Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 681
United States Minutes of the Fourth Plenary Meeting Between United States and French Representatives, at the Department of State, November, 1954, 10:30 a.m.¹

secret

Washington, November 26, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

Participants

• US

  • State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Byroade
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. McCardle
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Young
  • Mr. Moore
  • Mr. Jones
  • Mr. Fisher
  • Mr. Beigel
  • Mr. Utter

• FOA

  • Governor Stassen
  • General Porter

• Defense

  • Assistant Secretary Hensel

• France

  • Prime Minister Mendès-France
  • M. Bonnet
  • M. Roux
  • M. Boris
  • M. Juniac
  • M. Seydoux
  • M. Ruffin
  • M. Froment-Meurice
  • M. de la Grandville
  • M. Soutou
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Martin
  • M. Vimont
  • M. Tine
  • M. Andronikof

Communiqué

The Secretary and Mendès-France made a series of proposals on the working group text of the communiqué (attached as Tab A) and the resulting communiqué (Tab B)² was arrived at without major substantive discussion except for the final paragraph.

North African Situation

Concerning the final paragraph Mendès-France insisted long and stubbornly that he had to have something in this communiqué regarding the external influences bearing on the North African situation, especially because he had been committed to take this matter up with the US in the course of a recent parliamentary debate. The following pertains to significant remarks that were made during the discussion of the final paragraph.

The Secretary said that if the French wanted to bring the US into the matter, this would make it international whereas France had heretofore considered the North African situation a purely domestic affair. He said he did not see how France could expect to derive strength and support from other nations, yet tell the other nations to keep out. The Secretary proposed that language be used concerning negotiations between the parties directly concerned and stated that this would imply that the people who were not concerned should keep hands off.

Submission to NATO

Mendès-France said that after all the US was interested for Algeria was included in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. He said he thought the US should support better security in the area. He said that it was difficult for him to understand that in a situation like that which existed at present the French would get no help from the US. He said the French were just now at the end of the Tunisian negotiations and the following week might be decisive; consequently any statement merely urging the two parties to negotiate would have a bad impact. Ambassador Bonnet said that one could not bring something from the Pacific (such as the Secretary had proposed in making reference to the Pacific Charter) to North Africa.

The Secretary said that the US had a record of helping others and that was still the attitude of the US but that no nation had the right to demand US help under specific treaty obligations.

Premier Mendès-France said that the first question on his return will be would he get aid from France’s friends in this matter. He asked how could he answer this question.

The Secretary said that bringing the matter into NATO would require careful study by the US and the other members of the NAC. He said the whole matter must be most carefully prepared, that a sudden meeting would not have results for many members would be reluctant to be drawn in. He said that if they were drawn in, he believed that they would feel a need for a greater voice than the policies involved and he was not sure that France desired this.

Mendès-France said that if in the hypothetical case France were attacked by Belgium or Italy and asked the aid of its allies he did not believe they would ask what kind of a domestic [policy] had been followed in France. The Secretary said that under the North Atlantic Treaty members are not required to come to the aid of other members fighting each other. Mendès-France then said what if the country were Spain. The Secretary said that that presumably would come under Article 5 but happily such a problem has not arisen.

Mendès-France said he was not talking about French policy in North Africa and was not asking for approval of that policy. Rather that he was asking for assistance against external attack.

The Secretary said he felt very strongly about the North African situation being brought before the North Atlantic Council without the most careful study and preparation. He said that once reference was made to Article 4 and the Council and joint communiqué the US was associated. He said Mendès-France can speak outside of these talks if he wishes to say something about it himself. He said he thought it would be a terrible mistake to bring it up for Portugal would not be inclined to line itself up against Spain, and Turkey and probably the UK would not be inclined to line themselves up against Egypt; the Scandinavian countries would want nothing to do with it at all. He said the French don’t want to bring the matter up and then be rebuffed. He said that maybe after further thought had been given to the matter it might be a wise thing but that he did not feel it would be.

Mendès-France said he wished to insist on the gravity of the matter. He said he needed US advice. He asked what the French Government must do; the French Government has tried to make a liberal policy and then has been sabotaged from without. He said that in the past there had been trouble with the US representatives in North Africa but there was definitely no trouble now and he was pleased to say that for the record.

The US representatives in North Africa understand the situation although he was not sure US representatives elsewhere, say in Egypt, did. He asked what can France do. He understood and appreciated that the US was prepared to intervene privately with other countries but not publicly. He said that if the situation deteriorates the common security would be in danger. He said what would be the result if next year it was necessary to send more troops there if the North African situation developed like that of Indochina. He asked how can France get other countries interested.

The Secretary said he did not minimize the gravity of the situation for it could be even worse than Indochina, particularly for US and French relations. He said he had been worried about North African situation developing like it had in Indochina. This was close to home. He said he did not think it was unimportant but that perhaps it was the most serious problem that we faced. He said it might get NATO, it might break NATO apart. He said it was unwise to quote treaty language for the experience of mankind showed that nations act in accord with what they consider their basic interests and not by the letter of treaties for one pretext or another will be found. He said that when Algeria was brought in as NATO territory he was sure it was not contemplated at that time the strain that would result.

Domestic US International Problem

He said that perhaps the first thing for the French to decide was whether to treat it as a domestic problem or as an international problem. In Indochina the French had considered the policy decisions a purely domestic problem but sought international aid and this had not been very satisfactory for the US, as evidenced by many heated arguments he had had with Ambassador Bonnet. The French had had it both ways in Indochina but it had not worked well.

The Secretary said that if the French want the US to get into the matter the US will reluctantly. He said that today the US only observes. He said that when he had discussed this matter in Paris with Mendès-France and the latter had told him of his fresh approach to the problem he did not consider this strictly US business nor had he attempted to form an independent judgment concerning the program. He emphasized that US could not give French a blank check regarding their North African policy, since we did not know French Government’s plans.

Mendès-France said that the problem was domestic until external influences come in and then it becomes international.

The Secretary said if one asked the Egyptians to keep hands off, they will ask the US to keep out, too.

Mendès-France said that he really didn’t understand the US position but that he would agree that the reference to Article 4 and the NAC should not be mentioned in the communiqué.

Moscow Press Conference

Near the conclusion of the work on the communiqué the Secretary described the Moscow press conference that had been held at 12:30 and among other comments Mendès-France said that he believed this implied that the satellites would meet on November 29 and would make some kind of military agreements.³ He said it would be interesting to see if they have anything like the controls on armaments contained under the revised Brussels Treaty and the WEU Arms Agency.

At the conclusion of the work on the communiqué Mendès-France asked that the press not learn that all morning had been spent on the North African problem and suggested that they be told there was a special meeting in the Secretary’s office to review outstanding matters followed by a plenary meeting. Mr. Stassen suggested that the press also be told that while in conference the Secretary and Mendès-France had heard of the Moscow press conference and had awaited a report so that they could have a short exchange of views concerning it. This was agreed.

1. Drafted on Nov. 26. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a brief index, were circulated as document MFT Plenary Min 4a.
2. Neither tab is printed. For the text of the final communiqué, issued on Nov. 20, see Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 804.
3. Documentation concerning the press conference in Moscow on Nov. 20 and the Soviet-sponsored European Security Conference which opened in Moscow on Nov. 29, is scheduled for publication in volume viii.