Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF
203
No. 477
Memorandum for the Record, by the
Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)1
secret
Berlin, February 14, 1954.
February 14, 1954
Mr. Roland de Margerie
telephoned to me at 9:30 this morning to say he wished to call
urgently to show me a proposal which Mr. Bidault was considering submitting to the Berlin
Conference, with respect to Agenda Item 2 (Germany and European
Security). Mr. de Margerie had
previously spoken to me about this possibility. (See Attachment 1,
Memo of Conversation.2)
Accordingly, Mr. de Margerie
called on Mr. Merchant and
myself at the U.S. Headquarters at 10:15 a.m. and gave us a copy of
the French text of the proposal on European Security which Mr.
Bidault was thinking of
tabling. (Rough translation by U.S. Delegation is Attachment 2). Mr.
de Margerie explained that
the Molotov proposal on
European Security3 had
struck no responsive echo in terms of French public opinion, and in
fact had had a poor reception. On the other hand, the situation with
respect to the French Parliament was quite different, and there was
a great deal of insistence that the West take a positive stand with
respect to European security rather than simply refuse to accept the
Molotov plan.
After we had read the Bidault
proposal Mr. de Margerie asked
for our reaction. Mr. Merchant and I said we thought the proposal was
extremely dangerous on a number of grounds. In the first place, it
was not a document which could be just tossed in lightly to the
four-power conference, and as far as the United States was
concerned, it would require most careful study because there were
certain implications, notably in paragraph 4 on page 3 (of
unofficial
[Page 1094]
translation)
[which] raised very real constitutional considerations for the
United States.
Furthermore, and of great importance, was the fact that Molotov’s proposal on European
security had fallen flat in terms of Western opinion, and by
inserting a new proposal which was broad and fuzzy in many details,
we would risk taking the focus off the fundamental and basic fact
that the Molotov proposal was
preposterous, thereby injecting some apparently new and different
ideas which Molotov would
most certainly exploit. For example, he might say there were now two
proposals for security and that after the Foreign Ministers left
Deputies should meet to reconcile them. This kind of tactic would
confuse public opinion, take the heat off the Soviets, and might be
extremely difficult for the French, for example, to resist. Since we
had all agreed that it would be disastrous in terms of EDC and other policies for the
Conference to break up with the work being passed on to Deputies,
the Bidault proposal seemed a
very bad one.
Mr. de Margerie said while he
did not agree with all the reasons we had set forth, he would let
Mr. Bidault know our
reaction, and it was left that the three Western Ministers
themselves would discuss this matter when they met at 3 this
afternoon.
Subsequently, Mr. de Margerie
called on Sir Frank Roberts,
who called me by telephone to tell me that he felt just as strongly
as Mr. Merchant and myself
that the proposal was dangerous.
The Secretary met with the other two Western Ministers in accordance
with arrangements made, and the first item discussed was Mr.
Bidault’s security
proposal.4 Mr. Bidault opened by saying he understood his proposal
had had a very poor reception with both the United States and United
Kingdom Delegations, and that in view of this he thought the best
thing to do was for him to withdraw the suggestion, and that we
should forget about the entire idea. Mr. Eden welcomed this suggestion, as
did Secretary Dulles.
Accordingly, it was agreed that the proposal would be dropped and
that Mr. Bidault would
concentrate on making a strong speech at the afternoon session of
February 15 when Agenda Item 2 was again to be considered, pointing
out the fallacies and illusory character of the Molotov proposal.
[Page 1095]
[Attachment]
Proposal by the French Delegation5
Resolution
on the subject of
security
The Governments of the United States, of France, of the United
Kingdom, and of the U.S.S.R.
Renew the expression of their attachment to collective
security,
Reexamine their will to fulfill the obligations which they have
assumed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
worldwide security organization, without prejudice to the right
granted to each of the members of the organization to
participate in defensive regional associations,
Recall that the member States are free to define the extension of
such associations, taking into account the community of ideals
and of interests which binds them to other peoples, and that
they can underwrite, with this in view, with other peace-loving
States, all arrangements of a defensive character which appear
desirable to them,
Declare their resolve to pursue their efforts within the
framework of the United Nations with a view to reaching
gradually the truly satisfactory form of collective security
which would be constituted by a general disarmament,
simultaneous and controlled, which would alone be able to
eliminate the military preponderance of any State in Europe,
Recall that the success of certain efforts supposes as a
preliminary condition the cessation of hostilities wherever they
are taking place.
The four Governments emphasize that an essential element of
security would be European settlement through which the free and
reconcilable peoples would give back this part of the world to
its true destiny which is to divide and not to unite the
world.
This settlement in their opinion can only be achieved through
stages, of which the first is necessarily the conclusion of the
peace treaty with Germany and of the Austrian State treaty.
They consider that in order to contribute to security and to make
impossible the rebirth of militarism, the German settlement must
be inspired by the following principles:
[Page 1096]
The peace treaty must not be imposed but negotiated with a
government which is representative of the whole of Germany, in
no case should the freedom of action of this government have the
result of endangering the security of Germany’s neighbors.
The four powers therefore agree to uphold, insofar as they are
concerned, the necessity of inserting the following clauses in
the German peace settlement:
- 1.
- The four powers undertake to uphold the candidacy of
Germany for the United Nations so that she will
thereafter be bound by the obligations of Article 2 of
the Charter.
- 2.
-
Germany shall not have a national army at its
disposal. She will be free to furnish a contribution
in men and in armaments to a regional defense
organization of her own choosing.
The clauses foreseen to this end should, in the
opinion of the four powers, include guarantees of an
organic character without recourse to coercive
controls.
- 3.
-
A united Germany shall never take any initiative
susceptible of altering the purely defensive
character of this organization.
She shall undertake not to have recourse to force in
any case whatsoever in order to solve the
differences which might arise between her and other
States.
- 4.
- In the event that Germany should undertake armed
action in violation of the above commitments, the four
governments would consider such action as a threat
against their own security and would take in common all
measures necessary to reestablish peace within the
framework of the United Nations.
With regard to the period before the peace treaty, the four
governments agree not to subordinate to any preliminary
conditions the organization of free elections in order to
achieve the rapid formation of a German government.
They note that the maintenance of troops of the four powers in
the zones up to the time of the peace treaty renders impossible
any action by the German government which might threaten
security.
They agree consequently to renounce the usage of exceptional
powers borne up with the protection of the security of troops
except by unanimous agreement in case of grave threat of
internal trouble.
The four governments consider it indispensable to favor the
progressive reestablishment among the European countries of
normal relations founded on the respect of the individual and of
the fundamental rights of the individual.
They consider that the objective to be reached in the long run is
the pulling together among these countries of bonds freely
entered into and the establishment of relationships which assure
the security of all through the rest of the obligations of the
Charter.
They emphasize that the creation of a system of European security
will have to take into account the fact that certain states of
[Page 1097]
Europe and
especially the three great European powers represented at this
Conference have territories or responsibilities outside of
Europe.
They consider it necessary not to interfere with security
organizations in which there are both European and non-European
States.
They affirm that such a system of organization of relations
between the European States in which these States could envisage
the establishment of common institutions with the aim of making
impossible any recourse to force on the part of one of them,
must represent the crowning of an effort tending to put an end
to the consequences of the war and to stabilize the territorial
situation in conditions susceptible of assuring in durable form
the pacification of Europe and of the world.
