Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

secret
NSC 5433/1

Washington, September 25, 1954.

Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

scope of this paper

1. In view of the French rejection of EDC, the U.S. is faced with a choice between:

a. Continuing to pursue its present objectives in Europe by means other than EDC; or

b. On the assumption that continued pursuit of all these objectives is no longer feasible, determining what objectives should then be pursued.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. for the immediate future make further vigorous efforts to achieve the present objectives set forth below. Accordingly, this paper sets forth a program of action based on par. 1–a above. The paper also sets forth in par. 11 [10] below certain questions the answers to which may assist in making the determination under 1–b above, if that proves necessary.

present objectives

3. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

a. In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies.

b. To provide for the effective defense of Western Europe by maintaining and strengthening the NATO security system, inclusive of West Germany, as a deterrent to Soviet aggression designed to provide the most suitable defense of NATO territory.

c. To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent.

d. To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements.

program of action

4. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by:

a. Restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed. This step would require understanding regarding allied rights respecting Berlin, the unification of Germany, stationing of allied forces in Germany, and other issues resulting from the war and occupation.

b. Admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements.

c. Obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament. Such safeguards might include:

(1) Voluntary acceptance by Germany of limits on its initial build-up of forces;

(2) Regulations or restrictions on the production of certain types of weapons, possibly through designation of “exposed areas” or through a European arms pool;

(3) Agreement among NATO members to commit forces to NATO, under a non-discriminatory formula so designed as to include all German forces (except internal security forces);

(4) Further integration of the NATO command structure and logistics system, by protocol or administrative reform;

(5) Strengthening the authority of SACEUR regarding deployment of forces committed to him;

(6) German assurances against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.

d. Continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West.

5. Seek to reverse divisive trends in Western Europe by developing political and economic strength and cohesion which will enhance the European capacity and will to resist Communist subversion and neutralism. Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the Western alliance.

6. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies.

7. Continue to seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area.

8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225.²

9. Seek to induce France to cooperate in achieving this program of action. Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France. If it appears that French reactions will defeat one or more of our objectives, our policy should be governed by the results of the reappraisal contemplated in par. 11 [10].

reappraisal of basic objectives

10. The Secretary of State should report to the Council not later than October 28, 1954, whether in his opinion the foregoing program of action can be carried through successfully.³ In the event that the Council at that time believes that the above program of action no longer appears attainable, the Council should then be prepared to determine what objectives the U.S. should pursue in the light of conditions then existing and the answers to the following questions:

a. Assuming our continued purpose to maintain (1) an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and (2) the means for effective defense of the United States and areas vital to it, could a feasible strategy be devised for the defense of Western Europe:

(a) Without German participation?

(b) Without French participation?

(c) Without the participation of both France and Germany?

What basic changes in U.S. military dispositions and commitment of resources would be required to carry out each strategy?

b. If the U.S. and the UK should proceed with the rearming of Germany over a French veto, what would be the ultimate effect on (1) France, (2) Germany and (3) European stability and vulnerability in the cold war?

c. How would the political and economic integration of Europe be affected by French refusal to participate therein?

d. What is the likely course of UK policy over the next few years with respect to European integration and German rearmament?

e. What would be the political effect in the German Federal Republic and on the future orientation of Germany, if the raising of forces in a sovereign German Federal Republic were postponed for substantial time with or without German admission to NATO?

f. If Germany were unified and neutralized with restricted armed forces, what would be the probable course of its policy, and the effect on its vulnerability in the cold war and on the stability of Western Europe?

g. To what extent should the U.S. require formal agreements permitting the immediate use of nuclear weapons by the NATO command in the event of aggression? To what extent would pressing for such formal agreements seriously impair allied cooperation or the prospects for successfully carrying out the agreed strategy?

1. Attached to the source text, but not printed here, were the following: a cover sheet, a note by Lay, a table of contents, and two annexes (extracts from the Brussels Pact of Mar. 17, 1948 and extracts from the North Atlantic Treaty of Apr. 4, 1949). A memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24 at which the source text was adopted by the Council is printed supra.
2. See footnote 3, supra.
3. At its 220th meeting on Oct. 28, 1954, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission agreed that, in light of events, the requirement in NSC Action No. 1227–c for answers to the question in paragraph 10 of NSC 5433/1 should be cancelled. (NSC Action No. 1255)