Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–354: Telegram

No. 412
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State

top secret

Berlin, February 3, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 80. Far Eastern discussion at informal tripartite Foreign Ministers’ meeting February 3 as follows:¹

All surprised that Molotov has not yet pressed for agreed restricted meeting on Item 1. Eden thought it important we should avoid impression we seek to evade or indefinitely postpone this meeting. Ministers will meet fifth to discuss their substantive position and tactics for meeting, which may be held early next week.² Agreed that each Minister should have maximum of three assistants with him at restricted meeting.

Bidault reported that Molotov has intimated Soviets disposed to use “good offices” as to Indochina, but did not specify what he meant. Bidault told Molotov it should mean degree of Soviet support for French position. Molotov gave no assurances of such support. Bidault’s situation complicated by demands French public. Is obliged to hold out hope of peace in Indochina. Yet he is aware of dangers of seeking conference now, with resultant undermining of morale French expeditionary and Vietnamese forces and impairment position governments of Associated States. He knows that cease-fire now would put French and Vietnamese forces in untenable position.

Secretary mentioned costly nature of operation in Indochina for US as well as France and said US shared earnest hope of France for peace. But we must be certain we do not accept Soviet formula for “peace” in Indochina which would in fact lose war for us. New Communist technique is to capitalize on hopes for peace of war-weary people by putting such high price on agreement to participate in supposed peace conference that Communists have in effect won before conference starts. Then nothing comes of conference.

He said Communists are talking about need for conference to relax world tensions, but first we would be required to accept as a world power Communist China, a principal source of increased tensions. That would be a price far too high to pay for a conference. We do not know what would come out of such conference, but we are entitled to suspect it would be nothing. Molotov had admitted in private conversation after dinner January 29,³ in answer to question from Secretary that he did not think anything could be accomplished at political conference on Korea now.

Secretary asked why should we pay high price for unpromising prospect? As to Indochina, if France and Vietnam should accord any status to Ho Chi Minh, as they were being pressured to do, the will to resist Viet Minh would collapse and war would be lost.

Eden specifically endorsed Secretary’s analysis and Bidault also expressed agreement.

Secretary recalled recent Eden statement that if there is strong likelihood something worth while may come out of a conference, it may be justifiable to make a limited compromise to bring it about. Secretary added that unless one knows what can reasonably be expected from a conference, he can easily make a fool of himself by making costly concessions in order to hold meaningless conference.

1. For another report on this meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur, supra.
2. For a report on the Foreign Ministers meeting on Feb. 5, see Dulte 40, Document 425.
3. For reports on Secretary Dulles’ dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 29, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.