Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

No. 477
Memorandum for the Record, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)1

secret

February 14, 1954

Mr. Roland de Margerie telephoned to me at 9:30 this morning to say he wished to call urgently to show me a proposal which Mr. Bidault was considering submitting to the Berlin Conference, with respect to Agenda Item 2 (Germany and European Security). Mr. de Margerie had previously spoken to me about this possibility. (See Attachment 1, Memo of Conversation.2)

Accordingly, Mr. de Margerie called on Mr. Merchant and myself at the U.S. Headquarters at 10:15 a.m. and gave us a copy of the French text of the proposal on European Security which Mr. Bidault was thinking of tabling. (Rough translation by U.S. Delegation is Attachment 2). Mr. de Margerie explained that the Molotov proposal on European Security3 had struck no responsive echo in terms of French public opinion, and in fact had had a poor reception. On the other hand, the situation with respect to the French Parliament was quite different, and there was a great deal of insistence that the West take a positive stand with respect to European security rather than simply refuse to accept the Molotov plan.

After we had read the Bidault proposal Mr. de Margerie asked for our reaction. Mr. Merchant and I said we thought the proposal was extremely dangerous on a number of grounds. In the first place, it was not a document which could be just tossed in lightly to the four-power conference, and as far as the United States was concerned, it would require most careful study because there were certain implications, notably in paragraph 4 on page 3 (of unofficial [Page 1094] translation) [which] raised very real constitutional considerations for the United States.

Furthermore, and of great importance, was the fact that Molotov’s proposal on European security had fallen flat in terms of Western opinion, and by inserting a new proposal which was broad and fuzzy in many details, we would risk taking the focus off the fundamental and basic fact that the Molotov proposal was preposterous, thereby injecting some apparently new and different ideas which Molotov would most certainly exploit. For example, he might say there were now two proposals for security and that after the Foreign Ministers left Deputies should meet to reconcile them. This kind of tactic would confuse public opinion, take the heat off the Soviets, and might be extremely difficult for the French, for example, to resist. Since we had all agreed that it would be disastrous in terms of EDC and other policies for the Conference to break up with the work being passed on to Deputies, the Bidault proposal seemed a very bad one.

Mr. de Margerie said while he did not agree with all the reasons we had set forth, he would let Mr. Bidault know our reaction, and it was left that the three Western Ministers themselves would discuss this matter when they met at 3 this afternoon.

Subsequently, Mr. de Margerie called on Sir Frank Roberts, who called me by telephone to tell me that he felt just as strongly as Mr. Merchant and myself that the proposal was dangerous.

The Secretary met with the other two Western Ministers in accordance with arrangements made, and the first item discussed was Mr. Bidault’s security proposal.4 Mr. Bidault opened by saying he understood his proposal had had a very poor reception with both the United States and United Kingdom Delegations, and that in view of this he thought the best thing to do was for him to withdraw the suggestion, and that we should forget about the entire idea. Mr. Eden welcomed this suggestion, as did Secretary Dulles. Accordingly, it was agreed that the proposal would be dropped and that Mr. Bidault would concentrate on making a strong speech at the afternoon session of February 15 when Agenda Item 2 was again to be considered, pointing out the fallacies and illusory character of the Molotov proposal.

[Page 1095]

[Attachment]

Proposal by the French Delegation5

secret

Resolution

on the subject of security

The Governments of the United States, of France, of the United Kingdom, and of the U.S.S.R.

Renew the expression of their attachment to collective security,

Reexamine their will to fulfill the obligations which they have assumed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, worldwide security organization, without prejudice to the right granted to each of the members of the organization to participate in defensive regional associations,

Recall that the member States are free to define the extension of such associations, taking into account the community of ideals and of interests which binds them to other peoples, and that they can underwrite, with this in view, with other peace-loving States, all arrangements of a defensive character which appear desirable to them,

Declare their resolve to pursue their efforts within the framework of the United Nations with a view to reaching gradually the truly satisfactory form of collective security which would be constituted by a general disarmament, simultaneous and controlled, which would alone be able to eliminate the military preponderance of any State in Europe,

Recall that the success of certain efforts supposes as a preliminary condition the cessation of hostilities wherever they are taking place.

The four Governments emphasize that an essential element of security would be European settlement through which the free and reconcilable peoples would give back this part of the world to its true destiny which is to divide and not to unite the world.

This settlement in their opinion can only be achieved through stages, of which the first is necessarily the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and of the Austrian State treaty.

They consider that in order to contribute to security and to make impossible the rebirth of militarism, the German settlement must be inspired by the following principles:

[Page 1096]

The peace treaty must not be imposed but negotiated with a government which is representative of the whole of Germany, in no case should the freedom of action of this government have the result of endangering the security of Germany’s neighbors.

The four powers therefore agree to uphold, insofar as they are concerned, the necessity of inserting the following clauses in the German peace settlement:

1.
The four powers undertake to uphold the candidacy of Germany for the United Nations so that she will thereafter be bound by the obligations of Article 2 of the Charter.
2.

Germany shall not have a national army at its disposal. She will be free to furnish a contribution in men and in armaments to a regional defense organization of her own choosing.

The clauses foreseen to this end should, in the opinion of the four powers, include guarantees of an organic character without recourse to coercive controls.

3.

A united Germany shall never take any initiative susceptible of altering the purely defensive character of this organization.

She shall undertake not to have recourse to force in any case whatsoever in order to solve the differences which might arise between her and other States.

4.
In the event that Germany should undertake armed action in violation of the above commitments, the four governments would consider such action as a threat against their own security and would take in common all measures necessary to reestablish peace within the framework of the United Nations.

With regard to the period before the peace treaty, the four governments agree not to subordinate to any preliminary conditions the organization of free elections in order to achieve the rapid formation of a German government.

They note that the maintenance of troops of the four powers in the zones up to the time of the peace treaty renders impossible any action by the German government which might threaten security.

They agree consequently to renounce the usage of exceptional powers borne up with the protection of the security of troops except by unanimous agreement in case of grave threat of internal trouble.

The four governments consider it indispensable to favor the progressive reestablishment among the European countries of normal relations founded on the respect of the individual and of the fundamental rights of the individual.

They consider that the objective to be reached in the long run is the pulling together among these countries of bonds freely entered into and the establishment of relationships which assure the security of all through the rest of the obligations of the Charter.

They emphasize that the creation of a system of European security will have to take into account the fact that certain states of [Page 1097] Europe and especially the three great European powers represented at this Conference have territories or responsibilities outside of Europe.

They consider it necessary not to interfere with security organizations in which there are both European and non-European States.

They affirm that such a system of organization of relations between the European States in which these States could envisage the establishment of common institutions with the aim of making impossible any recourse to force on the part of one of them, must represent the crowning of an effort tending to put an end to the consequences of the war and to stabilize the territorial situation in conditions susceptible of assuring in durable form the pacification of Europe and of the world.

  1. There are no records for meetings of the U.S. Delegation or the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 14.
  2. This memorandum reported that on Feb. 12 de Margerie had informed MacArthur that Bidault was “toying” with the idea of a new proposal on Germany and European security.
  3. For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.
  4. The three Foreign Ministers met at 3 p.m. in the ACA building. In addition to Bidault’s proposal they also discussed Austria and the announcement of the termination date for the conference. (Memorandum by MacArthur, Feb. 13, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)
  5. Attached to the source text was the French language version.