Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 215th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, September 24, 1954

top secret
eyes only

Washington, September 27, 1954.

Present at the 215th meeting of the Council were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rose; Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a general discussion of world developments affecting United States security.]

2. Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

(NSC 5433;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 23, 1954;² NSC Action No. 1225³)

With respect to paragraph 8, which indicated possible U.S. commitments as a quid pro quo for commitments by the European nations to carry out the program of action, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to comment on the various proposed U.S. commitments because the Joint Chiefs did not know what these commitments really involved. He believed, however, that it would be unwise for the United States to make any additional preliminary commitments such as were proposed in this paragraph.

Secretary Wilson said that he felt even more strongly than the Joint Chiefs with respect to this paragraph. If we had to buy the French into supporting the program of action, the deal wouldn’t be worth anything. “None of this hit me very good.”

Secretary Humphrey asked, apropos of this paragraph, whether everything didn’t really depend on how wholeheartedly these Europeans supported a practical defense plan which the United States could approve of. If they come up with something that will really function, we can go quite a long way in helping them to develop their plan. It is not words that count, however, but spirit and deeds.

The Vice President expressed the opinion that the Secretary of State, who would be on the scene and would be entrusted with the negotiation, was in the best position to judge what, if anything, the United States felt it should give to the Europeans in order to get something from the Europeans. He therefore counselled against listing a rigid set of commitments which would bind the Secretary of State. Instead, he should be permitted discretion and flexibility.

Governor Stassen felt that nevertheless some guidance should be afforded the Secretary of State in view of the difference of opinion between the Planning Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Cutler pointed out that the United States might have to pay something in order to obtain support of the program of action outlined in this report, and the United States should therefore realize what it might have to pay.

Secretary Dulles explained that he did not believe at this time the United States was going to “sell any plan”. What we would face at the London meeting was not a U.S. plan but an indigenous plan. Neither France nor Germany nor the U.K. expect at this time to be paid by the United States to take this plan. Nor will they take kindly to any plan “made in America” because of any “payments” we undertake to make.

As a result of his trip last week Secretary Dulles was convinced that the Europeans are much more concerned with a program to replace EDC as a problem of their own rather than as a U.S. problem. What the Europeans will want to know is not whether we will give them a quid pro quo to adopt a program of action devised by us, but rather if they devise a substitute for EDC whether we will pull out our troops next week. Or if they devise a system of controls through increasing the authority of SACEUR, will we pull our forces out of the control of SACEUR. Or if the Europeans devise a control mechanism for procurement purposes, will the U.S. go along with it or break it up.

In sum, the Europeans will say to us, “Assuming we can agree on a substitute for EDC, will the U.S. cooperate with us along the lines that you agreed to cooperate with us with respect to EDC?”

Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, we should not try to impose a U.S. plan by dangling promises, nor will it be necessary to offer firm commitments as a quid pro quo. In any event, he did not expect to “scatter” U.S. commitments around the Nine-Power conference in London.

Governor Stassen expressed anxiety lest the European powers prove constitutionally incapable of a sound solution to their defense problem. Considering the great stake that the United States has in the defense of Europe, we may well find that we will have to exhibit more by way of U.S. initiative if an acceptable substitute for EDC is to be found. After all, EDC itself was originally an indigenous plan. Its successor may have to be made in America even if it does not apear to have been made there.

The Vice President inquired of Secretary Dulles whether our leadership was now so seriously resented in Europe that any defense plan openly sponsored by the U.S. would be likely to be defeated. Secretary Dulles replied that if such a plan appeared to have been devised by Europeans it would have better chance of success. He went on to point out that France and England, at any rate, have now reached a point of no longer wishing to seem tied to the U.S. coattails. They want to throw their weight around a little. We need not feel too badly about this, since one of our great objectives has been to get the Western European States to stand on their own feet. National pride may do more to assure a successful defense of Europe than U.S. tutelage. It may be wonderful to have strong United States leadership, but Secretary Dulles said that he was more interested in actual results.

Secretary Dulles then proceeded to give the Council his view as to the stakes at the forthcoming meetings in Europe. The heart of the matter was whether or not we should be able to preserve NATO. The Soviets successfully used Mendes-France to kill, or at least to maim, EDC. Will they now try to use him to destroy NATO? If they do that successfully the whole situation falls apart. There is no use talking about the U.S. proceeding unilaterally to rearm Germany. In such a situation Germany may well choose not to rearm. There would certainly be heavy pressure in these circumstances for Germany to accommodate to the Soviet Union. The latter could dangle the possibility of unification of Germany, rectification of the Polish frontier, and economic advantages. In short, there is no good alternative if the French torpedo the NATO solution, and we must not assume that we can go ahead independently to rearm Germany if the French won’t agree.

With respect to the means of inducing France to cooperate, as set forth in paragraph 10, Secretary Wilson suggested that unless and until the French start to cooperate, we should make clear to them that we should be compelled to stop any new construction in France or the placing of any new orders in France.

On this same subject, the Vice President again expressed the view that this was primarily a matter of tactics, and discretion should be left to the Secretary of State, who must conduct the negotiation.

Secretary Dulles said that he had talked with Chancellor Adenauer with respect to the flow of U.S. aid to France as part of the problem of how to handle Mendes-France. Adenauer had said that Mendes-France’s heart was really in the area of finance and economic reform in France. When Secretary Dulles asked if that meant that we should cut off everything to France, Adenauer had said no, not everything, but to slow down the flow to the point where Mendes-France realizes that the flow is slowing down and whose hand controls the spigot.

Secretary Humphrey thought that perhaps the sensible thing to do was to tell the French, when they came here next week, that we were simply not in a position to do anything until we see what happened in London. Secretary Dulles said that was all right, but don’t say to the French that you will cut off everything at once, as Secretary Wilson suggested.

With respect to the JCS proposal in paragraph 11, Secretary Dulles said the time had not yet arrived to make the decision to go ahead and seek the goals desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was general agreement with this position.

. . . . . . .

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report and in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5433, subject to the following changes:

(1) Paragraph 3–b: Delete the parenthetical phrase.

(2) Paragraph 4–a: Change the word “agreements” to “understandings” in the second sentence.

(3) Paragraph 5: Revise the second sentence to read as follows:

“Under present conditions, major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening, and subverting some members of, the western alliance.”

(4) Paragraph 8: Delete, and substitute the following:

“8. If a program of action along the above lines acceptable to the U.S. is developed and genuinely adopted by the European nations (including the UK), be prepared to give U.S. assurances generally similar to those given in support of EDC, in addition to NSC Action No. 1225.”

(5) Paragraph 10: Delete the second and third sentences and substitute therefor:

“Under present circumstances and until the situation has further clarified, slow down U.S. aid to France and make no new financial commitments to France.”

(6) Paragraph 11: Delete the JCS proposal, and in paragraph b change “If the U.S., with or without the UK,” to read “If the U.S. and the UK,”.

c. Agreed that answers to the questions in paragraph 11 should be prepared for the information of the Council not later than October 28, 1954, by the following departments and agencies:

a: Department of Defense

b through f: Director of Central Intelligence (coordinated intelligence estimate)

g: First sentence: Department of Defense

Second sentence: Department of State

Note: NSC 5433 as amended subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5433/1.⁴ The statement of policy contained therein subsequently referred to the Secretary of State to coordinate its implementation. The questions in paragraph 10 thereof subsequently transmitted to the appropriate departments and agencies for the preparation of answers pursuant to c above.

[Here follows a discussion of the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, United States policy on economic defense, and United States policy toward Iran.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. For the text of NSC 5433 of Sept. 16, see p. 1205.
2. Ante, p. 1246.
3. NSC Action No. 1225 noted that the Council had no objection in principle to increasing the authority of the NATO Council, in light of the possible admission of Germany into NATO, even though it might apply to increased control over U.S. forces under NATO command. This decision took place at the 214th meeting of the NSC on Sept. 12 during the Council’s consideration of NSC 160/1. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action—1954”) The text of NSC 160/1 concerning U.S. policy toward Germany is printed in volume vii.
4. The text of NSC 5433/1 of Sept. 25 is printed infra.