Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

711.56352/7–1552: Telegram

No. 865
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Spain¹

secret

Washington, August 13, 1952—5:38 p.m.

141. USNEG. In considering Span memo Jul 9 (Embtel 41, rptd Paris 12, London 4, Rome 5²) Emb’s comments (Embtel 46, rptd Paris 13, London 5, Rome 6³) and Vigon’s comments to Kissner 7 (Embtel 48, rptd Paris 14, London 6, Rome 7⁴) it is immed apparent wide gap exists between US and Span positions.

Span Govt maintains proposed amt of $125 million appropriated by Congress for aid to Spain will in no case be sufficient to satisfy obligations which wld arise for Span from an eventual agrmt between both countries under terms of Mutual Security Act of 1952 and proposed base agrmt.

On econ side Span Govt states assistance will be necessary which wld permit development of concrete program continued for several years. On mil side Span Govt states maximum figure of $37 million for mil aid is wholly insufficient; assurances of continued aid for period of several years wld be indispensable; and aid shld be in sufficient quantity; (a) to organize and equip divisions of Span ground forces necessary for adequate defense (totalling 22 divisions according to Vigon’s statement to Kissner (Embtel 1372, rptd Paris 261, London 136, Rome 64⁵), (b) to provide planes and anti-aircraft matériel sufficient for protection of natl territory against air attacks (100 AA battalions) and (c) to accomplish modernization of certain naval units and coastal defenses. Span Govt has prepared a list of extensive mil aid requirements for Span Air Force and Navy.

For its part Span Govt states it “wld be willing conclude an agrmt for construction and org of wholly Span bases whose eventual utilization by Amer forces in the event of emergency wld have to be subject of a later agrmt. Use of Span bases in time of peace by a fon power, inasmuch as it is not indispensable, conflicts with natl feelings and dignity and is considered harmful to harmony and understanding between our countries.”

Span Govt furthermore indicates in its memo “inability to advance in detailed negots if a basic agrmt has not been reached previously.” From Arguelles’ comments (para III Embtel 46) we understand this concept which you report was probably injected by Franco himself means a “mil alliance” presumably paralleling multilateral regional pacts of which US is party. We assume this concept includes in addition long term commitment re aid.

As an alternative to foregoing Span position, Span Govt proposes, “if it is not within the power of US Del to meet the inescapable obligations for a fundamental agrmt” that: (1) US concede $125 million aid to Span; (2) Span Govt wld study text of econ and mil aid agrmts; (3) counterpart wld be used to increase Span defensive mil strength; and (4) execution of gen base agrmt wld be postponed “until authorizations and econ assistance to meet the obligations derived from such an agrmt are available but allowing necessary study to complete text thereof to proceed.”

In short as we understand Span Govt’s position, it requests vast mil aid; it expects mil alliance with US; and re bases, Span Govt rejects right of US use in peace time and makes war time use subject to later agrmt. Span Govt’s alternative proposes immediate extension of $125 million of aid appropriated by Congress without commitment to accept any of US proposals.

We must conclude therefore that divergence between US and Span positions is such that gap could not be bridged only by relatively small amount of additional dollar aid this FY, beyond $125 million already appropriated by Congress even if we cld⁶ provide it which we cannot. Resolution of impasse must result from similar approach by both govts to basic question of nature and scope of arrangements to be made between them as well as better understanding by Spanish of limit of funds available for aid to Spain and conditions under which they may be used. Consequently in replying to Span memo you shld stress fol points:

(1) US Govt believes type of arrangements to be concluded between US and Spain must be considered in perspective of strengthening Def of West—and particularly Western Europe—against possible attack. Fundamental objective of strengthening common Def of Western Europe is of direct value to Spain since real Def of Spain, against most probable direction of attack, lies in most effective Def Western Europe as far to East as possible. Under this concept Spain can make valuable contribution of mutual benefit to strengthening Def of this area at this time by granting US use of mil facilities in Spain.

(2) We doubt addition US use bases in Spain wld appreciably increase risk Spain’s involvement if war with USSR shld come. Spain will inevitably be involved due Spain’s strategic location and, as Gen Vigon has stated, due Span’s anti-Communist position. Moreover presence our forces on Span mil facilities and our intention provide for Def these mil facilities wld provide Span with highly significant net addition to its defenses at same time valuable Span contribution is made to common Def.

(3) Western nations, and primarily NATO and EDC, are confronted with mil problem of providing adequate Def for West, total matériel requirements for which exceed mil equipment available now and in next few years. Limited equipment as available must therefore be provided on priority basis. Great bulk of it is thus going to those countries whose location places them in front line and who are actively participating in strengthening common Def and particularly Def of whole of NATO and EDC area. Extension of mil assistance based on this principle cannot therefore be properly considered as discriminatory toward Spain. Rather it is pure matter of mil necessity. Greatest firepower must be placed soonest in hands those who must use it first and have undertaken to do so for common Def. As matter mil necessity we cannot sacrifice earliest and most effective Def of forward areas order provide for contingent Def rear areas. Thus all US mil aid programs must be formulated in light of our world-wide security obligations and active defense against Communism, for example Korea and Indochina.

(4) While we fully understand and appreciate Span Govt’s desire to build up Spain’s own defenses, foregoing considerations—aside from question of amount of funds available this year—do not permit extensive program of mil assistance desired by Span Govt. Foregoing considerations are, equally, integral part of development mil aid program for Spain. Realistic appraisal of world-wide mil situation in gen and security of Western Europe and Spain in particular indicates strengthening common Def most effective way US can further Span Def interests now; and that Span can best contribute to this effort through cooperation with US Govt along lines of proposals submitted by US Reps.

(5) Agrmt re US use mil facilities in Spain, with adequate provisions for effective utilization by US in peace and war time is basic to arrangements to be made between US and Spain. Mutually satisfactory provision for such use of mil facilities has been made in other countries and has helped to strengthen understanding and good will as well as providing extremely valuable facilities to strengthen Western defense. Unwillingness on part of Span Govt to reach such mutually satisfactory agreement wld not be understood in US and wld be detrimental to efforts to provide for the common defense.

(6) Fundamental purpose of US fon aid program is to further mutual security of free world by building strong Def against aggression through both mil and econ aid to friendly nations. Such aid is furnished to all countries, participating in Mutual Security Program, in support of common Def objectives and in accordance with requirements of Mutual Security Act 1952. (See Train memo Apr 19⁷ and MS Act 1952⁸—particularly new sub-sec 7(h)—for further elaboration.)

(7) $125 million has been appropriated by Cong, which may be used in Pres’s discretion for econ, tech and mil aid to Spain. Important to note that assistance to Spain is provided to carry out provisions of Mutual Security Act and is therefore part of Mutual Security Program for strengthening common Def. Basis for US aid is mutuality of effort. This concept, although not reflected in Span proposals, must be fundamental part Span participation in Mutual Security Program. Realistic appraisal must be made in this sense of Span contribution to common Def effort and agrmt reached re Span effort as basis for extension econ, tech and mil aid. $125 million authorized by Cong for aid to Spain is total amt which wld be available this FY if necessary agrmts are reached. After this phase Span desire and ability to help themselves in contributing to common Def will determine justification for program of aid for Spain.

(8) Proposals made to Span authorities by US Reps re mil facilities and econ, tech and mil aid are based on fundamental principles of Mutual Security Program. We have set forth these proposals to Span authorities in completely frank and open manner stating clearly what we are able to do and outlining policy and other considerations on which our proposals are based. It is our desire to complete arrangements between two govts which are mutually beneficial and in common interests both nations and basic policy strengthening Western Def. We believed proposals made to Span authorities are soundly based on these purposes.

(9) While US Repts have suggested division of aid funds for Spain between types of assistance, this proposed division can be revised by agrmt between reps two govts. Feel sure Span authorities understand purposes and objectives US aid program as stated Train memo Apr 19 (see also Deptel 947 rptd Paris 6483⁹) and appreciate supply shortages and other considerations which affect division and programming of aid. However we believe sound program econ, tech and mil aid can be developed in line with purposes and objectives US aid policy and in support proposed arrangements between US and Spain.

(10) While no firm assurances re amts and types of US aid in future years can be given Spain or any other country, continuing US support of purposes and objectives Mutual Security Program and US assistance to participating nations in past years clearly indicates policy of US Govt this regard. Such programs of aid as may be undertaken in succeeding years with Spain wld be developed, as they are with other countries, in accordance with normal procedures of US Govt and provisions established under econ and MDAP agrmts. You shld state “In this connection, US Govt considers that relations between the US and Spain shld be on a continuing friendly basis in support of the policy of strengthening the Def of the West. This policy wld include support of Span Def efforts for this purpose by the provision of reasonable mil aid to Spain over a period of several years, subj to limitations imposed by Congressional appropriations, existing NATO priorities, the exigencies of Korean sitn, the status of supply and the internatl sitn.”

We leave to ur discretion manner in which you wish to present these considerations to Span Govt. However we believe foregoing suggestions contain fundamental points of our position and coincide with ur understanding and views of US position re negots. Order avoid any possibility misunderstanding or misinterpretation ur reply Span memo you may wish consider submitting Span translation with ur memo.

Fol FYI:

Re para V (B) Embtel 46, view heavy Cong cuts in fon aid appropriations, we are not in position offer any increase over $125 million for aid to Spain. Incidentally $25 to $30 million program mil aid a year for two or three years mentioned Deptel 1076¹⁰ wld if undertaken be financed for this FY out of $125 millions; i.e., addtl $25 million recently authorized by Cong wld be used for mil aid this FY over and above $12 million listed in original breakdown of $100 million thus making total of $37 million for mil aid this FY; addtl amts wld then have to be requested for succeeding years but not for this FY. Also view many important considerations which enter into division aid funds between econ, tech and mil assistance and many considerations affecting programming of each type aid, we do not believe Spans shld be asked to recommend division of aid. Rather we believe this shld be worked out jointly (see para 9 above).

Re Span desire for mil aid you may wish in ur discretion to impress upon Span necessity of using Spain’s munitions-producing capabilities for its own use instead of diverting Span mil equipment or supplies to other countries (e.g., see Milatt RPT–379–52 of Jun 11¹¹ and previous and para 3 Embdes 32 July 10¹²). You might also wish suggest conversion of plants producing excess equipment or supplies, to other mil production wld also assist in mtg Span mil needs.

Embtel 93¹³ (rptd Paris 23, London 18, Rome 12) now being given careful consideration in connection with review DMS D–7¹⁴ negot position which will provide revised position re Span assistance program for negot if and when major difficulties discussed above are satisfactorily resolved.

Bruce

1. Drafted by Dunham and cleared with Parsons, Bonbright, Perkins, Foster, Ohly, Hopkinson, Matthews, and Byington. Repeated to Paris, London, and Rome.
2. Document 861.
3. See footnote 4, ibid.
4. Telegram 48 reported on a conversation of July 9, between Vigon and Kissner, during which Vigon reemphasized some of the major points of the Arguelles memorandum of July 9. (711.56352/7–1552)
5. Dated June 21, telegram 1372 contained the text of a Spanish memorandum specifying the amount and types of military equipment desired, in compliance with Kissner’s request of June 9. (711.56352/6–2152)
6. Above “cld,” the word “wished” was written in longhand.
7. Document 851.
8. Mutual Security Act of 1952, P.L. 82–400 (66 Stat. 141), June 20, 1952.
9. Document 854.
10. Document 859.
11. Not found in Department of State files.
12. Despatch 32 dealt with the possibility that Spain might sell arms to Guatemala. (420.528/7–1052)
13. Dated July 31, telegram 93 was a response to telegram 36 to Madrid, July 11, in which the Secretary of State noted that the program for economic aid worked out by the MAAC and reflected in DMS D–7 had been rendered obsolete by the addition of $25 million by Congress to the available aid funds and by the recognition that Spain now needed fewer dollars than originally thought for the economic sector. The Embassy in Spain was asked to present its ideas for the revision of DMS D–7. (711.56352/7–1152) Telegram 93 from Madrid counseled against reducing too drastically the $50 million commodity import program in favor of more military end-item aid, noting that inflationary pressures in Spain persisted despite good harvests, due to indigenous investment programs bearing no relationship to the projected base construction, and observing that a reduction in commodity imports would correspondingly reduce the amount of counterpart necessary for base construction, which would accordingly have to be made up by additional U.S. expenditures. (711.56352/7–3152)
14. Document 846.