Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–2554: Telegram

No. 349
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Berlin, January 25, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 15. Pass OSD. Following is résumé meeting January 24, three Foreign Ministers Conant’s residence:²

1. Secretary General’s Report

Secretary General Bromley of Western Secretariat was asked give report on status technical arrangements concerning passes, press, recording of minutes and agreed decisions, etc. Noted insistence Soviet opposite number that flags in conference room be arranged in reverse of customary clockwise order of rotation of chairman and seating. Three Foreign Ministers suggested interior flags be eliminated as solution possible Soviet effort to lay foundation for counter clockwise rotation at table which would entitle Molotov to opening speech if Secretary in chair at first meeting.³

2. Outline of Bidault’s proposed opening statement

Bidault outlined in general terms opening statement, which it is agreed he should make tomorrow’s first meeting, along following lines:

(a) We come to meeting with open mind, ready to understand each other and hope for concrete results. We desire not to be polemical because we have respect for everyone here. We assume mutual respect and faithfulness traditional friendships.

(b) We will be discussing matters of grave importance; they are not new but until now we have failed to reach agreement on them. Very fact of this conference can contribute to results, although conference itself not enough. We believe it will be useful to deal with these problems within the correct framework.

(c) Recent offer by US President⁴ has universal implications. We have no illusions, however, as to difficulties involved. French attitude regarding Soviet proposals toward control of armaments well known. This is unchanged. Examination this problem while hostilities still going on anywhere premature. UN normal place handle this problem.

(d) Asiatic problems should be considered in normal framework. They should not be mixed with other problems. This conference for European affairs. We are here for Europe. It would be bad for us to try to strike bargains between the European and Asiatic situations. If necessary to discuss the latter, let’s have another conference on Asia.

(e) As to Europe, we are trying to unite not divide it. Division of Europe has led to situation where defensive alignments had to be set up. Strictly defensive in character, they are aimed at no one. They have defensive goals. We do not wish to negotiate on the defense efforts of our peoples. We are motivated by our understanding of the legitimate security requirements of all, including Soviets. We are interested in mutual security and not separate national security.

(f) Reference will then be made to Austrian problem along familiar lines.

(g) Regarding Germany, we are trying to establish a peace treaty. For this purpose we need an all-German government and thus free elections and the necessary conditions therefor. Our objective is the peace treaty. Such treaty should not be based on vengeance or imposition of controls. We must avoid consequences of the first world war. There are two paths to a solution, coercion or association. History shows error of first path, hence need for system of defense to prevent aggression by means of association. As to suggestions regarding German neutrality, this would tend to make Germany an umpire rather than one of the players. Our goal is not to use Germany as an instrument in a policy of strength but to include it in a league of free peoples of the West.

(h) Bidault will conclude speech with what he calls certain “French shadings” and by general remarks on the conditions of peace and avoidance of war.

(i) He characterized the approach embodied in this speech as devoid of polemics, flexible, and low pitched.

Secretary and Eden complimented Bidault on his presentation and Secretary said that any minor suggestions he might have would be passed on privately. He also emphasized need to avoid any leaks to public re nature of speech until delivery.

3. Discussion of procedure re other speeches at opening meeting

On assumption he would be second speaker, Eden indicated he had in mind talking in general terms about our plan for free elections in Germany. Although it was not intended to table specific plan for free elections, Eden thought speech dealing with subject would introduce something concrete into discussion.

There was a discussion of the time which would be required for the delivery of the French and British speeches and the possibility Molotov might also wish to make opening statement tomorrow. Eden and Bidault both indicated desire, if Molotov should speak, for US also give opening statement tomorrow. Possibility that Molotov would insist on equality of right to make opening remarks on first day and also might wish present specific agenda proposals was discussed. It was agreed that when Secretary sees Molotov before meeting tomorrow (see separate telegram⁵), he would sound him out regarding these matters.

4. Western agenda

I agreed that our optimum agenda would be that contained in Paris tripartite group report.⁶

5. Austria

It was agreed Secretary’s suggestion that various unagreed points regarding Austria (article 35, neutrality, security guarantees, Austrian military forces) would be discussed by tripartite committee experts set up yesterday’s meeting (see paragraph 4, Secto 12⁷).

6. Declaration of intent

It was agreed that this project should be reviewed by tripartite expert committee.

7. HICOMer report on discussion with Blankenhorn

British HICOMer reported to Foreign Ministers that we had outlined earlier in day to Blankenhorn reasons why we did not find it possible to accept latest German proposals re Volkspolizei and Soviet Zone elections.⁸ Blankenhorn seemed to take our negative attitude calmly and indicated these matters had not been given full consideration on German side and had not been cleared with Foreign Relations Committee of Bundestag.

Blankenhorn emphasized desire Adenauer be informed daily re conference developments and was informed that every such effort would be made. Bidault thought daily briefings might be impracticable or unnecessary.

British HICOMer also reported decision to give reply to Adenauer’s letter of January 18 to Blankenhorn tomorrow evening.⁹

No tripartite meeting set for tomorrow.

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow; transmitted in two sections.
2. The meeting took place at 4:30 p.m. on Jan. 24.
3. Representatives of the four delegations held three meetings, Jan. 18–20, to resolve questions dealing with the administration, communication, security, and press for the Foreign Ministers Conference. Minutes for these meetings are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, “Meeting of Experts in Preparation for the Conference”.
4. See footnote 2, Document 326.
5. In Secto 13 from Berlin, Jan. 24, the U.S. Delegation reported that Molotov had agreed to meet Secretary Dulles one-half hour before the opening of the conference to discuss the procedural arrangements for the first meeting. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, “Sectos and Tosecs”)

6. The agenda in the Tripartite Working Group Report read:

   • “(A) Problems of German Unity
   • “(B) Austrian State Treaty
   • “(C) The Problem of Security in Europe
   • “(D) Other Matters”. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 178)

7. Document 347.
8. The U.S. Delegation reported on the meeting with Blankenhorn, substantially along the lines indicated here, in Secto 14 from Berlin, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)
9. Not identified further.