Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

611.00/7–2753: Telegram

No. 208
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

top secret

Bonn, July 27, 1953.

327. Eyes only for the Secretary. In replying to your circ 53, July 23,¹ I should like to emphasize first of all that the German reaction to the U.S. is at the present heavily conditioned by the forthcoming election. The SPD leaders cannot help regretting the obvious fact that the U.S. Government has taken actions which help Adenauer’s election and some are inclined to be bitter on this point. Comments by American newspaper correspondents to the effect that United States is actively assisting Adenauer’s campaign by such means as insisting on postponing any four-power conference until late September may have intensified feeling. Since the vast majority of organized labor is in SPD camp this aspect of the campaign is unfortunate but inevitable. Apparently the Chancellor is not worried about the possibility that the opposition will throw in his face the fact that he is clearly the candidate favored by both the British and American Governments. Nevertheless we are officially, of course, doing all we can here to preserve neutrality in this campaign. The small neutralist party is attacking the United States along well-known lines as war-mongers. Right splinter parties with strong nationalist views are attacking the United States as an occupation power while certain SPD leaders, particularly in Berlin, are criticizing the United States together with France and Great Britain for not being active enough in support of the demonstrators in the East Zone. When pressed for an answer to the question, “What would you have us do?” there are no concrete proposals and the magic words “four-power talks at the highest level” are certain to be uttered. In general, however, I would say there was no widespread distrust of the U.S. Government motives and much real gratitude for the economic help of the past. There is further recognition of the military protection now afforded by U.S. troops and almost everyone wishes them to remain in spite of the inevitable difficulties about housing and the uneasy relations with the civilian population.

Comparing the situation today with what I understand it was last December, one can say that there has been no loss of confidence in the U.S. Government since six months ago the SPD leaders were declaring the new administration was going to abandon the EDC treaties. The strong adherence to the EDC and EPC particularly as recently emphasized by the three Foreign Ministers, has impressed the Germans even those who are in the opposition. On the other hand, the long delay and the apparent uncertainty about the position of the French have made some people skeptical about the future.

What misgivings there are in Germany about the present administration are the consequences of the publicity given to disagreements between Congress and the Executive branch. Such misgivings could become serious because the Germans do not understand the American system of government. To them orderly government is of great importance and they associate signs of disagreement and disorder with revolutionary troubles. Hence their frequent attempts to equate Senator McCarthy with an incipient Hitler. To some degree their public apprehension about the clashes between Congress and the Executive represent a delight in pointing out that the Americans are not as freedom loving or democratic or tolerant as they have made themselves out to be as an occupation power bent on reforming Germany. For the future, however, a minimizing of the public criticism by Congressional leaders of the present administrative officers and repeated public demonstrations that the executive is in control of both executive functions and over-all policy will be necessary to convince the thoughtful Germans that the U.S. Government today is a strong government. This is particularly true in regard to foreign policy, including making the slogan “trade not aid” a reality since the Germans want trade not aid (except for the special case of Berlin).

If in the next six months the EDC treaties are ratified and German rearmament begins in this framework, the U.S. will be in a very strong position of leadership in Germany barring unforeseen moves by the Russians. On the other hand, as most Germans believe we are in a position to force the French and Italians to ratify, a collapse of the EDC policy will be blamed on the U.S. primarily. After EDC ratification leadership will be expected on German reunification but for the time being most people outside of the SPD are probably satisfied with our position.

James B. Conant

1. In circular 53 the Secretary asked the Ambassadors in 11 NATO countries and Austria and Germany for their frank confidential estimate and views on how the United States was regarded by the public and the governments in the countries to which they were accredited. (611.00/7–2353) For the response from the Embassy in Austria, see Document 878. Responses from the 11 NATO countries are scheduled for publication in volume vi.