742.5/10–1353
No. 977
Memorandum by Outerbridge Horsey of the Office of British
Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Director of the
Office (Raynor)
secret
[Washington,] October 12, 1953.
- Subject: Joint Canadian-American Military Study Group
I attended a meeting of the Joint Canadian-American Military Study Group
(MSG) at Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh,
N.Y., on October 7–8, as State Department Observer in the U.S. Section.
As you recall, MSG was set up in the
process of obtaining Canadian agreement to the establishment last spring
of the experimental early warning stations in the Far North (Project Corrode). The American and Canadian sections
of the MSG report to their respective
Chiefs of Staff and the mandate of the Group is “to study those aspects
of the North American Air Defense system in general, and the Early
Warning System in particular, which are of mutual concern to Canada and
the United States.” We think that the real purpose of the Canadians in
getting it established was to insure that joint defense matters were the
subject of joint study before the Canadian
Government was presented with a request by us for further facilities in
Canada.
The October 7–8 meeting produced an interim report, copy attached,
phrased in somewhat bland terms but sufficient, in the judgment of the
American side, verified by informal conversations with some of the
Canadians, to serve the basic purpose of adequately preparing the
Canadian Government for a formal request for joint action in the next
step toward the establishment of the southern Canada early warning line.
This objective is among the first priority recommendations of NSC 159/4.1
Informal discussion with some of the Canadians indicated that it would
help them in getting final governmental approval if we were now to
propose as the next step a special meeting of the Permanent Joint Board
on Defense, at which we could present the U.S. proposals and explore the
terms and conditions under which Canada would agree to joint
construction and use. An exchange of diplomatic notes would then confirm
agreements so reached.
The recommendation provides for the use of so-called McGill equipment,
developed in Canada and to be manufactured there—very important point in
getting Canadian approval for the project
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as a whole. Moreover, with this system the 213
proposed stations would be unattended except for periodic servicing.
They would tie into a complex system of communications which would relay
warnings set up by any planes crossing the line. There was a brief
presentation at the meeting by two dissenting American members of the
Joint Scientific Team who advocated a “composite line” employing
scanning radar, which is still in the process of development at the
Lincoln Laboratory, in
conjunction with the McGill equipment. They contended that their line
would not cost much more, would not require many bodies to be stationed
along the line to operate the system, and that their system would be
much more effective than the “McGill Fence”. As far as I could tell,
however, there was no serious questioning by any of the Canadian or
United States Service or scientific representatives present as to the
wisdom of the recommendation of the Joint Scientific Team as a whole
that the Canadian equipment be used.
[Attachment]
Report Prepared by the Joint Canadian-American
Military Study Group
secret
[Newburgh, N.Y., October 8,
1953.]
Interim Report by the Military
Study Group
The Military Study Group (MSG) under
its terms of reference obtained all available information concerning
the Air Defense of North America, examined the agreed Canada–United
States intelligence and also the recommendations of the two Air
Defense Commands as to their estimate of the facilities required to
provide for an effective air defense system. The MSG was impressed by the apparent
agreement between the United States and Canadian Air Defense
Commands regarding the need for an early warning line based on the
55th parallel. The MSG then
requested the Canada–U.S. Scientific Advisory Team (CUSSAT) to undertake an analytical
study of the implication of such a line. This study was completed
and CUSSAT presented an oral
report of its findings. This oral report is to be followed up with a
fully documented report in approximately two weeks.
As a result of CUSSAT findings and
subsequent discussions the MSG
considers it advisable to submit an interim report to their
respective Chiefs of Staff with recommendations on the above aspect
of the air defense system for North America.
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Following a thorough review of all information available to the group
it was determined that the amount of early warning time which will
be provided by the presently programmed air defense system of the
two countries is inadequate to:
- a.
- Permit maximum utilization of the available active air
defense forces;
- b.
- Meet the needs of strategic air forces; and
- c.
- Provide for the implementation of other military and civil
defense measures.
The initial step toward correcting the above deficiencies was
considered to be the installation of an early warning line across
North America roughly along the 55th parallel. The principal reasons
for choosing this location are as follows:
- (1)
- The additional warning provided by such a line would
materially increase the effective use of the military forces
of both countries;
- (2)
- It would be far enough south to limit enemy penetration
with the object of causing false alerts;
- (3)
- It would be far enough north to be beyond existing heavy
air traffic. This would simplify the problems of identifying
aircraft and increase raid recognition capability;
- (4)
- Such a line would be logistically feasible; it would also
be economical in that considerable advantage could be
obtained from existing lines of communication and
transportation facilities.
It was recognized that the aircraft identification function is an
essential operational aspect of an effective early warning system.
This has been and continues to be a major deficiency which must be
resolved. However, this problem should not prejudice the
installation of the line itself but should be resolved by the
concurrent development of an adequate identification capability.
Another aspect of the early warning system which requires
implementation before the system can be made operationally effective
is the seaward extension in the Atlantic and the Pacific. This was
also felt to be a problem which although requiring an early solution
should not be permitted to delay the decision to go ahead with the
installation of the overland portion.
A preliminary estimate of the cost of the proposed early warning line
has been made by CUSSAT. Although
it is not based upon field surveys, the MSG feels that the estimates indicate that the
construction, operation and maintenance costs of the line appear to
be reasonable in the light of the defense benefits which would
accrue.
In view of the above the MSG
recommends that:
There be established at the earliest practicable date a chain of
aircraft detectors located across Canada generally along the 55th
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parallel to form a
continuous detection line between Alaska and Newfoundland. The
operational requirements for this early warning line should include:
- (1)
- A high degree of detection capability against all forms of
penetration by hostile air attack;
- (2)
- Capability of discrimination between incoming and outgoing
aircraft.
