711.56352/10–952
No. 871
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Martín Artajo)1
secret
Madrid, October 7, 1952.
My Dear Minister: I enclose herewith the memorandum about which we spoke
last night,2 with copies for Senor Arguelles and General
Vigon. I am very glad to
be able to give you this document at last, and also happy that I can
assure you that the long delay has not been caused by any wish in
Washington to postpone decisions but solely by the necessity of
coordinating the views of the many governmental agencies involved.
As you will see, the memorandum starts out by taking cognizance of a
matter which you and I have discussed together, namely, the absence in
our original proposals of any supporting political basis such as NATO affords to countries which have
hitherto granted facilities on their territory. I have brought the
importance which you attach to such a basis very strongly to my
Government’s attention, and a way has been sought whereby it might be
supplied. Accordingly, the suggestion is made, which I hope you will
find pertinent and acceptable, that we should prefix in publishable form
to the agreements we arrive at, a statement of intent as a matter of
accord between our two governments, giving overt expression to our
friendship and joint purpose and consequent validity to any pursuant
mutual arrangements on the technical level.
Also, I hope you will note, as a matter in which I have been specially
interested, that the memorandum leaves out any question of principle in
connection with supplying the Spanish military. No distinction is made
or implied between Spain and any other country collaborating in Western
defense. The only limiting factors in this connection are of a practical
nature, having to do with availability of funds and supplies and such
priorities as are or may be necessitated by the general defense picture.
Actually, our intention in principle is to give Spain, along with
others, whatever we can which will help contribute to that general
picture. But in view of our practical limitations this intention must
not be understood, and I am sure you will not so understand it, as
implying more than
[Page 1888]
we can
undertake. In particular, while it has been helpful to have the lists of
desired military items obtained from General Vigon, these cannot be regarded as
having any direct relation to what the United States can, in fact,
supply. That problem, of what we can supply, is still one to be
determined as regards even the near future, if not the actual present,
and as time goes on will have frequently to be determined again as the
world situation develops. Also, the places in which our available aid
can best be applied here in Spain in furtherance of the joint effort
will probably have to be repeatedly considered, but these are technical
matters which should not be too difficult of solution once fundamentals
have been established. At the present moment, it is my hope that with a
common expression of accord agreed on as a basis for our collaboration,
and with a full understanding of the practical limitations affecting our
intentions, your experts and ours will be able to work out the details
of the proposed agreements in a manner sufficiently satisfactory to both
sides to enable us to sign and move ahead together.
In my personal view (since you have also talked personally to me on this
subject) there is more at stake in this matter than merely some base
rights for us and some equipment and financial aid for you, though these
things in themselves are important enough. There is the opportunity
presented us of evolving a closer association between our two countries
than has even before existed in their history, and one which, given the
goodwill which I believe exists between us, could be of inestimable and
growing value to both Spain and America, and even to the whole
world.
With all due respect, I am, my dear Minister,
Always devotedly yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to
the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs (Martín
Artajo)
secret
Madrid, October 6, 1952.
The informal memorandum which Sr. Arguelles handed to
Mr. Train on July 9,3 as well as the statement which
General Vigon presented to
General Kissner on July
304 have been
carefully and
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sympathetically reviewed. These documents, together with the various
conversations which the negotiating groups representing the two
countries have had, lead to the belief that the divergences between
the United States and Spanish positions is not such as to prevent a
mutually satisfactory solution. In this connection, the following is
presented in reply to the questions raised concerning future
relationships between the United States and Spain and the continuing
nature of United States assistance to Spain in the event that
mutually satisfactory pertinent agreements are concluded between the
two countries.
- (1)
- The United States Government considers that relations between
the United States and Spain should be on a continuing friendly
basis in support of the policy of strengthening the defense of
the West. This policy would include support of Spanish defense
efforts for agreed purposes by the provision of assistance to
Spain over a period of several years, subject, as in the case of
United States relations with all friendly countries, to
limitations imposed by Congressional appropriations, existing
priorities, the exigencies of the Korean situation, the status
of supply and the international situation. Thus while no advance
assurances regarding the amounts and types of aid in future
years can be given to any country, continuing United States
support of the purposes and objectives of the Mutual Security
Program and programs of assistance to participating nations in
past years clearly indicate the policy of the United States
Government in this regard. Such programs of mutual aid as may be
undertaken with Spain in succeeding years would be developed, as
they are with other countries, in accordance with the normal
procedures of the United States Government and the provisions
established under Economic and Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreements.
- (2)
- The fundamental purpose of the Mutual Security Program is to
further the peace and the security of the free world by building
a strong common defense against aggression through continuous
and effective self help and mutual aid. Such aid is furnished to
friendly nations participating in the Mutual Security Program as
may be required to support common defense objectives and in
accordance with the requirements of the Mutual Security Act. It
is important to note that such assistance to Spain as may be
provided would be intended to carry out the provisions of the
Mutual Security Act and would, therefore, be part of the Mutual
Security Program for strengthening common defense. The basis for
United
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States aid is
mutuality of effort. This concept is fundamental to the
participation of any country in the Mutual Security
Program.
- (3)
- Accordingly, it is believed that the type of arrangements to
be concluded between the United States and Spain must be
mutually considered in the perspective of strengthening the
defense of the West—and particularly Western Europe—against
possible attack. The strengthening of the common defense of
Western Europe contributes essentially to the real defense of
Spain, since the most probable direction of attack would be
toward that quarter. Under this concept Spain can make a
valuable contribution at this time to its own defense as well as
that of Western Europe by granting to the United States the use
of military facilities in Spain intended to further the common
defense capabilities.
- (4)
- Furthermore, a realistic appraisal of the worldwide military
situation, the security of Western Europe in general and of
Spain in particular, indicates that strengthening the common
defense is, in a broad sense, the most effective way in which
the United States can further Spanish defense interests at this
time; and that Spain on her part, can make an important
contribution to this common effort through cooperation with the
United States along the lines of the proposals submitted by the
United States representatives as further amplified in this
memorandum.
- (5)
- Western nations, and primarily North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the European Defense Community nations, are
confronted with the military problem of providing an adequate
defense for the West, the total military requirements for which
are in excess of military equipment now available or likely to
be available in the near future. Such equipment as is likely to
be available must, therefore, be provided on a priority basis.
The great bulk of this equipment is being allocated to
supplement the defense efforts of those countries which are
actively participating in the common defense of Western Europe
and whose geographic location places them in the more immediate
areas of operation in the event of attack. It is believed that
there can be no disagreement that extension of military
assistance based on this principle can properly be considered as
being in the interests of Spain. Military necessity dictates
that the greatest combat capability be provided as a matter of
priority to those who are in position to employ such weapons
first and have undertaken to do so in the common defense. This
does not mean that other areas are or should be neglected, but
under the conditions which now prevail, it becomes a matter of
military necessity to provide for the most effective defense of
forward areas rather than provide for contingent defense of less
vulnerable areas. Thus all United States military aid programs
must be formulated in light of our worldwide security
obligations and the active defense
[Page 1891]
against Communist aggression as, for
example, in Korea and Indo China.
- (6)
- The Spanish Government’s desire to build up Spain’s own
defenses is fully understood and appreciated, and its appraisal
of the increased risk involved in the United States use of
military bases in Spain has been carefully considered. If war
with the U.S.S.R. should come, Spain, due to its strategic
location, would not be able to escape Soviet aggressive action.
In this connection, Spain’s determined anti-Communist position
would be at least as suitable a pretext for eventual attack on
Spain in the event of general hostilities as would the use of
Spanish military facilities by United States Forces. Under these
conditions, the presence of United States military personnel on
these facilities, together with the intended provision by the
United States, in collaboration with Spain, for the defense of
these facilities, would provide a valuable net addition to
Spanish defense capabilities while, at the same time, affording
to Spain the opportunity of making an important contribution to
the defense of Western Europe. It will be evident also that the
military forces, both United States and Spanish, which would use
such facilities in time of war must become thoroughly familiar
with their capabilities and operational characteristics in time
of peace. The development of logistical, aerological,
navigational and kindred techniques, is not accomplished
quickly. Such techniques, developed to the highest point of
effectiveness, in the shortest possible time, should be the
objective of mutual endeavor.
- (7)
- It is felt that the foregoing considerations provide an
explanation of the reasons which require, in peace time, the
effective preparation and use of Spanish facilities against the
possibility of sudden aggression. These measures are deemed
essential to the proposed arrangements between the United States
and Spain. Mutually satisfactory arrangements of this kind in
the common cause are basic to strengthening the defense of the
West and provide the framework within which appropriate aid can
be extended.
- (8)
- It is felt that it is well understood that the $125 million
for aid to Spain already appropriated by the Congress is all
that will be available during the current fiscal year. Tentative
programs for foreign aid in fiscal year 1953–1954 are already
under discussion in the Executive Branch preparatory to their
presentation to the Congress when it reconvenes. In the event
that mutually satisfactory agreements are concluded with Spain,
and provided that the time schedule permits, the Executive
Branch of the United States Government is prepared to include
suitable provisions for assistance to Spain in its presentation
to the Congress regarding assistance for fiscal year 1953–1954
to all countries participating in the Mutual Security
Program.
- (9)
- It is believed that the Spanish Government, equally with the
United States Government, considers that relations between the
two countries should be on a continuing friendly basis in
support of the policy of strengthening the defense of the West.
Recognizing that the people of the two countries should be
informed of the character of any understanding reached between
the two Governments, the United States Government would be
pleased to prefix a statement along the lines of paragraph (1)
above, to the agreements which may be arrived at as the result
of its proposals or, should the Spanish Government so desire, to
issue such a statement as part of a joint communiqué at the time
of signing of the agreements.
