Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “S/P Papers—Jan.–Feb. 1954”

No. 339
Paper Prepared by Jacob Beam of the Policy Planning Staff¹

secret

[Washington,] January 20, 1954.

Briefing Paper on Prospects for Berlin Conference

The Conference developed from Churchill’s hints that the West probe the intentions of the new Soviet leaders.² These hints were seized upon by the French who insisted that before they could ratify the EDC, a serious effort must be made to reach an accommodation with the Russians on Germany. For both sides the French position will be the critical point at the forthcoming conference.

It was obvious that after the June 17 events³ the Soviets would be most reluctant to seriously discuss German affairs. Our principal achievement to date is that we have forced them into a position where such a discussion at some stage is unavoidable. We can face them with the issue of free elections; their acceptance would mean abandonment of a communist regime for the first time, that in Eastern Germany; should they seek an alternative advantage in a plausible plan for unification, their credit is so low as to invite skepticism and exposure. The Russians, however, will try to becloud the issue by placing emphasis on their concept of European security and by a proposal for five-power talks to settle Far Eastern problems. They will try at all costs to forestall a clear-cut decision by delay.

Judging from the Soviet notes⁴ and Malenkov’s August 8 speech,⁵ the Russians will probably play two gambits—the French and the German, with stress probably on the first. The French gambit will be: Russia is willing to develop a European security system based on a “normalization” of bilateral relations and trade expansion, and on an exchange of bilateral security assurances where desired. The Franco-Soviet alliance should be built on. Thus there will be no need for the NATO military coalition. The solution must be purely European in character. U.S. bases which are obviously aimed at Russia must be withdrawn. France would forfeit great power status in EDC which would be dominated by Germany and which Germany would use to involve Europe in new adventures.

The Russian gambit on Germany may take some such form as this: The Western Germans must know that their entry into EDC will permanently prevent German reunification. The Soviet Government is now prepared to take the following steps: East and West German representatives should attend the conference to express their views. Since unification may take some time to complete, the East and West German Governments should meet together to form a provisional authority capable of consulting with the four powers on peace terms. This authority should establish conditions of free elections without foreign interference, since this is purely a German affair. In the meantime occupation costs must be immediately reduced and foreign debts cancelled. Under the peace treaty occupation forces would be withdrawn; united Germany must join no bloc but should have an army adequate for defense; its economy should be uncontrolled except for the production of war material.

In short the Russians will work toward a neutralized Germany. Although they have recently concealed their intent, They doubtless envisage some kind of four-power control over Germany in the peace treaty. If a dead-lock is reached the Russians may offer, as an alternative to continued division, an “Austrian solution” for Germany. Under this the present barriers would be removed and the East and West German Governments would be encouraged to work out some kind of united authority. Occupation forces would remain and four-power control would be reinstituted.

As to Austria itself, the Russians will probably be willing to discuss the state treaty, despite their recent reluctance. They are unlikely, however, to agree to a settlement until a solution is found for Germany.

The Russians would count upon their five-power conference proposal, which they say they will introduce, to serve several purposes: first, to encourage the French to believe that a solution can be found for Indochina; secondly, to divide the Western allies in their respective attitudes toward communist China; and thirdly, to gain favor with the Chinese, possibly in return for a commitment from them to insist on Soviet participation in the Korean political conference.

Our endeavor will be to help the French to face up to their own decisions, avoiding insofar as possible any appearance of U.S. domination or interference. The French must find out for themselves that EDC offers them greater security than a Germany united on even the most liberal Soviet terms. At best these would make Germany a source of continued rivalry between East and West; Germany would be left sufficient initiative to provoke such rivalry, the more so as it would rebel against any imposed restraints. By probing, the French and Germans must be convinced that the Russians probably have no intention of agreeing to free elections or of totally abandoning their stake in Eastern Germany.

On the positive side, we will emphasize that the division of Germany must be repaired in the interest of peace and justice toward Germany. A role must be found for a united Germany which best serves European security. Past experience has shown that it is dangerous to hold Germany down by dictated terms and crippling servitudes. It must voluntarily accept the same restrictions on its actions as other nations are willing to assume for the maintenance of peace.

While we will not initially confront the Russians with acceptance of EDC, we will stress that security can best be obtained by Germany’s association with a community devoted by self-interest to the maintenance of peace. A constructive relationship between France and Germany must be found in order that one source of war can be eliminated. The type of association should be one in which Germany must depend upon its partners for prosperity and protection. There should be collective responsibility for the prevention of aggression. The opportunity should be offered Germany to participate in a community which by the nature of its mutually accepted engagements and organization itself would make it unprofitable and impossible for any one country to break the peace. Russia’s security would be assured through any system, based on the principles of the UN Charter, which included Germany as a member and which through collective action and conscience made it certain that no act of aggression could be committed by any partner within or without the confines of the community.

We will say that the first step is to enable the German people freely to decide the form of the institutions under which they choose to live and to determine the role which Germany by its own free will is best suited to play in the community. It is essential that our first consultation with all the German people be through the holding of free elections and the observance of human rights. A democratic government for all of Germany should be established which would be able to join the four powers at an appropriate stage in the drafting of a peace treaty.

We will not deal with the question of five power discussions until this is raised by the Soviets. We will oppose the suggestion on the grounds that the projected Korean political conference is the proper place to start any discussion of Far Eastern problems. We will endeavor to hold the French in line with respect to any overtures on Indochina.

We will insist that the Austrian treaty be concluded apart from the question of Germany and we will reject the introduction by the Soviets of extraneous issues or a proposal that Austrian neutrality be stipulated in the treaty.

Our probing action is likely to be as tedious as the Soviet methods are devious. The Russians will try to protect themselves against any final break. They may propose that since this conference has not achieved results, a further meeting be held within a few months time. We will guard ourselves against any such excuse for further delay.

1. The source text bears the notation “Prepared by JB for Secretary’s presentation to NSC mtg 1/21/54”. For a record of Secretary Dulles’ presentation to the NSC, see the memorandum of discussion, Document 343. Copies of this paper were also sent to Bowie, Murphy, MacArthur, and Merchant.
2. Reference is to Churchill’s proposal for a four-power meeting with the Soviet Union; see footnote 3, Document 186.
3. For documentation on the uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Germany beginning June 16, see Documents 713 ff.
4. For text of the Soviet notes, exchanged with the three Western powers during the summer and fall of 1953, see Documents 257 ff.
5. For extracts from Malenkov’s speech on Aug. 8, 1953, to the Supreme Soviet, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 22 ff.