396.1 BE/2–354
No. 411
Memorandum of a Meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, Berlin, February 3, 1954, 11:30 a.m.1
The following agreements were reached at the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting today at Mr. Eden’s house at 11 a.m.2
[Page 941]- 1.
- The three Ministers will meet Friday morning, February 5, at Secretary Dulles’ residence.3 Mr. Eden has a luncheon engagement, but M. Bidault and his associates will remain for luncheon with the Secretary.
- 2.
- Since M. Bidault has already accepted Molotov’s invitation to the concert in East Berlin tomorrow night (Thursday), Mr. Eden and the Secretary agreed they should all appear at the concert so that a solid front would be maintained.
- 3.
- Restricted Meetings:
- a.
- Regarding the restricted meeting proposed last week to examine Agenda Item 1, it was agreed the three Western Foreign Ministers would not raise this subject this afternoon. If Molotov raises it, the Western Ministers would propose the restricted meeting occur on Saturday, February 6, but if Molotov insisted on Friday, they would accept it. In agreeing to such a meeting, it would be made clear that the Conference had not moved on from Agenda Item 2 and that following the restricted meeting, discussion of this item would be resumed, if this seemed desirable.
- b.
- There was some discussion as to whether there should be a restricted meeting on Germany. Mr. Eden seemed to think such a meeting would be necessary at some stage of the game, but Ambassador Conant and Sir Derick Hoyer Millar (and privately two members of the French Delegation) expressed the very greatest reservations, pointing out the effect on German public opinion, the fact that Molotov seemed to damage himself every time he spoke on Germany, and there would be no public reports on what took place in restricted meetings.
- c.
- It was agreed that at restricted meetings the Western Ministers would propose a total of four from each Delegation to attend. That would be, the Foreign Minister accompanied by three of his associates. It was also agreed that the three Ministers could rotate their three assistants in the event different subjects were discussed in the restricted meeting.
- d.
- The Ministers agreed that when a restricted session was held it would be limited to Agenda Item 1 and that in view of the Conference record, the five-power meeting issue would probably be raised first. Subsequently the question of disarmament could be raised with M. Bidault carrying the ball in connection with the latter item.
- 4.
-
Austria
The three Ministers agreed with the recommendation of the Steering Group that it was not desirable to inject the question of Austria into the four-power meeting at this time. When it seems clear that the German item is about to be wound up, it might be appropriate to raise the question and fix a date for the discussions on Austria so that the Austrian Ministers could arrive in time for [Page 942] the opening of discussions on their country. The Steering Group, therefore, will continue to follow this matter.
- 5.
-
Five-power Meeting
There was a discussion by the three Ministers concerning the five-power conference. As indicated above, it was agreed that they must meet before this item was discussed in restricted session, and it was also agreed to meet on Friday morning. M. Bidault said he had, in his conversations with Molotov at dinner4 tried to make clear that if the Soviets were disposed to use their good offices in connection with Indochina, he meant by good offices a degree of Soviet support for the French position. Bidault then said his situation with respect to this item is difficult in light of French opinion. He is obliged to give the French hope that peace will come about in Indochina. At the same time, a conference on Indochina or Southeast Asia cannot be called under circumstances and conditions which would undermine the morale of the French and Associated States military forces in Indochina and also the morale of the governments of the Associated States. This would be to lose the game in advance. Furthermore, since, unlike Korea, there is no front in Indochina, the suspension of hostilities itself presents very real difficulties for France and the Associated States (he did not so state, but implied that the Vietminh would be able to do a great deal of dirty work even if hostilities were suspended).
Secretary Dulles said that the United States particularly wanted peace in Indochina. At the present time, the danger is to accept or fall for Soviet maneuvers which could lose the war in Indochina in the immediate future. The Soviets are maneuvering to capitalize on the natural desire for peace and peaceful solutions everywhere of existing tensions and hostilities by suggesting new conferences on which they put a very high price. The danger is to pay the price for such a conference if there is not a certainty that something will come out of it. As it is now, the Soviets ask for the price to be paid, and when they receive payment they have given up nothing and are under no compulsion to do anything constructive in a conference. Indeed, they are under no compulsion even to have one.
Specifically, the danger in Indochina is that if the Associated States believe a conference is being held which will result in Ho Chi Minh coming to power, their resistance to the Vietminh may collapse, and the USSR and Chinese Communists will have won a major victory before a conference has even been firmly agreed. Therefore, if we do not know that there is a strong probability of something constructive coming out of the conference from the [Page 943] point of view of our own interests, we should be very wary about agreeing to it or paying any price whatsoever for it.
- Drafted by MacArthur.↩
- For a further report on the Foreign Ministers discussion of the Far Eastern question, see Secto 80, infra.↩
- For a report on this meeting, see Dulte 40, Document 425.↩
- For a report on Bidault’s dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 26, see the memorandum by Bohlen, Document 361.↩