Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series

No. 976
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 159/4

Washington, September 25, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Continental Defense

[Here follow references to documents and actions of the NSC that apply to those sections of NSC 159/4 not related directly to Canada. For text of the sections omitted here, see volume II, Part 1, page 475.]

The President has this date approved the enclosed statement of policy as a guide to the respective departments and agencies in implementing their programs during FY 1954 and in developing their programs for future years, subject to the following:

(1) Before November 15, a more precise definition by the Department of Defense of the following programs and their phasing, and the identification of the portion of Defense Department effort and costs related to such defined programs:

• Paragraph 15–a: Seaward extensions of the Southern Canadian early warning system
• Paragraph 15–b: Fighter interceptor forces Anti-aircraft forces

(2) Before December 1, determination by the Council of the manner of financing the recommended integrated programs for continental defense in FY 1954 and future years, in proper relation to the over-all budget and taking into account FY 1955 budget submissions by the departments and agencies.

Accordingly, NSC 139² is hereby superseded.

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay Jr.

[Here follow a list of persons receiving copies of the report, a table of contents, and a list of related documents.]

[Enclosure—Extracts]

³

[Washington,] September 25, 1953.

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Continental Defense

. . . . . . .

Agreements with Canada

12. Canadian agreement and participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defense system. Although machinery for reaching and implementing agreements exists, the Canadian government should at once be approached at the highest levels in order to establish a common appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.–Canadian security and the measures required to meet it. Exploration should be made of the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in developing parts of the system and in contributing to its expense.

. . . . . . .

Specific Programs (There is no significance in the order of listing within subparagraphs.)

15. a. The following programs should be completed with all possible speed:

Southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof. (para. 16–a below)

Extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage, (para. 17 below)

Methods of aircraft identification. (para. 17 below)

. . . . . . .

b. The following programs should be developed to a high state of readiness over the next two years (and, in the case of fighter interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, be further strengthened and kept effective in ensuing years in phase with the other military programs in 15–a and b, and with developing Soviet capabilities):

Northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by project Corrode and the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group. (para. 16–b below)

Air control system, converting as rapidly as possible to semiautomatic control centers, (para. 17 below)

Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance. (para. 17 below)

Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant detection of submarines, (para. 17 below)

. . . . . . .

Early Warning System

16. a. An early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity for both military and non-military measures for continental defense. The Southern Canadian Detector Line and the Alaska and Northeast Air Control and Warning Systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions of this line to Hawaii and to the Azores should be provided, beginning with the Atlantic extension, utilizing the minimum number of ships and aircraft determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary to meet the threat and enemy capabilities at any given time. In planning these seaward extensions, the maximum use should be planned of these installations for other purposes such as weather reporting, search and rescue, etc., in order to eliminate program duplication.

b. A longer warning than will be afforded by installing the Southern Canadian Detector Line is presently desirable and, in view of anticipated increases in speed of aircraft, will probably be required within the next few years. If as a result of Project Corrode and the report of the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group, the Northern Canadian Detector Line is deemed feasible, plans and preparation for its installation should be made as if the program were included in para 15–a. Project Corrode should be carried forward with the greatest feasible speed.

Identification and Control Systems

17. Even with early warning, effective fighter control is impracticable without accurate means of identification and contiguous radar coverage to seaward of our coastlines. Therefore, an increase of identification capabilities, such as through the utilization of Consolan radio stations and the extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage, should be completed with the same urgency as the provision of early warning. As the early warning aircraft identification systems and contiguous radar coverage are completed, they should be supplemented during the next two years with programs such as:

a. An air control system, utilizing the Lincoln Transition System unless a better system can be developed.

b. Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant detection of submarines.

c. Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance.

1. This report was developed by amendment of NSC 159/3 at the 163d meeting of the Council on Sept. 24 (NSC Action No. 915), with President Eisenhower presiding, and was approved by the President on Sept. 25. A summary of the action taken at the 163d meeting is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the NSC, 1953”.
2. Document 958.
3. The sections that precede and follow the extracts printed here are not directly related to Canada.