Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–2154: Telegram

No. 340
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Berlin ¹

secret

Bonn , January 21, 1954—8 p.m.

457. Berlin for US Delegation. In course of conversation January 21, Brentano, CDU faction leader, volunteered following comments on Chancellor’s position on tactics for Berlin conference:

“Although no one in coalition disagrees with Chancellor that Federal Republic should not be sacrificed until replaced by all-German Government which is free to act and capable of doing so, including capacity continue policy of close cooperation with West, there is serious disagreement over Chancellor’s approach to conference. Main characteristic Chancellor’s position is excessive caution, which has led to proposals so complicated they could be understood neither by public nor Bundestag leaders and which were open to interpretation as indications Chancellor’s preference for EDC over idea of German unity at this time. Almost whole CDU faction is opposed Chancellor’s position on Volkskammer elections, veto right on transfer of powers to all-German Assembly, and continued existence separate east zone government, but as long as issue remains merely theoretical one, their loyalty to him will prevent public criticism. Faction favors clear and simple policy which can be understood by public, i.e., genuinely free elections to lead to all-German government which from outset has complete freedom of action internally (within limits of contractuals as minimum) and in foreign affairs.

“There is, of course, little chance that Soviets would accept such a program but if it began to appear more possible, Chancellor would undoubtedly quickly shift his ground and lead movement in direction outlined above. If Soviets ever actually prepared accept free elections this alone would amount to such complete revolution in their policy that it would mean they were also in fact prepared relinquish all control over east zone Volkspolizei and SED apparatus would have disintegrated even before elections during election campaign.

“Extra elections for Volkskammer at same time as all-German elections or later completely unnecessary, as are recent government demands for pre-election reduction of Volkspolizei though latter not bad propaganda issue. There would be many ways cope with problem of governing Soviet zone in event Soviet agreement on free elections. For example, one could imagine that all-German Assembly would establish committee to temporarily administer area by means of ordinances on basis basic law until new all-German constitution adopted, while Federal Republic remained intact as administrative unit.

“If Soviets should bring up question of withdrawal of occupation troops as topic which must be negotiated before all-German elections take place, it would be best if West would refuse discuss problem in these terms but rather seek to turn edge of Soviet attack by insisting that only all-German Assembly could decide on such questions, since it is policy of West to demand freedom of all-German Government to decide which foreign troops it wanted on its territory and where they should be stationed as part of general freedom this government should have. If pressed, Western powers could concede withdrawal to Wesser in order create troop-free area in central Germany if Soviets would go to Oder-Neisse. In no case should US agree to withdraw its troops.

“West should have no fears about outcome of elections, provided they were really free—and Germans are united in their understanding of what free elections really are. Coalition leaders expect a high majority for Chancellor, much higher than in federal elections if all-German elections were to be held, and Chancellor’s fears about composition all-German Assembly groundless, all the more if selection of candidates took place as now planned with each Federal Republic (and DDR) party drawing up single list of candidates for all of Germany. Certain risks are connected with every change, but risks for West and for Adenauer, if Soviets actually permitted free elections, would be infinitesimal.”

In subsequent conversations, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gerstenmaier took identical line. He too ascribed Chancellor’s “overly cautious” approach, latter’s nervousness over potential dangers of conference for Germany and his desire to counter them all in advance even though this could lead to breakup of four power meeting.

In our opinion, general tone taken by Brentano in conversation represents feelings of majority of coalition on this subject. Main reason there is not more visible coalition dissatisfaction with Chancellor’s present course, is, we believe, as Brentano states it: At present issue is regarded as so theoretical that it is not considered worth-while provoke Chancellor’s displeasure or give public proof of important rift in CDU and coalition at time when unity of approach necessity for Germans. Nevertheless, Ministers Tillmanns and Kaiser, State Secretary Thedieck and faction whip Krone (all CDU) have privately expressed views almost identical with those of Brentano and Gerstenmaier. Of course, SPD also following this line, together with majority FDP and large number government officials who feel Chancellor unnecessarily jeopardizing his prestige by present course, (e.g., Grewe’s position on east zone elections as reported Bonn’s telegram 2323 to Department, 376 London, 468 Paris, 447 Berlin, 20 January²). These points might be taken into account in deciding accept or reject Chancellor’s position in its entirety for incorporation Western powers tactical plan at Berlin.

Conant

1. Repeated to Paris and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Telegram 2323 reported that a meeting with Grewe on Jan. 20 had been generally inconclusive since Grewe had not had an opportunity to discuss the tripartite position on all-German elections, the status of an all-German Government, and tactics for the Berlin Conference with Hallstein and Chancellor Adenauer. In particular Grewe had refused to commit himself on whether the reduction of the number of Soviet Zone police was a precondition for all-German or Eastern Zone elections. (396.1 BE/1–2054)