Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

711.56352/11–452: Telegram

No. 873
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the Department of State¹

secret

Madrid, November 4, 1952—10 a.m.

360. USNEG—Noforn. Embtel 355 Nov 1.² Fol is translation of texts of (1) FonMin’s covering personal ltr to me and of (2) enclosed memo constituting Span Govt’s reply.

(1) “I duly recd ur friendly ltr of Oct 7, enclosing the memo of Oct 6.³

“The Span Govt has examined both documents and, in reply to them, I am pleased to enclose a memo, dated today, which constitutes the reply to those documents.

“I also have the pleasure of advising you that today there will be delivered, by the High Gen Staff and the Min of Commerce to the chiefs of the respective Amer missions, the pertinent texts of the agrmts for ‘mutual Def assistance’ and ‘econ aid’ between both countries once the minor amendments which the Span Govt has decided to propose have been incorporated in them.

“I hope that with this document the Govt of the US will have the necessary data to reach an early solution to the problem and, with this end in view, I am, my dear Amb; etc. (signed) Alberto Martin Artajo.”

(2) “The memo of Oct 6 last, given by the Emb of the United States of America to the Ministry, has been carefully studied by the Span Govt and in reply to that memo there are expressed below due observations concerning the reaching of agrmts mutually satisfactory to both countries.

• “I. The Span Govt is pleased by the tone of cordiality and the friendly indications contained in the covering ltr of the enclosed memo, as well as by the favorable reception accorded by the US to some of the observations made to it in the course of the negots and shares its confidence that the divergences which may persist will not impede the conclusion of satis agrmts.

  “The Span Govt notes the statements that no distinction is made or implied between Spain and any other country collaborating in western Def and that the only limiting factors are those of a practical nature and refer to the availability of funds and supplies and to priorities which may be necessary within the gen Def plan, as well as the intent of the US clearly stated in the ltr, to allocate to Spain, as to the other countries, whatever may help to contribute efficaciously to said gen plan.

  “The Span Govt accepts, likewise, in the truest interpretation, the opinion expressed by the Amer Government the establishment between both countries of a continuing friendship in support of the policy and the strengthening of the Def of the West, which will include assistance to Span Def efforts and the provision of assistance to Spain for a period of several years, within the legal limitations of available appropriations and the exigencies of the gen internatl situation.

• “II. The Span Govt reiterates its purpose of cooperating for world peace and is willing to contribute to the extent possible to the security of the free world through the establishment of a strong common defense against agression, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid with the US. The Span Govt accepts, likewise, that the assistance which shld be given Spain shld have as its aim the fulfillment of the precepts of the mutual security pact for the strengthening of the common Def. In this respect, the Span Govt is pleased to recognize the efforts and the sacrifices that the Amer nation is imposing upon itself in order to achieve these ends.

  “In the judgment of the Span Govt, this disposition of the Def of Spain within the gen plan can be and ought to be coordinated with the particular needs of Spain’s preparedness which, far from hindering it, fortifies and supports the possibilities of the common Def. The Iberian Peninsula, by virtue of its geographic and strategic characteristics and the size of its population as well as by its anti-Commie history and gen policy, will, properly prepared, give body and strength to collective western Def. Therefore, the Span Govt reiterates the necessity that Spain, as well as Portugal, receive complementary mil means sufficient to assure the Def of the peninsular territory, without detriment, clearly, to those other allocations of material which are necessary to the nations whose forces may be placed more forward in the gen disposition of defensive forces.

• “III. Although the Span Govt shares the conviction of the US that the strengthening of the common Def of Western Eur contributes basically to the real Def of Spain and that the facilities which Spain may give to the US for such Def wld strengthen possibilities for gen Def, the Span Govt considers that, even with such strength attained, in the measure desired, there is not excluded, rather to the contrary, there is required, in the Govt’s opinion, the strengthening of, and means of Def for, the Iberian peninsula. The Govt welcomes, therefore, the US promise of assistance to our rearmament for a period for some years and offers, on behalf of the Span Govt and the Span people, to spare no efforts to achieve these ends.
• “IV. The Span Govt, recognizing that when the strengthening of the Western Eur Def may have been achieved to the extent desired, the position of the Span Def interests will have improved, cannot, however, fail to recognize, in a realistic estimate of the world mil sitn, the vacillation and lack of decision which predominate in the domestic policies of various of the states concerned and the existence, within a certain country, of strong resistance organizations and important nuclei of Commie affiliation, and obedient to Moscow, facts which place a stamp of insecurity upon the Eur rearguard and in the face of which the armament and strength of Spain must constitute, without any doubt whatever, the most essential factor for restraining and lessening the dangers thereof.
• “V. We accept as logical and necessary the establishment of a system of priorities, in amt and timing, for aid to the rearmament of the various countries, in the light of their resolution of action and of their position in the zones most immediately exposed to an eventual attack, altho, according to what has been materializing, the tempo of the efforts in the preparation of effectives by the nations concerned seems to be greatly inferior to that of the plans established in the US concerning their armament and matériel, which naturally shld leave room favorable to the armament of other countries. If in the land and tactical commands, priority can be accepted, the same does not occur with ref to the risk of aerial offensives and offensives against commerce, in which all the countries of Western Eur in effect find themselves in the same line and, at least, in identical danger, and in many cases there will certainly be more interest in destroying the ports, industrial centers, and population nuclei which need not be utilized by the aggressor, and where nuclei inclined toward Communism do not exist, than those others which are nearer and shaped by Commie propaganda and which, once occupied, can re-enforce the industrial strength of the invader. Accordingly, we consider singularly urgent the need for equipping our air force with the most indispensable elements, combining to this end the utilization, to the maximum extent, of our own industries with the assistance and technical collaboration which the US can lend, without involving a delay in the aid required by other countries.

• “VI. The desire of the Spain Govt to estab its own defenses being understood and appreciated by the US, we must reiterate that altho because of her strategic position and her anti-Commie posture, Spain might constitute an objective of Sov aggressive action, in the event of war the presence on Span territory of joint bases and mil personnel of the US wld necessarily aggravate and accelerate the aggression. The Span people, to whom it cld not be explained that they do not themselves possess adequate defenses, wld doubtless consider it thus.

  “It is considered that, in peacetime, the tech facilities and the logistical, aerological, navigational and similar technical requirements shld be those indispensable to their operational condition. In this regard we are guided by the satisfaction of states of polit opinion and the aim of avoiding insofar as practicable all the occasions for friction on uneasiness which wld develop, as commonly occurs in countries faced with the prolonged presence in peace time of fon mil contingents, and which cld create states of tension which might damage the cordiality of the relations and the spirit of collaboration which, if war comes, must be indispensable to us. We are, on the other hand, convinced that this is a matter which can be resolved satisfactorily for both countries via agrmts which may be reached, without great effort, on the tech level.

• “VII. For the reasons set forth and considering urgent the initiation and development of the works related to the preparation of bases as well as those required for the improvement of communications and of our mil industry, the need is emphasized of agreeing upon and signing in the shortest time the single ‘mutual defense assistance agrmt’ and the ‘econ aid agrmt’, if the amendments to the drafts are accepted according to the text which is delivered this date to the respective missions, in order that the amts voted by the Congress can be utilized immed without the deliberations for the formalization of the mil base agrmt, which we hope satis agrmts will be reached, delaying the undertaking of the development of that preparation, account being taken of the fact that the amts authorized as “grants” are not subj, by Amer legislation, conditions other than the gen conditions of the Mutual Sec Acts of 49 and 51 and to what is established in the agrmts now being negotiated.

  “It is important that meanwhile and without a break the technicians make a study of the projects of all kinds which must be accomplished the methods and means to follow in their construction and those which may require the assurance of their correct functioning in the event of war, as well as the study of the most adequate means, within the credits assigned and others which may be available, for providing the air, sea and land forces with the complement of necessary war material, utilizing to the full, national means of production.

• “VIII. It is observed with satisfaction that the exec branch of the Govt of the US is disposed to include in the mutual security program for the FY 53–54 additional aid to Spain, once mutually satisfactory agrmts are completed. It being hoped that the minimum sum of 25 million dols from the 52–53 budget may be augmented during the year to a sum equivalent to that of 100 mil from the previous year, taking into acct the insufficiency which is recognized in the memo.

  “In this regard, because of the grave moral responsibility incurred, the need of accelerating the investment of the credits of previous years is stressed, the good-will and mutual interest for the two nations being manifest.

• “IX. The Span Govt considers, as does the Govt of the US, that relations between the two countries shld be maintained on the basis of continuing friendship in support of the policy of strengthening the Def of the west and is disposed, as a result of the agrmt of the mutual proposals, that a joint declaration to this effect be made at the time of the signing of the agrmts.

  “Madrid, Oct 31, 52.”

MacVeagh

1. Repeated to Paris, London, and Rome.
2. Telegram 355 noted the receipt from the Spanish of the documents transmitted in this telegram. (711.56352/11–152)
3. Document 871.