Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 674
United States Minutes of the Third Plenary Meeting Between United States and French Representatives, at the Department of State, November 19, 1954, 3:30 p.m.¹

secret

Washington, November 19, 1954, 3:30 p.m.

Participants:

• US

  • State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. McCardle
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Utter
  • Mr. Beigel
  • Mr. Fisher
  • Mr. Moore
  • Mr. Jones
  • Mr. Young

• Defense

  • Asst. Secy. Hensel
  • Admiral Davis
  • FOA
  • General Porter

• France

  • Premier Mendès-France
  • Ambassador Bonnet
  • M. Roux
  • M. Boris
  • M. Juniac
  • M. Seydoux
  • M. de La Grandville
  • M. Soutou
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Martin
  • M. Vimont
  • M. Tine
  • M. Andronikof
  • M. Froment-Meurice
  • M. Ruffin

Indochina—Joint Instructions

The Secretary opened the meeting by suggesting that agreement be reached on the text of the joint instructions to US and French representatives in Indochina.² He proposed the several drafting modifications which were accepted by Premier Mendès-France. The most significant one of which involved the elimination of a statement to the effect that the US has primary responsibility for Western policy in the Far East. The Secretary also stated that he wished to make clear that he did not interpret anything in the instructions as requiring the establishment of a fixed tripartite committees, saying that he did not wish to make this matter a rigid thing.

Premier Mendès-France said that he understood the Secretary’s interpretation. He then proposed several minor modifications which were accepted and the text of the instructions were agreed.

The Secretary stated that after the Manila Pact was in force it might then be appropriate to modify the principles outlined in the joint instructions. He said that the Indochina area in a sense was under the Treaty and he said he thought it might be covered by the paragraph concerning subversion which calls for consultation. Under the Treaty there would be certain obligations to the other signatories, and once treaty procedures were developed, new procedures regarding consultation on Indochinese problems might be necessary. Premier Mendès-France said that he thought there were two different things involved. He said that Paragraph 4 of the joint instructions alluded to Paragraph 3 of the September 29 US-French minute of understanding, that this all concerned not only military dangers but lots of additional questions concerning consultation between the US and France, many problems not connected with internal or external dangers. The Secretary thought that this would present no problem, that he only wished not to put the US and French in a position where they would not be taking into account the legitimate interests of other signatories of the Manila Pact.

Premier Mendès-France said that perhaps he had not expressed his view clear enough. He said there were essentially two kinds of problems, first, problems such as the US and French were discussing at the moment which included many things not included in the Manila Pact, and Paragraph 4 says that there will be consultation and he believed this consultation would continue even if the Manila Pact were enforced. Second, there were other special problems which would come under the Pact. He proposed that there be a clear distinction between the two and that it be understood that Paragraph 4 of the instruction be operating even when the Manila Pact is in force. The Secretary said that the US and French might wish to report to the Manila Pact signatories. Premier Mendès-France again stated he thought the Paragraph 4 would still be valid even after the Manila Pact went into effect. The Secretary said that he did not mean to suggest that the Manila Pact might automatically change Paragraph 4, but that there were many members in the Pact and he did not know what might be called for at that time. Premier Mendès-France said that if the Manila Pact were in force, there would still be a need for such talks as the present ones. The Secretary said yes, but it was conceivable the situation might change and that he did not want the US bound for all eternity by the joint instructions, although he did not anticipate that it would be necessary to depart from the principles contained therein. Premier Mendès-France said that any change would have to be discussed between the US and French to which the Secretary indicated agreement.

Pierre Mendès-France then inquired as to what should be said to the Associated States about the joint instructions. The Secretary said that he thought advice should be obtained from the representatives in Indochina, but that in any event he did not believe there should be any formal notification. This would give undue importance to the joint instructions. Premier Mendès-France indicated general agreement and proposed that experts meet perhaps that evening to see what might be said Saturday by a representative of the Secretary and by Ambassador Bonnet to the three Ambassadors of the Associated States.

The Secretary said he thought that the actual principles in the draft instruction would be developed gradually on a working basis. He said that there was the bigger problem of informing the representatives of the Associated States, concerning the present talks, to satisfy their curiosity and dispell their suspicions. Mr. Robertson said that he thought the present instructions were merely in implementation of the September agreement and did not represent any new agreement requiring formal notification to the Indochinese. Premier Mendès-France indicated his concurrence and the Secretary said that he agreed to the proposal that the experts get together to determine what should be told to the three Ambassadors.

Relationship with the Viet Minh

Premier Mendès-France asked if there was any other Indochina business. The Secretary replied that there were plenty of problems: one of which might be brought up at this time was that of the recognition of the Viet Minh which the US wished to avoid. Mr. Robertson asked what was the relationship of the Sainteny mission³ to the Viet Minh. Premier Mendès-France replied that there was an ambiguous situation, that the text of his letter had been worded as carefully as possible to avoid the appearance of recognition. They were not particularly happy with the paper but they felt obliged to give Sainteny some kind of paper of this type. He read the letter again which referred to Sainteny as being charged with the defense of French interests in the north zone, and being named delegate of the French Government “Auprès de vous”. He said he wasn’t proud of the wording but he hadn’t been able to find another one. He said that the Viet Minh had not said anything about a reciprocal representative, but it was believed they would most likely send one, and that one in Saigon would be dangerous but it would be very hard to refuse one for Paris.

The Secretary suggested that he ask his experts again whether there might be some substitute for the phrase “Auprès de vous” saying he personally would prefer, “to negotiate with you to that effect”, but he did not want to put his views in this matter ahead of those of the French. Premier Mendès-France said that unfortunately at Geneva a letter was written addressed to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam but he would see if some change could be made in the Sainteny letter.

French Citizens in North Vietnam

Premier Mendès-France said that there was still the problem of the French concern that the French citizens remaining in the North not be discriminated against by the United States, and M. Cheysson said that in September four written questions were addressed to the US, two of which had been answered, but the one pertaining to the matter of discrimination had not been answered. Mr. Young said that this matter was being worked on but that it involved a number of US Government agencies and it took a little time. Premier Mendès-France said he understood that the preliminary reply was favorable and this was generally confirmed by the Secretary.

Training Vietnamese Forces

The Secretary read from the telegram 2027⁴ which the Department had sent to General Collins Thursday evening and Premier Mendès-France indicated his concurrence.

Diem Government

Premier Mendès-France referred to the previous discussion concerning a program of action for the Diem government and inquired as to whether it was agreed to go ahead on this basis. The Secretary stated no objection and suggested that the experts get together first to define the specific proposals that might be suggested to Diem and the timing and manner of the presentation plus the arrangements for speaking together to see how the program was developing. General Porter said that he thought it would be necessary to go into the program carefully and the Secretary said but not so carefully that Diem will be gone before the program is ready to be presented to him. Mr. Young said that there were a number of pending proposals regarding agrarian reform which could be considered and General Porter said that he believed that Mr. Barrows, the head of the FOA Mission, would have something to contribute.

Premier Mendès-France inquired as to whether messages should not be sent to the two Generals in Saigon proposing that they work out precise measures. The Secretary said that he wished to make clear that he wouldn’t want to agree always to present the proposals on a strictly joint basis but that the efforts and timing should be concerted. Premier Mendès-France said that the only way to impress Diem’s associates was to show that the US and France agree; if not, they feel there may be disagreement and are inclined to play off one against the other. The Secretary said we do not want to be committed that the US would never talk alone to the Diem government. Premier Mendès-France said that he was speaking only of the present decision and program that was under consideration and not all things in general. The Secretary said that the US would want to check first with its representatives on this specific program. He said he agreed that while he was in favor of working together, he didn’t like to adopt a general principle as being absolute for every case. Premier Mendès-France said that what is important is that the Generals make the survey and keep in contact to judge on the execution of the program.

Premier Mendès-France said that it was difficult for the French to come to a decision on the problem of Bao Dai, and he wished the US views. He said that Bao Dai wants to go back to Viet-Nam and so far the French had been successful in avoiding that, but he is insisting. The Secretary said that while he was not in a position to give advice on the matter in general the US was against Bao Dai’s returning. Premier Mendès-France said that even if Bao Dai was not a very interesting person, he did provide legitimacy; he was now for Diem but if he went back what would be his position in a matter of months is another question. He said that it was hard to forbid him from going back and it was a delicate matter. He said he was afraid Bao Dai might make some public statement to the effect that the French were keeping him from returning, and again inquired if the US had any new ideas on this subject. The Secretary referred to Ambassador Heath’s return and said that he relied a lot on the Ambassador’s advice but at the moment he had no views to offer on this subject.

WEU Arms Agency

Premier Mendès-France said that on the question which had been discussed in London and Paris⁵ concerning the distribution of US arms via the WEU Arms Agency the French still desire something in this matter. He said that in London the Secretary had stated that the US would notify the Agency so it could take US arms aid into account in its own work. In Paris there was thought given to consultation but the Secretary had said he was not prepared to agree. He said he would like the Secretary to think the matter over because it was a matter of importance for the efficiency of the Agency and for public opinion.

The Secretary said that he had no doubt that means can be arrived at to help the Agency deal with its program but that the US did not want to duplicate machinery. He said that the US has missions in various countries which together with NATO mechanisms seem to work very well. He said that the US was anxious to see the Agency develop satisfactorily. He said the US would be glad to keep in touch with the Agency and see how, consistent with basic US principles, the US can help the Agency carry out its task, but the US cannot proceed very far until it sees how the Agency plans to work. He said that perhaps a good deal may depend upon the January 17 talks concerning the arms pool.

Premier Mendès-France said he was not seeking a commitment but only an indication from the US. He inquired whether the Secretary did not think that something could be developed on the same basis as had been done under the Marshall Plan with the OEEC. The Secretary said that he was concerned about there being duplication and delays in practical operations. Mr. Hensel said that the US would consider the matter sympathetically but it was difficult to agree in advance particularly as there was a responsibility to Congress. The Secretary said that France had not questioned US control of distribution of aid but desired consultation. He said it depended upon what kind of a positive or negative role the Agency developed. He said he did not want to pile machinery upon machinery. Premier Mendès-France said he was not sure concerning the procedures with NATO but that he thought that each country only indicated what program it could conduct and NATO is not directly included in the kind of consultation he had in mind. The Secretary said he didn’t fully understand the NATO procedure but as all the Brussels Treaty people were also sitting in NATO perhaps something could be arranged in that way. Premier Mendès-France said that in the EDC it was foreseen that aid would be distributed by the EDC organs and there was a consistent system with the EDC being responsible for supplying all arms. He said he couldn’t understand why what was planned for EDC would not work now. The Secretary said that like Mendès-France he himself had nothing to do with developing the EDC. However, he said there were no national armies in the EDC, only one common army and this made a difference. But he said he had not taken the position concerning US aid distribution through the EDC and he did not take that position now, that the matter was subject to the same objections in his mind.

Premier Mendès-France inquired as to whether it would be possible to have at this time some declaration of intention regarding sympathy for the French idea and stated that such a declaration would be a great help for the debate and ratification. The Secretary said he could take what he had previously said at London and Paris and perhaps tie it up in a ribbon, that might be of assistance. Mendès-France said that it would be of particular assistance if the ribbon would be a bit more tight and the Secretary said he would try to help. He inquired why the deputies were worried and sensitive about this matter. Mendès-France said that frankly they were afraid that the US would give more and better arms quicker to Germany than to France, that as a result Germany will have a newly equipped army and the French will have old fashioned type of equipment.

North Africa⁶

The Secretary said that our people were sensitive also when the French used the material we gave them to fight against the natives in North Africa, and that there was a feeling here that material should be given to those who keep it in Europe. He said he felt we may have considerable difficulties over this. Mendès-France said that the French were doing this in the common interest for it was a situation that was bad for all. The Secretary said he did not wish to speak on the substance of this problem but wished to point out that the US had parliamentary difficulties too. Premier Mendès-France said that under Article 4 of NATO Algeria was covered and a threat to the peace was a matter of common concern and the signatories would have to concert action. He said he had been instructed by the National Assembly last week to have a formal consultation on Article 4. He said that before leaving the Arms Agency matter he wished to stress that although he was not in a great hurry the matter was very important.

Mendès-France then referred to the Spanish, Egyptian, and Hungarian radio broadcasts in North Africa. He said that while the US perhaps could do little in Budapest he hoped the US could help in Cairo and Madrid. The Secretary said that the US had already spoken to the Egyptians and that additional instructions will be drawn up to Ambassador Caffery since the effect of the steps that were taken recently apparently had worn off. He inquired whether the French thought it was correct that the line Caffery should take was that the US was satisfied that Mendès-France was making an early and determined effort in the Tunisian matter. Mendès-France indicated his concurrence. The Secretary said that as he understood the matter, Mendès-France intended to deal first with Tunisia and then apply similar policies to Morocco. Premier Mendès-France said that for the immediate future political and economic measures were being undertaken although they realized this was not enough to resolve the crisis which was based on the dynastic problem. He said there is no speedy solution to the problem there. He said that with regard to Egypt could not some reference be made in the communiqué to the problem. He said this would be good for public opinion. The Secretary said he did not believe there should be anything in the communiqué that the US would be taking up with other countries. Premier Mendès-France asked that even if mention wasn’t made of the name of any country perhaps in the communiqué it could be indicated the matter had been discussed. Mr. Merchant said he was afraid if something were in the communiqué there might be a reaction which would make it more difficult for an effective approach by Ambassador Caffery. Premier Mendès-France said that unless something of this nature could be said in the communiqué from the French standpoint it would be better to say nothing.

The Secretary inquired as to whether Mendès-France was going to address himself to the North African matter in his speech before the United Nations. Mendès-France replied that was not his intention because he did not want to give the impression of defending the French position although his speech was not final as yet. He referred to his reply to a Press Club luncheon question which he had discussed the matter of arms coming in from outside North Africa, and added that if he touched on North Africa in his UN speech it would be in this connection.

Mr. Byroade said that a study had indicated there had been a change in the output of radio Cairo during the week and he said that the matter had been discussed with the Egyptian Ambassador who had telephoned Nassar who had promised to tone down the output. Mendès-France said that his reports were that the opposite was the case for on November 18 and November 19, the anniversary of the former Sultan, the Egyptians had repeated many times a day a call for manifestations on the streets in Morocco.

Premier Mendès-France inquired as to whether in the communiqué something could not be said to the effect that the problems had been examined in the spirit of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and it had been decided to have consultation to resolve these problems. He asked that the matter be thought over. The Secretary said that Article 4 was not a bilateral matter but required a meeting of all the members of the North Atlantic Council. Mendès-France said that is why he had suggested the words “in the spirit of” Article 4.

It was agreed that a meeting would be held at 10:00 Saturday, November 20, to reach an agreement on the communiqué.⁷

Mr. Hensel said that the US was disturbed over the reduction in French M to M plus 30 day divisions from 14 to 12. This taken with the transfer of divisions to North Africa weakens NATO and SACEUR is disturbed. This development would have an effect upon other countries tending towards a progressive reduction of NATO strength. He said also that US regulations did not permit furnishing MDAP equipment to divisions less ready than at M plus 30. He said that the US was mindful of the security problem in North Africa but that the US Congress insisted that MDAP equipment remain in Europe and even Algeria was not on the European continent. He said that the US hopes that France will return the divisions and equipment as soon as the danger is passed. In the meantime it would be difficult to replace in Europe any of the MDAP equipment taken to North Africa.

Mendès-France said that Mr. Hensel’s remarks caused no difficulty and it was the French intention to return the equipment as soon as possible as it was only sent as a temporary measure to deal with an acute situation. He said that France hoped, if it got results in Africa on the political side, to reduce the forces in North Africa by the end of 1955. He said that as this is connected with the evolution of the political situation it was hard to be precise concerning the date. He said that the French efforts were for the common defense and North Africa was not far away so that the troops could be brought back soon in an emergency. He said that the reduction of the M plus 30 divisions from 14 to 12 was a realistic measure for some of these 14 divisions had not been in full strength and had many gaps. He said that frankly, however, the situation derived from the North African problem and that part of the former M plus 30 divisions had been taken to make new divisions for North Africa. The French action gave only an appearance of a weakening for the manpower and the money was the same and the situation was on a more honest basis. He said that by the end of next year when forces could be returned from North Africa and Indochina he hoped this would allow an increase in the French NATO contribution in the course of 1955.

Mr. Hensel said that the US was disappointed in the reduction in planning for NATO strength and that the French decisions while involving the same amount of money resulted in less strength. Mendès-France said France was not decreasing its manpower or its expenditures although it was not enlarging its forces this year as it had been hoped due to the North African situation. Mr. Hensel said he appreciated the French difficulties and hoped Mendès-France also appreciated the US worries. Mendès-France said he did but that if the North African situation deteriorates it involves danger for all. Mr. Hensel said he hoped the US will be given time to talk to the French before any further MDAP equipment is moved to North Africa. Mendès-France said he understood and that the French would get in touch with the US in such event. He said he hoped there was an understanding that the North African forces were for the common defense.

1. Drafted on Nov. 23. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a brief index, were circulated as document MFT Plenary Min 3.
2. For the text of this joint instruction, sent to Saigon in telegram 2055 of Nov. 20, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2274.
3. Jean Sainteny, former French official in Indochina was dispatched to Hanoi by the French Government in August 1954 to arrange for the protection of French economic and cultural interests. For information on his activities, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 1936 ff.
4. Telegram 2027 to Saigon, Nov. 18, stated that preliminary discussions indicated that Mendès-France was opposed to eventual exclusive U.S. training responsibility in Vietnam. (751G.5 MSP/11–1854)
5. For documentation concerning the Nine-Power Conferences at London and Paris, Sept. 28–Oct. 3, and Oct. 20–23, including records of meetings concerning the matter of the WEU Arms Agency, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff. and 1404 ff.
6. For documentation on the subjects mentioned in the conversation concerning North Africa, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 127 ff.
7. For a record of this meeting, see Document 681.