Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

742.5/6–354

No. 992
Report by the Canada–United States Military Study Group¹

secret

[Washington, June 3, 1954.]

Third Interim Report²

1. The Canada–U.S. Military Study Group has, under its terms of reference, examined the general requirement for early warning in the defense of North America against air attack. While this examination has not been completed, it is apparent that a segment of a distant early warning system, located generally in the more northern regions of North America, is necessary if the development of the Air Defense System is to be kept abreast of anticipated improvements in Soviet capabilities to attack by air the vital areas of Canada and the United States.

2. After due consideration of current agreed intelligence estimates, a preliminary report on Project 572,³ and studies by the Canada–U.S. Scientific Advisory Team, the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group considers it advisable to submit a Third Interim Report, with recommendations on the above aspect of the Air Defense System for North America.

3. A review of intelligence reveals that by the time such a segment could be installed the USSR could have available numbers of aircraft of such advanced performance that a line as far north as practicable is essential to provide the required warning time. It should be noted, however, that the value of the land-based segment of the line is directly related to the effectiveness with which it is extended to cover flanking approach routes.

4. Therefore, to maintain the required warning to vital areas, a distant early warning line across the more northern portions of North America is considered necessary to:

a. Meet the warning needs of the Strategic Air Command.

b. Permit more effective employment of forces in active air defense.

c. Provide for the timely implementation of other military and civil defensive measures.

5. It is stressed that the mid-Canada Line will continue to be essential for providing the minimum amount of warning necessary for, and adaptable to, active air defense.

6. In view of the many problems which are inherent in the establishment of an early warning line in the Arctic and the time required for their resolution, the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group considers that inter-governmental agreement in principle on the requirement for such a line should be reached at an early date in order that appropriate system studies may be initiated.

7. The Canada–U.S. Military Study Group therefore recommends that:

a. The two Governments agree in principle to the need for the establishment of a distant early warning line across the most northerly practicable part of North America.

b. Mutually acceptable military characteristics for such a line be developed.

c. Appropriate systems studies be initiated for the purpose of developing detailed recommendations on the specifications, types of equipment, overall system composition, cost estimates, manpower requirements and the exact location of such a line.

“These estimates constitute a military opinion only of the desirable future strength of armed forces and equipment, and in no sense are to be construed as commitments by either country.”

1. This group, generally referred to as the MSG, is described earlier under the name Joint Canadian-American Military Study Group, in Document 977.
2. The first interim report of the MSG is presumably the report attached to Document 977. The second interim report has not been identified in Department of State files.
3. Project 572 created the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group (MSG) and authorized a research and development program known originally as Project Corrode, involving development of systems of detection and communication together with route surveys for the Distant Early Warning System. The project developed out of an exchange of notes dated Jan. 30, Feb. 27, and May 19, 1953. It was not considered a formal agreement by the United States although Canada treated it as such under its definition of how large-scale and long-term a project must be to qualify as an agreement. (Letter from Barton to Nugent, Mar. 17, 1955; Canadian Desk files, lot 69 D 302, “Canada—List of Agreements with Canada”)