Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 670
United States Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting Between United States and French Representatives, at the Department of State, November 18, 1954, 3 p.m.¹

secret

Washington, November 18, 1954, 3 p.m.

Participants:

• US

  • State
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Ambassador Dillon
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. McCardle
  • Mr. Young
  • Mr. Nolting
  • Mr. Jones
  • Mr. Fisher
  • Mr. Beigel

• Defense

  • Assistant Secretary Hensel
  • Admiral Davis

• FOA

  • Governor Stassen
  • General Porter

• France

  • Premier Mendès-France
  • Ambassador Bonnet
  • M. Juniac
  • M. Roux
  • M. Boris
  • M. Cheysson
  • M. Soutou
  • M. Perouse
  • M. Millet
  • M. Andronikof
  • M. Froment-Meurice

Press Briefings

The Secretary proposed that for purposes of assuring a common approach to press briefings, representatives of both sides discuss the line to be taken with the press immediately after the meeting. It was agreed that Mr. McCardle, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Robertson would meet with M. Millet and Froment-Meurice for this purpose. It was proposed that a communiqué drafting group also get together after the meeting, and it was agreed that M. Jones and M. Soutou would do this. It was also agreed that M. Mendès-France would arrive for the meetings about 10:15 Friday morning and the Secretary would be there shortly thereafter as soon as he could get away from the Cabinet meeting. It was agreed that the afternoon discussion would start with the subject of Indochina.

Indochina

M. Mendès-France, at the Secretary’s suggestion, began the discussion by referring to the September meeting in Washington in which M. la Chambre and General Ely participated, and at which time agreement was reached on basic policy toward Indochina.² He said the French still maintained the same position and were working to achieve the agreed objectives. He said that there had been new developments since then but they had not changed the general picture. He said he believed that the French have special responsibilities in the area, they have been there a long time and can be helpful in the future. He said that as a result of the Geneva Conference, the French have special rights with respect to the area which other countries do not have. This was important, for if the U.S. rather than the French took certain measures, this might be subject to considerable criticism from the other side.

Collins’ Statement

Premier Mendès-France said that he had seen in the newspaper that morning the declaration to the press of General Collins proposing measures which might well bring protests from the Communist side. He said he thought it was extremely important to offer the Communists no pretext for alleging that a breach of the Armistice had taken place, a point which he had made to the Secretary Wednesday evening. From what General Collins said concerning the military responsibilities that the United States was prepared to undertake, it was apparent that French responsibilities were to be decreased and to disappear finally, these responsibilities to be taken over by the United States. He said that the French need to know what the U.S. policies are, whether the United States had the intention of taking over French responsibilities. He said he had to explain to the French people why they should still support a heavy burden with regard to Indochina, and if they get the impression that there is no utility in carrying such a burden, there may be strong reactions.

Premier Mendès-France said he felt no steps should be taken by the United States without there being full consultation. He said that the French always avoid presenting the United States with any accomplished fact. He pointed out that there had been no consultation prior to the declaration of General Collins and he described this as not being a good procedure, and expressed the hope that there could be full consultation in the future.

Premier Mendès-France said that with regard to Asia as a whole, the French accept the United States as leaders of the Western community and have decided to follow the U.S. lead there, being particularly aware of the various responsibilities the U.S. has in the area. But, he said, the French need to know what the United States’ intentions are. He said that the French have many decisions to make and need to know where the United States is going. Before going into specific points with regard to Indochina, he said an understanding was needed on various general matters there.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. realizes the French preoccupations with these matters and is aware that there is greater sensitivity regarding actions taken by the United States in Indochina than perhaps would be the case when such actions are taken by the French who have an accepted stake in the area. He said that any armistice can have many interpretations, some of which might be rather extreme. He said that one should not necessarily refrain from doing anything the other side might possibly claim would be inconsistent with the armistice since virtually anything could be so claimed. He emphasized that the U.S. had no desire to do anything that was provocative.

The Secretary said he was not aware of General Collins’ statement, not having seen the newspaper, and that this was the first knowledge he had of it. He said he would agree there should be consultation before any statements are made that would affect each other. He said he appreciated what Premier Mendès-France said regarding United States responsibilities. He said the U.S. was aware that the common objectives could not be achieved without close cooperation, that French participation is needed in programs on which there is agreement. He said the U.S. has never thought of disregarding the interests of the French people, and that without the French there would be a vacuum in Indochina which enemy forces would rapidly fill. He said it was important that there be as much agreement as possible on long-term objectives. He said there was a feeling in some quarters that in the end some compromise and cooperation between the North and South Vietnamese would be inevitable. He said the U.S. would be willing to listen to any arguments along this line but that the U.S. is not itself disposed to accept this thesis, which the U.S. felt would inevitably result in the loss of the area to the Communists.

US Views on Indochina Situation

The Secretary said that frankly the U.S. faces the problem of what is worthwhile for the U.S. to contribute in money and effort in view of the possible outcome in Vietnam, and we wonder whether a similar amount of money spent elsewhere would accomplish better results. He said we need to evaluate the chances of success and agree to what we mean by success. If the Vietnamese [Viet Minh] were to get a majority control in a national government, the minority would not long survive. He said that the object should be to build a strong and anti-Communist Government in South Vietnam, one not seeking accommodation with the Viet Minh.

With regard to the French in the area, the Secretary said that the U.S. view, which he was expressing because he had been asked to do so, was that authority in the government, the military, and the police forces should as rapidly as possible become indigenous. He said that if the French pulled out now, there would be a vacuum, but as local forces were built up we would assume that some phase-out of French forces would be desirable, and he assumed this was also what the French desired. He said he thought the French view must be much like that of the U.S., that it is desirable to create a mobile strategic reserve through such actions as gradually withdrawing forces from Korea. He said the U.S. hoped to extend that strategy to other areas as soon as local forces are ready to take over.

The Secretary said that obviously forces need a good government under which to serve, and there was the problem of the present government. He said that he believed a government around Diem was the best that could be done. He said he realized Diem’s weaknesses, but on the other hand Diem had a strong spirit of nationalism without any feeling, sometimes found in the area, that Communism should be accepted to achieve nationalistic goals. He said that Diem was dedicated, sincere and honest, and was actually the head of the government at the present time. He said that the U.S. is prepared to support Diem strongly if the French are also prepared. He said there was no use in the French and U.S. working in different directions, that in order to accomplish anything they must work together.

With regard to a phase-out of French forces, the Secretary said he was not in any way referring to a diminution of French commercial and cultural interests in Indochina. He said that these were rooted and deserved to be a more or less permanent part of the society. He said that the U.S. welcomes this and had no desire to supplant the French in this respect. He said that if there was any evidence of any contrary views among Americans, he would like to know about this and he would take steps to eliminate it.

Mendès View on Indochina Situation

Premier Mendès-France said that with regard to the present Government the French had agreed in September to support Diem as a trial, although they were not very optimistic about his abilities. He said the French were surprised that some of the U.S. officials seemed to have had a different view of French intentions, but he believed that matter was cleared up now. He said with regard to the Secretary’s question Wednesday evening³ he had checked and found that the French had pressed Bao Dai to have General Hinh called back to France and this was further evidence that the French had done their best.

The Secretary said that when he spoke about this in Paris⁴ there had been some concern about some of the lesser officials but that this concern had dissipated and he could say now that the U.S. feeling was without any reserve that the French were actually working with the U.S. in supporting Diem.

Premier Mendès-France said that the French will continue to support Diem but he felt that the French and the U.S. might be obliged in a few months to consider a replacement. He said he had no one to propose at this time but wished to point out that some of the Vietnamese who had worked with the French in the past had made much better records than has Diem. He said that Tam, although considered too close to the French, had achieved results in clearing provinces and in establishing the national army. He said that in some provinces at the present time there were some Vietnamese governors who were quite efficient, that two or three had done quite well and had the situation well in hand, which proves that such good men do exist.

Premier Mendès-France said he believed that the French and the U.S. should now give Diem some specific advice, particularly in regard to agrarian reform, concerning which promises had been made long ago and nothing had been done, whereas the Viet Minh had achieved results and had a propaganda advantage thereby. Also, he said, Diem should be advised to establish an efficient administration and not to concentrate solely on the situation in Saigon, which, after all, the Army could hold, while the important problem is the control of the situation outside of the city. With regard to the propaganda, he said the Viet Minh was doing very much whereas in South Vietnam nothing was being done; he understands that the U.S. has lots of money for this purpose but that Diem was not using it efficiently. He said propaganda should not emanate from the U.S. or from the French but from the Vietnamese themselves.

He said that Diem should be given only a certain amount of time to act on such a program, for time was short. The U.S. and France might then consult every month or two to see what type of concrete action Diem had taken.

U.S. Technical Assistance

Premier Mendès-France said that with regard to the French role in Indochina, he appreciated what the Secretary had said, but he felt that in many situations the local U.S. authorities had not always acted consistently. This he said made a bad impression, even among the French troops there. With regard to cultural matters, the French were surprised that the U.S. are proposing to send Vietnamese officials to the U.S. for training; this was not in the French language and thus was not useful and not urgent. He said that in Vietnam and Cambodia an American university was interested in establishing an administrative training school. He said he did not see the reason for this. He said that administration was conducted by French methods, and training should be consistent with them. He said that the French had this view not for any selfish reasons, but he did not believe it was in the mutual interest to give the impression that on a long term basis the U.S. was replacing France. This, he said, created a bad impression in Indochina and in France. He said a French Parliamentary Commission representing a number of the parties had just returned from Indochina and had expressed concern about these developments. He said this problem also comes out in the matter of military training. He said all of this gives the Communists a pretext, a basis, on which to start again hostilities.

Premier Mendès-France said that in September it was agreed to set up tripartite coordinating committees in Indochina, but they had never been set up, and aid programs had not developed on a coordinated basis.

He said that with regard to the future and the matter of cooperation between North and South Vietnam, he felt the same way as the Secretary did, that such cooperation would be very bad. He said that at Geneva the Communists proposed many tricks in proposing certain bipartite relations between the North and the South but that the French had fought against it. He said he thought the only thing that could be done was to develop political strength in South Vietnam as a counterpart to the North. He said that even if it is not as strong as the North, if there is real political life, something could be hoped for, although he didn’t know exactly what. As long as there was disorder there would be infiltration and no counterpart to the North.

Mr. Stassen said that technical exchange programs such as those for Indochina were not intended to reduce the interests of any other nation. He cited India as an example, where the U.S. is definitely not trying to reduce the interests of Great Britain. He said the aim of the program in the Associated States was to increase the abilities of the local leadership, and he assumed that this paralleled similar activity of the French. He said that perhaps more consultation was needed but he was not aware that the problem existed. He said the program was the same as in 41 other countries.

Plea for US–French Coordination

Premier Mendès-France said that Indochina should be considered as a special case and special caution should be exerted to avoid misunderstandings. He said that with regard to this administrative school there would be a political result, depending on whether the French or the U.S. did the training. He said he insisted that this concern was not based on selfish reasons but on common interests. The Secretary said that the U.S. programs were not thought of as a political instrument, that the U.S. was interested in the area for only one reason, that if it fell it would affect the security interests of the United States. The Secretary said that as he understood it, there had been no specific agreement in September on the appropriate machinery for coordination. Mr. Robertson said that the principle of coordination to avoid duplication or overlapping, and direct aid, had been agreed upon, but that so far no machinery had been established, as U.S. aid programs had not yet been developed. Premier Mendès-France said he believed there should be coordination in the planning of programs, not just their execution. Mr. Robertson said he understood there had been close coordination between Ambassador Heath and General Ely. Premier Mendès-France said the French often heard indirectly about certain U.S. activities and that it would be useful in the future to have more coordination. He said that it might be done on the spot or in Washington, as the U.S. preferred. The Secretary and Mr. Robertson said they believed it should be done on the spot, and Premier Mendès-France said he agreed.

The Secretary said that perhaps the first thing to do was to find the local people that should be dealt with in the three States, have an understanding on this point, and initiate coordination through them. Premier Mendès-France asked if the U.S. objected to having committees. The Secretary said that perhaps it was a matter of semantics, but he thought the people could get together periodically and perhaps this could be called a committee. He said that he did object to formal standing committees with minutes et cetera through which every matter would have to be cleared. He said he would not want our activities limited to committee action nor to have to go through those formalities.

Premier Mendès-France said it was dangerous to give the feeling to the Indochinese that they can play the French and Americans off against each other. He said the French would prefer formal procedures. The Secretary said the two representatives should keep closely in touch with each other and that sometimes they might wish to consult before approaching the local government, and that sometimes matters might be taken up individually. He said he liked flexible procedures. He said he did not want to evade the substance of what was agreed to in September, that he would agree on this again. He said he did not want duplication of effort or to give the Vietnamese an opportunity to play one against the other. He said, however, that the situation was not sufficiently clear to name now a special committee; particularly in the beginning to maintain as much flexibility as possible. Premier Mendès-France said some of the Indochinese tell the Americans that the U.S. is popular and that the French colonialists are unpopular, whereas they say to the French the opposite, that the French understand their problems whereas the Americans were troublesome. He said perhaps some of the Americans believed what they were told and he thought they should be warned against this.

The Secretary said he would see that the people in the field were instructed to take steps to set up the necessary machinery for coordination.

UK Participation in Aid Programs

Premier Mendès-France said he had mentioned previously the possibilities of UK participation in aid programs, and the matter of relation between what is done in Indochina and the Colombo organization. The Secretary said he had no objections to the UK participation. He said, however, that if there were formal committees, that if the UK came in, certainly Australia would want to come in as well as anyone who had an interest in the area. He said a committee would become far too large and complicated to get anything done. He said that instead the U.S. and France should keep in touch with all who are willing to do something in the area. He said perhaps eventually there might be some coordination of effort with regard to Indochina programs under the Manila Treaty where there would be some more formal setup, but formality should be avoided in Indochina now where the situation is more urgent.

Cut in FEC

Premier Mendès-France said the French had given the U.S. their military plans as they stand now, which involve forces of 150,000 to be brought down to 100,000 at the end of next year. He said it was necessary to have that strength in Indochina. He said General Hinh was popular with the Army, that General Ely warned that his departure might result in incidents. He said what was important was whether the Army will have any new recruits. He said he also understood the U.S. was considering setting up another Army solely for internal order directly supporting the Government. He said this would be a delicate matter and that this would result in a weakening of the regular Army which, if fighting broke out, would be needed particularly if the French were to withdraw. He said the French preferred to expand the regular Army.

Spare Parts

Premier Mendès-France said, concerning the French Army, that he had spoken some time ago about spare parts for aircraft which were grounded. He hoped there would be a satisfactory reply soon. He said that with regard to financial aid, he was not prepared to discuss it but rather that the finance people of the Embassy would be prepared to discuss the matter. He said that M. Faure had understood that by the end of November there would be a response and that he would be very happy to know the answer. He said he hoped that the support given in the past would be continued; even though aid had been in support of military operations which had ceased nevertheless the present political need to maintain security in Vietnam was exactly the same as before.

US Training Mission

Premier Mendès-France said, with reference to training, that what General Collins had said indicated that eventually the U.S. would have all responsibility and that the U.S. intended only temporarily to use French help. He said this must be avoided. He said this would cause many inconveniences and in particular would give pretext to the Viet Minh.

Helicopters

Premier Mendès-France said that with regard to helicopters he wished to record what he had told the Secretary Wednesday night concerning the need of 6 of these planes for the Internal Control Commission. He said Mr. Pearson in Ottawa had urged him to insist on this matter, particularly because of the need for the Commission to get into northern Laos.

Aid to FEC

The Secretary said that our experts would be glad to talk to the Embassy Financial Attaché with regard to a contribution for the French Expeditionary Corps. He said, however, that such talks must be tentative because the U.S. must consider the minimum total cost of what is worthwhile doing. He said that in view of the odds against success, the U.S. may not wish to enlarge the stake. The U.S. needed estimates of various kinds concerning the cost of aid to the French forces, of training a national army, and the requirements for economic and technical assistance. He said that if it was a big sum, it perhaps might not be worthwhile doing. Consequently, any commitment would be subject to a total review of the program.

Mr. Hensel said there was no plan to establish any separate new army. He said the U.S. was considering whether what was needed was forces for internal security plus reliance on the Manila Pact and our own resources, or whether it was necessary to build forces to retard invasion; it was more a question of the character of the national army, that there would be only one force. He said General Collins and General Ely had hard discussions along these lines.

With regard to spare parts, he said he had no information that planes had been grounded whose use was necessary. He said he would have to take into account the balance between use of planes and the availability of spare parts.

With regard to helicopters, he said that the U.S. had no appropriated funds to supply the Control Commission and he moreover was not clear as to the availability of such planes. Ambassador Bonnet said that the request was to supply the French who in turn had the responsibility to provide the Control Commission with the means to carry out its function. Premier Mendès-France said he must emphasize the importance of northern Laos as it was a key area with regard to blocking further Communist expansion toward the other areas of southeast Asia. He said that at Geneva much was done to retain this area and now it was being lost because the Control Commission could not get there. He said the French had already given all the helicopters they could spare and that only six more were needed. Mr. Hensel said he would like a memorandum concerning more information on this matter. Premier Mendès-France said that some time ago a memorandum had been given at Paris and Saigon, and Mr. Hensel said he would appreciate it very much if a further memorandum could be furnished concerning what has been provided and what capabilities the French already had to provide the needed planes.

French Mission in Hanoi-Haiphong

Premier Mendès-France said he felt there should be further discussions concerning the training of the National Army Friday morning. He said he wished to use the remaining time to refer to the French mission to North Vietnam. He read the terms of reference provided M. Sainteny. He said that the French feared the Vietnamese will ask for reciprocity perhaps for representatives of Vietminh to be established in Saigon which would be dangerous, or in Paris which would be difficult to refuse. He said that this mission was very important for the French remaining in the North and although not many remained in Hanoi, there would be a real problem when Haiphong was evacuated. He asked whether the Secretary had any advice in this delicate matter. The Secretary said that any advice he could give now would not be helpful. Premier Mendès-France said that whenever the Secretary wished he would like to speak further on this matter.

1. Drafted on Nov. 22. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a brief index, were circulated as document MFT Plenary Min 1.
2. Reference is to the U.S.–French talks on Indochina which took place in Washington, Sept. 27–29, 1954; for documentation on these talks, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 2080 ff.
3. For a record of this meeting which took place the previous day, see Document 668.
4. Reference is to Dulles’ meeting with Mendès-France in Paris on Oct. 20; for a record of this conversation, reported to the Department of State in telegram Dulte 5 of Oct. 21, see vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 2147.