Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

611.63/7–3053: Telegram

No. 878
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State

secret

Vienna, July 30, 1953—8 p.m.

270. Limit distribution. Department circular 53.¹ Unquestionably confidence of Austrian Government and people in US leadership was shaken by developments early part this year. Principal causes were following:

1. Exaggerated reports both US and Austrian press of such matters as Congressional investigations, purge USIS² libraries, etc. Kaghan case³ had particularly unfortunate repercussions in Austria where he was well-known by virtually all top officials government as vigorous and effective anti-Communist. Socialists particularly sensitive these developments as tending confirm their fears new US administration would follow policies opposed to liberal concepts Austrian socialism. Both Austrian political parties tend interpret foreign events in terms sharp class and occupational divisions prevailing in Austrian politics. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Kreisky recently informed me there had been serious discussions in top social circles as to whether party could continue follow US leadership in view these developments. Believe situation now seen at least in government circles in more true perspective.

2. Scepticism with which our official announcements and propaganda greeted each move Soviet peace offensive caused many of less politically sophisticated to doubt whether US genuinely wished arrive at settlement with Soviet Union. This feeling reinforced by Attlee’s outburst,⁴ reluctance agree four power talks, etc. Many Austrian officials on other hand more concerned lest US deceived by Soviet moves and make deal at Europe’s expense. To the extent domestic and other considerations allow, I am convinced our propaganda and official statements should place more emphasis on welcoming and encouraging further Soviet moves toward detente in East-West relations. Gruber recently remarked that we should be careful not to provide the excuse for a reversal of Soviet policy, which he believes will eventually occur. Effect on public opinion would be serious if Communists could successfully maintain that Soviet efforts to reach accommodation had been rebuffed.

3. There is in Austria underlying doubt of our ability maintain continuity in our basic international policies. This based more on historical than recent events, although emphasis on foreign affairs in election campaign stimulated these misgivings. These are being allayed as the outlines of the policies of the new administration are becoming clear.

4. Strain of long occupation and accumulated resentment at what some Austrians regard as undue interference in their economic affairs without sufficient regard for political consequences of our actions have made Austrians fretful. This exacerbated by extent of our East-West trade controls. The increasing intensity of these controls has been cause for serious concern among agricultural, industrial and organized labor groups as well as Austrian Government. Diminished Austrian trade with East and simultaneous difficulties finding West markets in country heavily dependent upon international trade is subject of continued Communist press attacks but also of thoughtful analyses in non-Communist press. While Austrian Government cooperation on East-West controls has been remarkably good in past, I believe simplification and reduction in number of items subject to quantitative control essential for the accomplishment of basic objectives of program.

5. Closely related to growing resentment at overly rigid and broad scope East-West controls is question repeatedly put to us by Austrians as why US simultaneously continues adhere to restrictive import policy that handicaps Austrian ability to earn needed dollars. Reduction in East-West trade has forced Austria to find import supplies and export outlets elsewhere with greatly increased dependence upon dollar area for imports of commodities formerly obtained in East Europe. The problem becomes increasingly acute as MSA dollar grants to Austria diminish. US is criticized for advocating and even pressing Europeans for liberalization of trade while not practicing that philosophy itself.

While factors listed have caused us serious preoccupation, basic confidence in US democracy and leadership is intact, Austria would be one of last countries in Europe to be deceived by Soviet tactics and while Soviet peace offensive has doubtless caused much soul searching and while they will understandably endeavor to exploit situation to their advantage, net effect in my opinion has been to increase Austrian determination remain firmly attached to West.

I have received categoric assurances to this effect from President Koerner as well as the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor.

Thompson

1. Circular telegram 53 asked the Ambassadors in 11 NATO countries and Austria and Germany for their frank confidential estimate and views on how the United States was regarded by the public and government in the countries to which they were accredited. (611.00/7–2353) For the reply to this circular telegram from Bonn, see Document 208.
2. U.S. Information Service.
3. Theodore Kaghan, Deputy Chief of the Public Affairs Office, HICOG, was accused of being soft on communism in April 1953. After appearances before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Government Operations Committee, in which he denied the accusations, Kaghan resigned in May 1953.
4. Presumably a reference to former Prime Minister Attlee’s speech before the House of Commons on May 12, 1953, in which he criticized the United States and its foreign policy. For text, see H. C. Deb 5s, vol. 515, cols. 1061–1071.