Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398
No. 668
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)
- Subject: Indochina1
Participants:
- The Secretary
- M. Mendès-France
- Ambassador Bonnet
- Livingston T. Merchant
During the course of the Secretary’s meeting with the French Premier he raised the question of the 1956 elections in Indochina and inquired as to the Premier’s attitude as to the form and manner in which they might be held.
M. Mendès-France replied that he felt it was too early to speak with any finality on this subject and that much would depend upon conditions at the time. His present view was that the elections should be broken down into small local units rather than held on any national scale for a national set of candidates. In the latter case he said it seemed clear that Viet Minh would win whereas he believed that if the voting was by precinct or county, good local leaders if found and supported could do a great deal in their own districts between now and 1956 and thereby assure victory for anti-communist candidates in many areas.
Mendès-France then said that the French were continuing to support Diem and they intended loyally to cooperate with the Unites States on our agreed policy. He noted, however, that he had only limited faith that Diem had the capacity to succeed. When the Secretary asked him whom they had in mind as a replacement, Mendès-France confessed that this was the great difficulty in that there seemed no logical successor. He refused, however, to consider this fact as justification for regarding any man as indispensable or irreplaceable. The Secretary then urged him to find time to talk to Senator Mansfield which it was agreed would be worked out after dinner tomorrow night. The Secretary referred to Senator Mansfield’s knowledge of the area, his great influence in the Senate and the firmness of his conviction that Diem was our last and only hope.
The Secretary went on to say that from our reports from General Collins, he and General Ely were working extremely closely and [Page 1461] well together. He asked if the Premier had received any reports from his people since the arrival of General Collins in Indochina. M. Mendès-France said that some reports had just come in but that he had not yet read them. He mentioned the Collins minute, which he described as “controversial”. The Secretary suggested that the Premier go over his own reports overnight so that they could compare notes the following day.
At this point Mendès-France raised with emphasis the importance of giving the Viet Minh no pretext for reopening hostilities. He said that their strength had been built up since July whereas the Viet Namese National Army had suffered desertions. He also referred in complimentary terms to General Hinh and his position of influence in the army. In reply to the Secretary’s question he expressed ignorance as to whether or not Bao Dai’s recall of him was the result of French suggestion and pressure. Mendès-France said that the military position of the French in Indochina was weak and that they were in no position to halt an invasion of South Viet Nam if the war started again. In consequence it was important that the Viet Minh be given no excuse for breaking the armistice on grounds that our side first breached it.
The Secretary replied that he agreed completely that the armistice should be lived up to scrupulously; that the United States had publicly stated that it would respect it and that it would take no action which in our judgment would violate the terms of the agreement. He went on to say in certain aspects the agreement was vague and ambiguous and that we were not aware what, if any, agreements as to its interpretation might have been reached in meetings to which we have not been a party.
The French Premier then said that he wished to raise two specific matters of aid, concerning the details of which he believed we had been informed by our MAAG in Saigon. The first was helicopters. The situation in Northern Laos (which he described at some length) was extremely disturbing and Foreign Minister Pearson in Ottawa had spoken to him of the difficulty of getting the Commission into the area because of lack of transport. He said that the ground was such that helicopters were the only means by which the area could be covered. The Secretary promised to look into the matter but inquired whether light planes such as we have used in Korea might not be the answer, particularly since he understood that helicopters were in short supply as well as extremely expensive.
The second request of the French Premier was for spare parts for American planes in French hands but now grounded in South Viet Nam. The Secretary agreed likewise to look into the status of this request.
[Page 1462]M. Mendès-France then reverted to his concern over a possible rupture of the armistice by the Viet Minh if they were given any plausible excuse. He said he was worried over the thought of granting additional military aid to any of the 3 Associated States. He was also concerned over any plans involving an increase in our MAAG mission. He reiterated his belief that we should all act with extreme caution.
- For extensive documentation on Indochina, see volume xiii.↩