Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 398

No. 666
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

secret
  • Subject: North Africa1

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • M. Mendès-France
  • Ambassador Bonnet
  • Livingston T. Merchant

M. Mendès-France having indicated during the ride from the airport to Blair House that he was anxious to start talking to the Secretary this evening, the Secretary called at Blair House at 7 p.m. The talk lasted for about ¾ of an hour covering a number of topics which are reported in separate memoranda.2

The Secretary opened the conversation by mentioning the fact that a delegation of 8 Arabs had called on him earlier in the day to insure (as he put it jocularly) that he took the proper attitude with the Premier on North African matters.

The Prime Minister responded by reviewing at some length the difficulties in the area. He said that he had tackled the problem of Tunisia first since he had always thought it was easier of solution than Morocco and that a successful result there would have a beneficial influence on the Moroccan problem. The difficulty he said came from internal extremists and terrorists who in turn were supported and encouraged from outside. He said that time after time the French had been on the verge of agreement with the Tunisians only to have them reopen the negotiations and increase their demands as a result of extremist activities. He spoke particularly of the role which elements in Egypt were playing in the affair and particularly asked the Secretary if he could speak to the Egyptians regarding this matter. The Secretary replied that he had had the impression that certain of Mendès-France’s policies in North Africa had been frustrated in part at least by the resistance of certain French elements. He added that in connection with the Egyptian aspect he would be willing to speak to the Egyptians.

The Prime Minister expressed appreciation for this offer and then went on to deny that French elements in North Africa, who admittedly were extremely conservative, had in fact or indeed were [Page 1458] in any position to sabotage his policies. He went on to say that whereas in times past he had felt that some of our officials in North Africa had been too friendly with nationalist elements, there had been as far as he was concerned not the slightest basis for complaint against actions of any of our people during the past year.

The Prime Minister then raised the subject of Libya. He said that there were a number of camps of terrorists maintained on Libyan soil which served as a base for attacks in Tunisia. He said the French knew exactly where they were and all the details but had been unable to get any corrective action by the Libyan Government.

The Secretary inquired if he had approached the British on this subject since it was an area in which they had large influence. Mendès-France said that he had and that while he knew the British ran Libya they had done nothing on this matter.

The Premier then spoke of a certain limited area in Southern Libya which was occupied by the French. He said that it had a strategic importance to them because of its relation to caravan routes in the area and the fact that it was astride of one of the main routes for infiltration into Algeria and Morocco. He referred to the fact that the French had been unable to negotiate a settlement of this disputed area with the Libyans, and that now they had received within the past few days a strong note from Libya stating that the French clear out of the area by December 31 of this year. The Premier said flatly that the French would not do so for the reasons he had stated and that he wanted us to be privately informed of the present status of affairs. He said that they would be sending Libya a strong note on this matter in the immediate future.

The Secretary inquired whether the French had any money since it had been his observation that base rights were directly related by the Libyans to payments in cash. The Premier replied that they had money but that did not seem to be the solution in this case.

  1. For documentation on North Africa, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 127 ff.
  2. Infra and Document 668.