Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5433 series

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council ¹

top secret

Washington, September 23, 1954.

Subject:

• Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe

Reference:

• NSC 5433²

At the request of the Secretary of Defense the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which the Secretary of Defense agrees, with respect to the reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of NSC 5433 at its meeting on Friday, September 24, 1954.³

Also enclosed and transmitted herewith at the request of the Secretary of Defense for the information of the Council are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the related subjects of “Strategic Issues Confronting the United States in Europe” and “Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London”. The Secretary of Defense agrees generally with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in these papers.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 22 September 1954.

Subject:

• Immediate United States Policy Toward Europe—NSC 5433.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy, titled “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe” (NSC 5433), prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Friday, 24 September 1954.

2. The draft paper sets forth a program of action for the immediate future designed to achieve present United States objectives in Europe by means other than the European Defense Community (EDC). It also sets forth certain questions the answers to which may assist in determining the United States objectives to be sought in the event that the pursuit of all present United States objectives is no longer feasible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in general with this approach and consider that, in view of the uncertain trend in the European situation, the National Security Council should direct the appropriate United States Government agencies to develop now the answers to these questions, in order to permit the timely formulation of any such changes in United States policy towards Europe as events may prove to be necessary.

3. The following comments are addressed to the specific portions of the draft statement of policy:

a. Subparagraph 3b, page 2. Delete the parenthetical phrase.

Reason: The parenthetical phrase is considered to be susceptible of misinterpretation. It tends to downgrade the major importance which the United States attaches to the successful defense of Western Europe and carries a connotation that a resolute defense of Western Europe might not be warranted. It ignores the probability that the loss of this area to the Allies would serve to prolong a general war and render eventual victory more costly.

b. Paragraphs 5 and 6, page 4. Delete the second sentence of paragraph 5.

Reason: This sentence, either separately or as a part of the paragraph, does not prescribe a course of action. Further, as now written and in the context of paragraphs 5 and 6, the sentence appears to imply that, since Soviet aggression is not now imminent, the political and economic aspects of the European situation should receive major emphasis in the United States short-range program of action. While the recent developments in Western Europe may not have served to increase the imminence of Soviet military aggression, neither have they in any way served to lessen the threat. The Soviet divisive efforts have as an ultimate aim the reduction of Allied military effectiveness as well as the weakening of Allied political cohesion. If this sentence is to be retained, it should be reworded as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“Under present conditions, Soviet military aggression against Western Europe does not appear to be imminent and major Soviet efforts are devoted to dividing and weakening the Western alliance.”

c. Paragraph 8, pages 5 and 6.

(1) Until the precise extent and scope of the proposed courses of action have been delineated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would desire to reserve their final endorsement.

(2) Delete subparagraph e and reletter the following subparagraphs accordingly.

Reason: Until, among other things, the reliability and support of the European Allies have been better demonstrated, it would be injudicious to enter into a commitment with such far-reaching implications. Certainly an offer to transfer nuclear weapons to our NATO Allies should not be used as an inducement for acceptance of the United States short-range program.

d. Paragraph 10, page 7 (Revised). Modify the third sentence as follows (changes indicated in the usual manner):

“As a tactical matter, we should act to implement the program, if necessary and as feasible without French approval or cooperation, (leaving to France opportunity later to cooperate), [if such action appears likely] [because such action is most likely] to induce ultimate French acceptance of the program and not to jeopardize attainment of our objectives.”

Reason: To provide for the early initiation of measures designed to test French reactions and which the United States, in any event, should pursue, while avoiding commitment to courses of action which might have to be abandoned or reversed in the face of strong French opposition.

e. Paragraph 11, page 8. Of the alternative proposals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor the “JCS Proposal.”

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be incorporated in the Department of Defense position in connection with the formulation of an immediate United States policy toward Europe.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

Chairman

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 22 September 1954.

Subject:

• Strategic Issues Confronting the U.S. in Europe

1. In response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 September 1954,⁴ subject as above, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the actions required in the three situations outlined in paragraph 5 a, b, and c thereof follow:

a. Should France abstain from a program for German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, but not withdraw from NATO or take active or passive measures of interference to the German defense contribution, no significant adjustment would be required in either NATO or U.S. strategic planning or in military programs.

b. Should France actively oppose German membership in NATO and controlled rearmament under NATO, and take measures of interference to hinder German rearmament short of withdrawal from NATO, adjustments in strategic planning might be necessary, depending upon the nature and degree of interference. Successful implementation of military programs would be handicapped but would not be prevented.

c. Should France withdraw from NATO and take all measures of interference with independent rearming of West Germany by the United States and United Kingdom short of open hostility, NATO and U.S. strategic planning for Europe, including North Africa, and military programs would require major adjustments and an immediate reappraisal by the United States of its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments would be necessary.

2. With respect to your further request for at least tentative conclusions regarding those aspects of a strategic reappraisal having a significant impact on the development of a new U.S. approach for Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff respectfully reiterate their views contained in their statement on alternative EDC planning submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 September 1954, as follows:

a. A German contribution is essential to the defense of Europe and the free world. Therefore, the United States should seek such a German contribution, preferably with the concurrence of the French and British but if this cannot be obtained we should be willing to go as far as making a bilateral agreement with the Germans in order to get their participation and to keep them on the side of the free world.

b. A really sound defense of Europe depends on an adequate contribution from both Germany and France as well as the smaller nations. Failure to obtain French cooperation for a German contribution at this time will therefore require a basic change in NATO commitments and structure but this should not deter the United States from working out the best possible arrangement with Western Germany in our own interests as well as the interests of a free Europe.

3. The possibility cannot be discounted that France might not concur in any form of German rearmament and might actively oppose and obstruct Allied German efforts in this direction. French retaliatory measures, under extreme circumstances, might take the form of a withdrawal from NATO and the cancellation of all bilateral military facilities agreements. Any such action Would compel a reorientation of United States strategy. On the assumption that the majority of the free nations of Europe still exhibit a resolute intent to stand in unified opposition to Soviet aggression, this would entail our support of a more extensive rearming of Germany, the increased utilization of Spanish and English naval and air bases and the strengthening as feasible, of the remainder of the West European perimeter. Under such circumstances, the rearming of West Germany should proceed without restrictions on the size and composition of forces and on her munitions production, such as contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements. It should be our policy to capitalize on the potential of West Germany to the maximum extent. Her rearmament should be directed toward:

a. Initially, providing her with forces which, with U.S. and Allied support, could maintain an effective defense against an invasion by satellite forces, particularly those of East Germany, and which could compel the Soviets to mount an all-out attack in order to overrun Western Europe; and

b. Eventually, providing West Germany with forces adequate to compensate for the loss to the NATO of the French military commitment and to provide, with U.S. and Allied support, a reasonably effective defense against any external attack.

4. In the event that the support of the NATO nations envisaged in paragraph 3 above is not forthcoming, but these nations do not actively oppose such a course, the United States should nevertheless endeavor to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom in rearming that part of West Germany lying within the United Kingdom and United States zones on the order of that contemplated in the Contractual-EDC arrangement.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to keep the reappraisal of U.S. long-range policy with respect to Europe under study in the light of developments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

Chairman

[Enclosure 3]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

top secret

Washington, 22 September 1954.

Subject:

• Preparations for the 9-Power Conference in London

1. This memorandum is in response to the memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 21 September 1954,⁵ subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the proposals concerning revisions to the Brussels Treaty, contained in a French Aide-Mémoire, and regarding certain reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of a revised Brussels Treaty.

2. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the general subject of a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe may be summarized, in part, as follows:

a. From the military point of view, the most desirable method of obtaining a German contribution would be the admission of the Federal Republic as a full-fledged, sovereign partner in the NATO;

b. Any politically feasible variant of the NATO or EDC formula would be militarily acceptable, provided it would result in a German contribution on the order of that contemplated in the EDC treaty;

c. It is desirable that maximum use be made of the German industrial potential for the production of munitions for Germany and for the NATO nations, consistent with and in support of the security interests of the United States; however,

d. If dictated by political consideration, restrictions on the composition of the military forces of West Germany and on her munitions production, approximating the safeguards incorporated in the Contractual-EDC arrangements, would be acceptable from the military standpoint, provided that such restrictions would not serve to impair the effectiveness of the German contribution.

3. As a general observation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest the current Allied efforts to achieve a German contribution to Western European defense become so involved, in the inhibitory and negative aspects of the proposed arrangements as to detract seriously from the military effectiveness of any organization which might eventually be evolved. They feel that, since the paramount purpose is to increase the strength and cohesion of the Western alliance, the principal efforts of the organization should be directed toward positive accomplishments, rather than to surveillance of the respective members.

4. The following comments are addressed to certain military aspects of the proposals in the French Aide-Mémoire:⁶

a. Section II. This restriction could be accepted, provided that, in the face of SACEUR’s recommendations, the French, through veto or other voting process, would not be in a position to delimit the German contribution substantially below that contemplated in the EDC treaty. With respect to the inspections designed to detect violations of the restrictions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these should be a function of an agency other than SACEUR—who must not be placed in a position of policing conformance of member nations to the imposed restrictions.

b. Section III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it desirable to locate arms manufacturing facilities in relatively unexposed positions and of coordinating arms production programs among the Brussels Treaty countries, however, they consider that the French proposal respecting the manufacture and distribution of arms on the continent of Europe is excessively rigid, would fail to take advantage of German production facilities and, in distinction to fostering the development of an adequate mobilization base for the support of the NATO armed forces, would serve to inhibit its growth; consequently it would tend to perpetuate the dependence of those forces on United States arms production. Further, while the United States might find it convenient to avail itself of the proposed machinery for the importation and distribution of arms provided by this country, it would appear inadvisable to bind ourselves to do so. The exclusive use of this channel might serve to deprive us of a potent means to accomplish the aims of our military aid programs.

c. The comments in subparagraph 4a above, regarding controls and inspections by SACEUR apply with equal force with respect to the inspections envisaged in Sections III and IV of the Aide-Mémoire.

5. The following comments are applicable to certain of the provisions of the Informal Memorandum:

a. Paragraph 2. This arrangement would be satisfactory provided it is definitely established that it would not preclude the integration of German units up to the level of a conventional army corps.

b. Paragraph 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States assurances should not specify minimum forces to be maintained by this country on the European continent. In their opinion, these assurances should conform generally to the United States assurances concerning EDC transmitted by the President to the EDC signatory nations on 15 April 1954.⁷

c. Paragraph 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer to withhold their concurrence until the terms of reference of SACEUR in this regard are more definitely delineated.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views form the basis of the Department of Defense position at the 9-Power Conference with respect to the French proposals concerning the revisions to the Brussels Treaty and with respect to the reservations which the French propose as preconditions to the adoption of that treaty.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

Chairman

1. At the same time that the Secretary of Defense sent the three enclosures to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council for distribution, he also sent a letter to Dulles with the same three enclosures attached. In the letter he stated his belief that the views of the two Departments were not “basically very far apart.” (396.1 LO/9–2354)
2. Dated Sept. 16, p. 1205.
3. For a memorandum of discussion of this NSC meeting, see p. 1263.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. There is a translation of the French aide-mémoire in circular telegram 148 of Sept. 20, p. 1231.
7. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.