Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Germany”

No. 205
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State

top secret
eyes only for the secretary

Bad Godesberg, July 17, 1953.

Dear Foster: I am venturing to send you this personal letter for whatever use you may care to make of it. It is a report on the first reactions here in Germany to the results of the three Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington.¹ It includes some reflections of my own about the future.

The general press response has been favorable though perhaps not enthusiastic. Each paper reflects to some degree the tensions of the coming electoral campaign. But there can be no doubt that the Chancellor has scored a considerable political advantage and for the time being at least has fairly well spiked the Opposition’s claim that he was not doing all he could to bring about German unification. I think everyone must admire the skillful way in which he has turned the flank of the SPD. While some of us here were very skeptical about the wisdom of Blankenhorn’s visit,² there can be no question that as events turned out it was very useful to the Chancellor. It was played up by the newspapers as being an important part of the Chancellor’s plan to be sure he was fully consulted, and through Blankenhorn he is said to have influenced the outcome of the Conference.

The SPD leaders still believe that the Chancellor is only paying lip service to German unification. Mayor Reuter at lunch here today referred obliquely to a widespread opinion in his party (SPD) by saying there never would be German reunification until Germany had a leader who really wanted it. R. Maier of Stuttgart made a heavy attack on the Chancellor along the same lines, bringing in the religious issue at a party conference in spite of the fact that his party (FDP) is in the Coalition. Nevertheless we in this office doubt if this type of electioneering will prove very effective in view of the Chancellor’s present public stand for four-power talks (the phrase has become a magic word in Germany).

Much depends on the Soviet’s reply, of course, which you will undoubtedly have before this letter reaches you. If Moscow asks for an immediate four-power talks, the SPD leaders will pick up this point for Ollenhauer has already criticized the Washington communiqué³ for postponing the talks until after the German elections. I assume the reply would be that since the three powers must consult with the Government of the Federal Republic they would not be in a position to do so until the election had determined what the composition of the Government would be. The SPD would have some difficulty meeting this argument, I think, but the possibility of such a Soviet offer has seemed to us here a real danger. Indeed, it was with this danger in mind that I put forward my proposal that the East Zone had to be freed first before a four-power conference met to work out the details of an all-German election.

While I still think my proposal was less risky than the Chancellor’s, there is no doubt that if the Washington conference had expressed some such view, the SPD Opposition would have attacked it vigorously. Whether the Chancellor could have disassociated himself from the outcome by stating he had urged a four-power meeting is now a purely academic question. The French, I judge, were even more insistent on the magic words than the Chancellor.

One of the factors that seems to have influenced the Chancellor in his rather complete reversal on four-power talks is the persistent rumor that the Soviets are going to make a bold offer in regard to German reunification. The form in which the story usually comes is that the Soviets will offer reunification through the road of free elections provided the coming Federal elections are postponed, and provided the actions of the Federal Republic in regard to treaties and international agreements are to have no binding effect on a subsequent German Government. I would suppose it would not be difficult to answer such a proposal for I would doubt if the SPD would be willing to join in asking for a postponement of the Federal elections which would only be done by a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag amending the Constitution. Of course, if the Soviets offered immediate desovietization of the East Zone, that would be a different story.

Leading members of almost all parties seem to be in agreement that the events of June 17 in the Soviet Zone are such as to make the Russians more willing to withdraw from the German commitments. Put in other words, the price they will ask for unification has been lowered but I doubt if it is low enough as yet to make real negotiations a possibility. It would be my own view that the troubles in the East Zone will continue and that the Russian price will continually decrease until a point comes when reunification and European integration are not antithetical doctrines.

If I may say so, I thought the way the EDC Treaty was handled in the communiqué was excellent, though of course most of us here wished that the French would have gone along with a stronger statement. I am planning to be in Paris on Monday to talk with Dillon, Aldrich and Bruce. I find it increasingly necessary to offset the defeatist opinion among visiting Americans that EDC is dead and that further steps toward European integration are hopeless. Until you direct to the contrary, I shall still continue to stick to the opinion that after the German elections, ratification of the EDC will be accomplished by all six nations because there is no real alternative. This latter proposition, I believe, can be proved up to the hilt by an examination of what will happen if the French fail to ratify in the next few months. What we will be faced with then is a chaotic situation here in Germany caused by a rapid deterioration of the prestige and power of the Allied High Commission. Such a situation would be very dangerous to the French, so much so that rather than live with it they will ratify, assuming a solution of the Saar problem next fall. At least, those are my opinions for what they may be worth.⁴

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

James B. Conant

1. Conant is referring to the tripartite note to the Soviet Union calling, inter alia, for a four-power meeting to consider German unity and all-German elections, which was delivered on July 15. For text of the note and the discussions leading to its drafting at the Foreign Ministers meetings in Washington, July 10–14, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.
2. For documentation on Blankenhorn’s visit to the United States, see Documents 192 ff.
3. For text of the communiqué, July 14, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1703.
4. On July 24 Secretary Dulles replied that he had read this letter with care and was circulating it to one or two other people in the Department of State. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Germany”) The source text indicates that copies were sent to Smith, MacArthur, Bowie, Matthews, and Merchant.