740.5/9–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
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1254. After two days of effort we received a message at 6:15 last night, 10 minutes before Murphy was leaving for airport, that Mendes-France would see Murphy and me at Marly at 7:15. Murphy postponed his departure for London and we met with Mendes for approximately one hour.
Mendes first apologized for the delay in arranging the appointment and said that he had had a very busy day, and in particular had devoted a great deal of time to the Dides affair which he said was assuming serious proportions (full reports on this strange and highly important affair are being forwarded through other channels2).
Murphy then expressed the Secretary’s regrets at not being able to come to Paris and said that the Secretary had asked him to stop and see Mendes and tell him how much the Secretary was looking forward [Page 1257] to seeing Mendes at London. Mendes immediately expressed surprise that the Secretary had any regrets about coming to Paris and a discussion of the Secretary’s last trip thereupon ensued between Murphy and Mendes. Mendes said that the decision to omit Paris was very unfortunate not from the point of view of personal feelings, which should not be considered in matters of this sort, but because it made more difficult the task of reaching an agreement on the European problem. He said that Adenauer had not behaved well in the weeks since the defeat of EDC and had made a number of unfortunate public statements which Mendes had been careful not to answer. According to Mendes, the Secretary’s trip to Bonn and his cordial visit with the Chancellor gave him impression that the US supported these extreme statements by the Chancellor which was unfortunate.
. . . . . . .
The subject then shifted to a discussion of where we go from here. Mendes said, and repeated a number of times, that he was sure that the London conference would succeed as failure would be inadmissible. He expected the meeting to last for three or four days, but he said if there was no agreement at the end of four days, the conference must go on for six days or nine days, or whatever was necessary to reach agreement. The agreement would be in general form to be submitted to experts for final drafting. Final draft should also be relatively simple and not attempt to cover all contingencies. Mendes said that he would propose a time limit of 30 days on the drafting procedure by the experts. Mendes said that his real concern was to obtain an agreement that could be approved in the French Parliament. To do this he would require an agreement that was as close as possible to a simplified EDC treaty without the provisions unifying forces, and with Great Britain as a member. He said that a solution along the lines of the Eden proposals, as he understood them, would have no chance of approval by the French Assembly. He then explained that, as he understood the Eden proposals, they consisted of the admission of Germany to NATO after a number of unilateral renunciations and statements of policy by the German Government. In addition, Germany and Italy would be admitted to the Brussels pact more or less as window dressing for the admission of Germany to NATO. Mendes said that there was great opposition in France to the admission of Germany to NATO and it would never be accepted in this form. This opposition existed, he said, because throughout the years of the EDC debate, admission of Germany to NATO had been held up to the French people as the terrible solution which must be avoided at all costs and it was to avoid this solution that some pro-EDC people were willing to sacrifice a portion of French sovereignty.
[Page 1258]On the other hand, Mendes said he felt there was a very good chance that if the London conference accepted the broad outlines of his proposal he could get it accepted by the French Assembly. He said that his proposal essentially meant the expansion and strengthening of the Brussels treaty for the purpose of creating a European organization to take the place of EDC. He said the Eden plan created no European organization and therefore he felt that the US would prefer the French plan, as it represented some progress toward the goal of European unity in which Mendes said he had always believed. The Brussels organization would be charged with setting maximum force limits for each country, with the procurement of all military equipment for the Brussels treaty nations and with the continuous inspection of armament production in all the countries. Finally, it would be charged with the licensing of the creation of all new armament factories in any of the Brussels treaty countries.
Mendes said that at the same time the Brussels Organization went into effect, France would be ready to accord Germany full sovereignty. He said he foresaw legal and negotiating difficulties in reaching an agreement with Germany on the stationing of forces on German territory but that he saw no difficulties in principle, as the French fully agreed in principle on the complete restoration of German sovereignty. In this connection he laid down one absolute condition which was that the negotiations for stationing of troops in Germany would have to be conducted with Germany on a tripartite basis. He said that under no circumstances would France accept separate negotiations between Germany and the three occupying powers individually on this problem. He also said that he had reluctantly agreed that Germany could join NATO at the same time as the Brussels Agreement went into effect. He said this would be difficult to put through the French Assembly, but that he felt it could be done provided the Brussels Organization had been established along the lines of his plan. The whole would be presented to the Assembly in one package.
Regarding the Saar Mendes said, as he had previously told me, that a Saar settlement remained as a pre-condition to any French agreement on German sovereignty or rearmament. He said there should be Franco-German negotiations on this subject concurrently with the meetings of the experts to draft the treaty agreed on at London. He thought that with goodwill the problem could be ironed out in two or three days. He said he recognized that the defeat of EDC created problems for Adenauer in connection with the Europeanization of the Saar, and if it would be helpful to Adenauer he would be willing to have the Saar placed under the Brussels Organization as a step toward its Europeanization.
Regarding the common procurement program Mendes said it could be operated one of two ways; either with a common budget, which he [Page 1259] did not appear to favor, or by giving the Brussels Organization the sole right to place orders for armament production giving it the authority to draw on national budgets for payment. In other words, the national budgets for procurement of military equipment would be made available solely to the Brussels Organization which would place all orders and distribute all equipment. Mendes apparently has not thought out any of the details of this plan regarding how and on what basis the Brussels Organization would reach its decisions. He also apparently does not contemplate preparing any drafts of articles necessary to revise the Brussels Treaty, and his statement that some 20 articles would be required was apparently not based on any work on such articles, but was only put forward as a contrast to the 140 or 150 articles in the EDC treaty.
Regarding limitations of production in strategic zones, Mendes said that such zones should be created and based solely on strategic considerations and this would not have any discriminatory aspects as regards Germany. The production of critical items would be prohibited not only througout the strategic zone of Germany, but also in the Benelux countries and in parts of Eastern France. On the other hand, there would be no objection to armament production in Germany of more or less standard items. Finally, he would suggest what creation of joint German-French, or possibly Brussels community factories in safe areas. In this connection he mentioned the possibility of airplane factories in Algeria.
It is clear that Mendes does not plan to consult with any political leaders, either among the pro-EDC or the anti-EDC groups prior to the London conference. What he plans to do after London, assuming agreement has been reached there, is not known.
- Transmitted to the Department of State in two sections and repeated to Bonn, London, The Hague, Rome, Brussels, and Luxembourg.↩
- Documentation concerning the l’affaire Dides, which involved accusations concerning indiscretions committed by persons acquainted with military secrets relating to Indochina, is presented in volume vi.↩