Spanish Desk files, lot 58 D 344, “Negotiations—U.S.–Spanish, June–Sept. 1953”
No. 901
Generalissimo
Franco to President Eisenhower1
My Very Esteemed and Admired General: The scope and importance of the agreements which my country is prepared to enter into with your nation lead me to address this letter to you. I am confident that my military uprightness will find a sincere echo in one who has so fully earned his authority and prestige.
The object of this letter is to lay before you my own fear and that of my Government concerning the manner in which our negotiations are developing. Since they were initiated by Admiral Sherman and the first negotiators, their tone has been gradually altered and they show a tendency to descend to the level appropriate perhaps to the drafting of a deed or indenture but which is at times forgetful that in fact it is a question of a momentous negotiation in a common interest and not of the hiring of certain services. The forced slowness with which the negotiation is developing for this reason, may I fear, go so far as to create an atmosphere of mistrust or suspicion which, should it spread to public opinion, might affect the cordiality which I consider essential to the efficacy of the agreements and may, because of trifling causes totally foreign to our desires, confuse our common aims.
Spain has accepted the negotiation over Bases in recognition of the menace of aggression that lowers over the West and which it considers as a menace also to itself, but not because of the material advantages which such an agreement might bring it. Indeed the dangers to Spain and its population which may be anticipated as a consequence of the agreement, cannot have a price put on them nor can they be compensated, for the destruction of one or two towns would amount to much more than all that American aid could bring.
Spain has stated clearly from the very first day what it could bring to the Mutual Defense Agreement with the United States, and what it required in order to insure itself as far as possible [Page 1951] against the major risks to which that Agreement might expose it. Nevertheless, from the course of negotiations, it does not appear that the American Administration shows the proper interest in the efficacy of Spanish defense preparations nor in the value of the collaboration Spain is called upon to give in the event of an aggression against the West. The reserves and limitations to which the American Administration, on imperative grounds, has been subordinating the granting of aid, have been making it difficult to satisfy as far as would be desirable, Spanish defensive interests. Fully confident, however, of the scope of our own defensive effort and that, when it comes to the point, American self-interest would ensure that Spain should not lack the assistance needed to complete its defense—there are unfortunately not many countries in Europe willing and prepared to defend themselves—we accept that the equipment in full of our land armies should take place at a later stage. But we cannot do so as regards aerial defense in view of the lightning swiftness of such aggressions, which make it necessary to be prepared at all moments.
We believed that once the three principal agreements had been signed, the settlement of the technical features would become part of the executive phase, during which the successive and necessary complementary agreements would be drafted. But the negotiators have stated that it is the wish of the American Administration that the technical agreements should be signed at the same time as the principal ones. This has made it necessary to study and work on the American texts which concern in general the exclusive service of the Bases, and refer to details which are of interest to the United States but do not specify reciprocally the detailed provisions affecting Spanish aid. If this is to be taken into account and specified in the appropriate annexes, it will delay the signing of the principal agreements.
For all these reasons, and even allowing for the good faith and generosity with which the American nation has been carrying out its obligations towards the other European nations, the whole structure of the agreements will not be completed until, at the proper moment, there is added to it the appropriate annex concerning the details of American aid towards the equipping of our Armies. In this belief I am confident that the prompt signature of the Agreements will open a new phase in the friendship between our two nations.
I take this opportunity [etc.]2
- According to the memorandum by Dunn, infra. this letter was carried unopened by Dunn to Washington on Aug. 30. Because President Eisenhower was then at the Summer White House in Colorado, Secretary Dulles opened the letter and made arrangements to have a reply drafted for the President’s signature. On Sept. 3, Dulles addressed a covering memorandum to the President and attached to it Franco’s letter, Dunn’s memorandum, and the draft reply for the President’s signature; see Document 903. (711.56352/9–353) With the packet in hand, Dunn departed Washington for Colorado on Sept. 4 for the purpose of consulting with the President.↩
- The source text is not signed.↩