Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
Participants:
- Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Under Secretary of the German Foreign Office
- Mr. Oskar Schlitter, Counselor of German Embassy, London
- Mr. Butterworth
- Mr. Merchant
I saw Mr. Blankenhorn for nearly an hour at his request. First he said that if the Secretary wanted to see Adenauer before the conference he would be available between 7 and 8 and after dinner on Monday. I gave no indication that the Secretary was planning to see him in advance of the conference.
Blankenhorn then said that he was disturbed by indications from Frank Roberts that it would be impossible to terminate the occupation by declaration until all the accompanying arrangements had been concluded. He said that the Chancellor’s political position was weak and that he was most anxious that there should be a declaration at the conclusion of the London conference restoring sovereignty to Germany. I said I could not see how it would be possible to consider anything beyond a declaration of intent to restore sovereignty prior to agreement on German entrance into NATO and the Brussels Pact and agreement on the treatment of the contractuals. He expressed disappointment.
[Page 1273]Next Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor hoped that certain interim measures could be taken immediately following the London conference. I pointed out that the London conference was really preparatory to the North Atlantic Council meeting and that it was the latter rather than the former which seemed to me to be the crucial meeting, before the holding of which nothing along the lines he suggested seemed to be possible of consideration.
Blankenhorn asked if we were going to insist on according supranational powers to the amended Brussels Treaty. I said he knew the Secretary’s views on the importance of organic union on the continent and I said we were most anxious that nothing be done which would impede its development in the future but that we would not take a position insisting on supranational powers in the Brussels Treaty.
I asked him why they had withdrawn the reference to the arms pool which was in the earlier draft of the memorandum. He said that as they understood Mendes-France’s proposal it was totally unacceptable and they had finally decided that it would place them in a false position to appear to endorse it. He felt that any arms pool of a satisfactory nature would involve a complicated and extremely prolonged negotiation.
Blankenhorn asked if I knew what the French position was on the Saar as a precondition. I said all indications we had were to the effect that even if the government did not establish it as a precondition, the Assembly would. Blankenhorn first said that any solution of the Saar at this time was impossible and that this was another French effort to block progress. He said Adenauer had made the ultimate sacrifice in his agreement with Teitgen in order (as he thought) to assure the EDC passage. With no supranational community a Saar settlement along these lines amounted to a simple cession of German territory which no German government could defend. He said it was nonsense to contemplate putting the Saar executive under either the Council of Europe or the Brussels Treaty Council. I suggested that a relationship might be worked out with the Coal and Steel Community which was a supranational organism already functioning. He said they could discuss a solution along these lines.
In closing I gave him in outline form our general attitude in approaching the London conference. I agreed with him that our position was very close to that of the British and the Germans. I made the point, however, that care must be taken not to give Mendes-France the impression that he was isolated from the outset. I said, and he agreed, that we must all assume that the French came here with a flexible position and that it was a necessity for the London conference to succeed.
- This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 27.↩