Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 363
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)1
Participants:
- Sir Frank Roberts, British Foreign Office
- Mr. Butterworth
- Mr. Merchant
I saw Sir Frank Roberts for about an hour at my request. At the outset he went over in some detail the conference arrangements and the general British approach to the handling of the substance. I said I agreed with the suggestion that Mr. Eden serve as Permanent Chairman and would so recommend to the Secretary. I responded similarly to his suggestion that the conference avoid selecting any one of the three outstanding memoranda as the basis for discussion but instead deal with a functional agenda.
On the working groups envisaged for post-conference work, he felt strongly that the group on the contractuals should meet in Bonn. He said that the purely formalistic changes in the Brussels Treaty would have to be done in London by the Brussels Pact organization but that this was only an hour’s work. He agreed that it would be desirable to establish in Paris, depending on the NATO international staff for administrative support, the working group or groups which would deal with the substantive safeguards to be inserted by protocol or Council action in both treaties. He agreed to my suggestion that the members of NATO not attending the London conference be invited to place representatives on this working group.
We briefly and inconclusively discussed the question of keeping the NATO non-London members informed of the progress at the London conference.
I then asked him what British thinking was on the actions which should be taken in the event that it was impossible to reach agreement on our program with the French or in the event that even after agreement was reached the French were clearly delaying progress. He said he could only speak personally on this. Mr. Eden was asked this same question, he said, at every capital and replied uniformly by saying that in the absence of any Cabinet decision he could not say what the view of the British government was but that to him it was clear under the described circumstances that prompt action would be required and he had no doubt that Britain would take it. Roberts went on to say that their thinking centered around the “empty chair” thought [Page 1275] of the Prime Minister. It would be necessary with us to restore sovereignty to the extent within our power and to move ahead with actions looking to the rearmament of Germany but all on a basis which would leave the door open for the French and encourage them to take it. I said we were thinking along the same lines. I asked him if in terms of action he was thinking of such things as permitting the Germans to start building their barracks, bringing some students to the UK for pilot training and starting the training of cadres. He indicated that it was action such as this that he had in mind. I said that an idea I had had personally was that at some early point (if this conference failed) there might be value in a joint survey of the situation by the British and American Chiefs of Staff. He said he thought this would be an excellent idea and that it might be helpful if the French knew such a study were under way.
- This document was circulated among the U.S. Delegation at the Nine-Power Conference as NPT Memo 28.↩