and might be extremely difficult for the French, for example, to resist. Since we had all agreed that it would be disastrous in terms of EDC and other policies for the Conference to break up with the work being passed on to Deputies, the Bidault proposal seemed a very bad one.
Mr. de Margerie said while he did not agree with all the reasons we had set forth, he would let Mr. Bidault know our reaction, and it was left that the three Western Ministers themselves would discuss this matter when they met at 3 this afternoon.
Subsequently, Mr. de Margerie called on Sir Frank Roberts, who called me by telephone to tell me that he felt just as strongly as Mr. Merchant and myself that the proposal was dangerous.
The Secretary met with the other two Western Ministers in accordance with arrangements made, and the first item discussed was Mr. Bidault’s security proposal.4 Mr. Bidault opened by saying he understood his proposal had had a very poor reception with both the United States and United Kingdom Delegations, and that in view of this he thought the best thing to do was for him to withdraw the suggestion, and that we should forget about the entire idea. Mr. Eden welcomed this suggestion, as did Secretary Dulles. Accordingly, it was agreed that the proposal would be dropped and that Mr. Bidault would concentrate on making a strong speech at the afternoon session of February 15 when Agenda Item 2 was again to be considered, pointing out the fallacies and illusory character of the Molotov proposal.
[Page 1095]- There are no records for meetings of the U.S. Delegation or the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 14.↩
- This memorandum reported that on Feb. 12 de Margerie had informed MacArthur that Bidault was “toying” with the idea of a new proposal on Germany and European security.↩
- For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.↩
- The three Foreign Ministers met at 3 p.m. in the ACA building. In addition to Bidault’s proposal they also discussed Austria and the announcement of the termination date for the conference. (Memorandum by MacArthur, Feb. 13, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)↩
- Attached to the source text was the French language version.↩