740.5/9–2354
Memorandum of Conversation, by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs1
Record of Meeting
Hotel Talleyrand, 3 PM, September 23, 1954
Participants:
- Assistant Secretary Merchant
- Ambassador Dillon, AmEmbassy, Paris
- Mr. Achilles, AmEmbassy, Paris
- Ambassador Hughes, USRO
- Mr. Martin, USRO
- General Wood, USRO
- Mr. Page, USRO
- General Schuyler, SHAPE
- General Cook, USEUCOM
- General Freeman, USEUCOM
- Mr. Fessenden, Department
- [Mr. Bruce]
Mr. Merchant outlined the general situation on the eve of the London Nine-Power Conference. Following the Secretary’s trip of the preceding week to Bonn and London,2 an NSC paper3 had been prepared which set forth the basic US position. The NSC paper would be approved by the President before the Secretary left Washington. Underlying the US position was the assumption that it was crucially important to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West. We agree with Adenauer’s own estimate that he cannot go on much longer maintaining his position unless we take positive action.
At the forthcoming London conference, our general frame of mind will not be one of discouragement or defeatism. We do not believe that the conference is foredoomed to failure. We are also taking the position that primary responsibility rests with the Europeans for developing a proposal. No “made in America” plans will be presented, although we will do what we can to assist.
[Page 1254]Three positions have been presented so far. The German position appears reasonable to us, and the British position is generally close to ours. The French proposal in our view has many serious difficulties. However, we have not rejected it out of hand, but have made certain general comments on it which were incorporated in circular telegram 156.4 We have also in Washington been giving thought to what should be done if we encounter a fundamental roadblock of obstructionism and cannot reach agreement. We have been giving much thought to the so called “interim measures” for proceeding without the French, if this becomes necessary. Finally, the cables coming out of the NATO Working Group in Paris have been very helpful in Washington and it is clear that our views and those in Paris have been very close.
Mr. Merchant suggested three general questions on which he would like to have the views of the group: (1) the best guess as to the nature of the package which could be sold to the French Assembly. (It must be borne in mind, of course, that the proposal must also be acceptable to the Bundestag, the British Parliament and Congress.) (2) The nature of the steps to strengthen NATO authority, particularly with respect to SACEUR control in various fields. (3) The feasibility of an arms pool plan. Our feeling in Washington is that an arms pool has many attractions, but that its feasibility in the immediate future is another question.
In replying to the first point, Ambassador Dillon reviewed Mendes-France’s conversation with Mr. Murphy (Paris’ telegram 1254 to Department5). Ambassador Dillon then gave his own evaluation of Mendes-France’s probable position at London. Mendes will probably say he has little basis for negotiation. He will claim that unless he gets what he has asked for from the other Ministers he will not succeed with the Assembly. Ambassador Dillon added that we must remember that NATO membership is poison to the pro-EDC Deputies and that these same Deputies also have great personal animosity for Mendes-France. We must therefore be prepared to face the fact that, even if some sort of agreement is reached in London, it is by no means certain that the Assembly will approve it. It is therefore questionable whether anything acceptable will be worked out. We must therefore be prepared to go ahead with the British in the rearmament of Germany. It would be very important, however, to do this in a way which will not appear to be a threat to France.
The main difficulty with the French proposals is that they would require long and complex negotiations. The situation is very reminiscent of the pre-Brussels situation. Mendes has submitted proposals which he may well claim must be accepted without change if there is to be any prospect of approval by the Assembly. It is very important, [Page 1255] therefore, that we go to London, not in a spirit of forcing Mendes to agree, but with our attention primarily focused on how our attitude will look after the conference. It is essential that Mendes not succeed in putting the blame on others for any failure. In replying to the second point raised by Mr. Merchant, strengthening NATO controls, General Schuyler described in some detail the practical controls which already exist under SACEUR and which could very easily be further developed. (General Schuyler’s account followed very closely Defto 157.6) General Schuyler reported that General Gruenther had discussed SACEUR controls with Mendes-France during his recent talk with him, and Mendes-France was obviously not interested in NATO controls on the ground that they lack political appeal. It was generally agreed that, if Mendes-France wanted to, he could make effective use of the NATO and SACEUR controls in selling NATO membership and German rearmament to the Assembly. It was felt that his unwillingness to make any important use of NATO controls was a further reflection on his intentions.
General Cook commented that our attention was perhaps being diverted from Mendes’ real purpose in his proposals. The emphasis on arms production controls in the French proposal might well reflect primary French concern over German economic ascendency, rather than military ascendency. Ambassador Dillon suggested that there might be considerable basis for General Cook’s interpretation; pointing out that Mendes emphasized in his proposals that only new armaments factories would be subject to licensing. This obviously applied to Germany only.
General Cook raised the question of possible rearmament of Germany without the French. It would be quite possible that France would become “pacifically hostile” and the position of US forces in France and perhaps in Africa would become untenable. Our line of supply to our forces in Germany might then be impossible to maintain. General Schuyler pointed out that the British and US forces in Germany were in a very different position as far as their lines of supply were concerned. We have a long logistical “tail”; the UK has a very short one. Mr. Merchant explained that the primary purpose of the interim measures program for proceeding without Germany was to induce France to go along. He agreed that if our action produced an excessively hostile attitude in France, then we would certainly have to take a long, new look at our entire program to determine whether it made sense militarily. It was also our view that it would make no sense militarily to proceed on the interim measures program without the United Kingdom, and it would certainly be very doubtful whether the Germans would agree to proceeding without British cooperation. [Page 1256] Mr. Bruce made certain general observations on the forthcoming conference. He felt that, in the first place, our general attitude should be that of the nation which has the least direct interest in the conference. Second, he felt the German proposal was certainly the most meaningful of the three. It places full reliance on the NATO contact, and it is certainly to our own great long-term interest to build up NATO. The Brussels Treaty might be used to a limited extent, but only as window dressing. A third point was the grave danger of our making too many concessions and in a futile effort to win votes in the French Assembly when we were not at all sure that we will succeed. On the other hand, we must not be in a position of browbeating the French to the extent that we are made responsible for failure. We should go into the conference without “made in America” proposals and with our position essentially uncrystallized. On the arms pool, for instance, he felt that the US should remain completely aloof and let the others directly involved deal with the French proposal.
The participants generally agreed that the French proposal for a European arms pool was too complex and discriminatory. It was also agreed that full establishment of an arms pool, even if one should be worked out, should certainly not become a condition to German entrance into NATO.