Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–3054: Telegram

No. 390
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, January 30, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 56. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes January 30 meeting Bidault presiding:²

Bidault opened the meeting by recalling that at the end of previous session no agreement had been reached on Soviet proposal to invite representatives of governments in Western and Eastern Germany to appear together at meeting. He asked whether conclusion could be reached on this point. Eden and Molotov maintained their previous positions. Secretary said he maintained views he had previously expressed in opposition to Soviet proposal. He pointed out Federal Government, which is freely elected government of 50 million Germans, had expressed no desire to be represented and that Bundestag had voted that only representatives of freely elected all-German government should appear at such meeting. Bidault repeated views he had expressed in previous meeting in opposition to Soviet proposal and concluded that there was no agreement on this point.

Eden requested views of other delegations on proposal regarding elections he had tabled in previous session.³ Molotov said he would only make preliminary statement on Eden proposal, since it required detailed study.⁴ He said that he wished to know what views of other delegations were on Eden proposal and whether they would submit proposals regarding Germany.

Molotov said exchanges of notes prior to conference⁵ had indicated importance attached by Western Governments to question of so-called free elections which were subject of Eden proposal. Soviet Government also attached importance to free all-German elections, but its views in this regard did not coincide with those of Western Powers. Eden plan suffered from defect that elections would be turned over to occupation authorities. Plan showed distrust of democratic forces and too much concern with supervision of preparations and carrying out of elections by foreign powers. This he said was matter for Germans whose opinion should be sought, which Eden proposal did not provide for.

Molotov said position of all-German government which would emerge from elections proposed under Eden proposal was not clear, particularly whether it would be truly free both in internal and external matters. He referred to provision that all-German government would have authority to assume international rights and obligations of Federal Republic and Soviet Zone and to conclude such other international agreements as it might wish. This would retain Bonn and Paris agreements⁶ in force and extend them to East Germany against wishes of population represented by the GDR. It was hardly possible, he said to speak of a Germany which is truly free in the light of bland assumption in Eden plan that all-German government would not be free to decide whether these agreements would remain in force. In fact, Bonn agreement would continue occupation for decades and Paris agreement would tie Germany to military chariot of certain powers for 50 years. This provided freedom for German militarists but not for German people.

Molotov said that after all-German elections Germany should not be committed by agreements to associate itself with any particular group of powers and that Germany should embark on peaceful and democratic path free to decide external as well as internal policy. Four powers should see to it that Germany is reborn as united, independent, democratic and peace-loving state. Such a truly free Germany would not be a threat to her neighbors, but would play role as a great power among peace-loving states of Europe. He concluded by saying that when he next spoke he would set forth views of Soviet delegation on German problem and submit proposal.

Secretary then made statement text of which has been telegraphed separately.⁷

After brief intermission⁸ Bidault spoke for about half hour on German question much along lines Secretary’s speech.⁹ He stressed following points:

(1) Although there is close relationship between questions Germany and European security German question came first for solution that question would contribute to second.

(2) French Government always looked toward general European settlement. Molotov erred in stating that division Europe would result from establishment EDC. Exactly the opposite. EDC conceived only after creation Eastern bloc. But we not searching for causes this situation but for remedy.

(3) Destiny of Germany depends on peace treaty rapidly concluded which would establish basis lasting peace. Potsdam merely covered probationary period for Germany which cannot be prolonged. Peace treaty must be freely accepted by Germany and freely negotiated with German representatives. Imposed peace out of question. Bidault then fully backed United Kingdom plan German reunification in freedom.

(4) Peace treaty must assure durable peace. But there cannot be indefinite controls in Germany. Soviets maintain Germany can never join any coalition or military alliance directed against any power which waged war against Germany. Army would be limited. Such clauses in treaty without guarantees cannot be considered as forceful as EDC with all its controls. If Soviet proposals accepted real danger exists Germany being dominated militants. Controls and discriminations from outside would breed nationalism and militarism. We need new solution for Germany—formula of association which would make impossible individual revengeful German action.

(5) West and East occupational authorities have fulfilled their tasks. Time has come for new regime. Two different systems exist. That precisely why German people should be asked to decide their future. We in general agree Eden’s plan for it provides unity in freedom.

Eden then assured Molotov that his plan, upon coming into force peace treaty, guaranteed full freedom to Germany in her external relations and that Germany would not be bound in any way by formal commitments either to East or West.

Meeting then adjourned with agreement convene February 1, 3 p.m., Soviet sector under the chairmanship Molotov.

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixth plenary meeting, USDEL PLEN/6, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193.
3. For the British proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.
4. For Molotov’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)20 in the records of the conference, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 61–64, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 45–47.
5. For text of the notes exchanged between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union in the summer and fall of 1953, see Documents 65 ff.
6. For documentation on the agreements signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Documents 51 ff. Regarding the agreements signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 684.
7. Secto 55, infra.
8. For a record of Thurston’s conversation with Semyenov during the intermission, see the memorandum of conversation, Document 392.
9. For Bidault’s statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)19, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 67–71, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 42–45.