711.56352/8–3153
No. 902
Memorandum by the Ambassador to Spain
(Dunn) to
the Secretary of State
Having received word from the Embassy in Madrid while I was at Geneva attending the Conference on Prisoners of War that the Spanish Foreign Minister wished to see me, I returned to Madrid on August 27 and called upon the Minister the following day, August 28, at noon.
The Minister had returned the previous evening from Rome where he had signed for the Spanish Government the new Concordat with the Vatican.
Señor Martin Artajo stated that General Franco had asked him to talk to me about the delay in completing the negotiations for the American air bases and facilities in Spain. He said that the Generalissimo felt that the negotiations had been going on for a longer period than seemed necessary to achieve agreement on these facilities. The Generalissimo felt that the Spanish Government had done everything they possibly could to meet our wishes with regard to the several agreements under discussion, and he found it difficult to understand why we had not been able to arrive at agreement as to details when apparently both governments were in agreement on the fundamentals. The Minister said that Generalissimo was beginning to feel that either there were some elements in the American Government who were trying to block this arrangement or that the American Government in general was mistrustful of the Spaniards carrying out their side of the bargain and was not dealing with this matter on the basis of mutual cooperation for the achievement of the common objectives. General Franco had asked the Minister to take this matter up with me, and the Minister entered into a rather lengthy review of all the history of these negotiations.
In giving the impressions of the Generalissimo with regard to the discussions of the various documents, Señor Martin Artajo said that General Franco was struck by the fact that in all the documents other than the basic defense agreement there were stipulations in great detail as to what the Spanish Government would be required to do, even to the extent of naming the locations of the bases, the procedures for entering into contracts, and many other minute details of what the United States required on the part of the Spaniards, but there was no document which provided any indication [Page 1953] as to what the United States Government would do with respect to furnishing of arms and equipment to the Spaniards. The Minister said the Generalissimo had at a certain moment felt that there should be some document among the set of agreements which would go into this phase of the arrangements and would contain schedules and lists of equipment to be delivered to the Spaniards, as the whole operation looked very much one-sided as set forth in the documents we were discussing. This would make necessary an agreement in addition to the four agreements we are now discussing (the basic defense agreement, the military technical agreement with its four schedules, the MDAP agreement, and the economic aid agreement). The Minister said that the Generalissimo, however, was willing to leave to a later time the discussion of the precise details of the military assistance we were prepared to give them provided all the agreements we were now discussing could be finished up promptly and the operation begun. I was concerned with his mention of the possible requirement of another agreement providing details of our military assistance, and to be certain to clear up this point I went back to it at the end of our conversation. I then asked the Minister explicitly whether the Spaniards were ready to sign the agreements we were now discussing, including the four annexes to the military technical agreement, if we could reach agreement on all those instruments at this time. The Minister said that the Spanish Government is willing to sign these agreements now provided it could be done promptly, and in that case would leave to a later agreement the equipment which we were to furnish under this whole program.
The Minister then said that General Franco had finally come to the point where he wished to bring the matter up in a personal way directly with President Eisenhower as he has a deep respect and admiration for the President, and he felt that this matter should be brought directly to the personal attention of the President in order that he might know the feeling of the Spanish Chief of State on the subject. General Franco therefore decided to write a letter1 to the President and the Minister pointed to a letter addressed to President Eisenhower which was on the table before us. Señor Martin Artajo said that the Generalissimo had thought of having the letter carried over by the Chief of his military household and asking for a special audience by the President in order to receive him. It occurred to me that any such voyage of the Chief of General Franco’s military household to the United States for this purpose would undoubtedly receive publicity and in my opinion it did not seem to me to be helpful to the whole situation to have this [Page 1954] approach attended by press articles and comments that might not assist in the present situation. I therefore asked the Minister what he would think about my bringing the letter over, to which he was immediately enthusiastic in his response, and furthermore said that General Franco would be most grateful if I were willing to undertake such a task. It was quite obvious to me that this was exactly what they had both wished, as after all the Minister had the letter right in his office and gave it to me without any hesitancy or without waiting to consult with General Franco. I told the Minister that I would leave on the first plane for Washington which was the following evening, August 29, and I arrived here on the afternoon of Sunday, August 30.
The Minister told me that the letter had been typed by the Generalissimo himself and apologized for a mistake in the spelling of the President’s name by the omission of the “h” in his first name. He also said that the letter was in Spanish but that he had made a translation which was enclosed. He said that only two of the Cabinet Ministers knew of this action of General Franco’s and that the Generalissimo was extremely desirous of not having the fact that he had written to the President become public. The Minister said that an English translation had been enclosed but he did not give me a copy, nor did he tell me what was in the letter. I can only judge from the conversation I had with him that the letter probably brings to the attention of President Eisenhower General Franco’s feelings about the present negotiations.