Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

740.5/9–2354: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices ¹

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Washington, September 23, 1954—7:07 p.m.

156. Re French request for US views on proposals incorporated Circular 148 September 20² sent all addressees, difficult for us to comment in detail in absence clarification points raised Deptel 1039 to Paris repeated London 1642 and Bonn 800.³ However, believe following general comments should be transmitted to French:

1. We note that French proposals deal primarily with Brussels Treaty arrangements. Question German sovereignty not covered and no statement that French favor German admission NATO, although some form of German association with NATO appears implied in proposed six arrangements outside Brussels context. US view is that Germany must be admitted full NATO membership promptly. Any form of German association with NATO short of full membership out of question in light of political realities in Germany. Also our understanding that apparently unanimous support for principle of German membership in NATO developing among other NATO countries.

2. We fully recognize French Government’s need for some safeguards and controls in order to make German participation NATO acceptable to parliament. US does not in principle oppose making use of Brussels Treaty context as partial means for working out certain of the safeguards required by France. However, we believe such safeguards or conditions as may be necessary to France, irrespective of what context they may be worked out in, must meet certain criteria: (a) They must in the first instance be nondiscriminatory if they are to be acceptable to the Germans. We are pleased to note that French Government has itself recognized this principle in its aide-mémoire. (b) They should be capable of prompt adoption. Lateness of hour regarding need for German sovereignty, association with West, and defense contribution make it essential that prolonged and complex negotiations be avoided. (c) Arrangements should be such as not to create new organizational machinery which will duplicate or frustrate existing machinery. In particular, we would hope that no machinery would be established under Brussels which would conflict with existing NATO functions and powers. (d) Generally preferable to meet French need for safeguards through positive measures, such as strengthening powers and functions NATO commanders, rather than through negative measures, such as inspection of forces and armament production. Concept of inspection is contrary to spirit of trust and mutual confidence which characterizes Western alliance.

3. French should be told that it cannot be assumed that US April EDC assurances would be reaffirmed. Much will depend on outcome of London Conference and NAC Meeting.

4. Similarly proposal channel US MDAP aid through Brussels Council is very different proposition from intended use of EDC Commissariat for this purpose and would require careful examination by US.

5. To extent that French proposals meet foregoing objectives and criteria, we believe they represent valuable contribution toward solution of problem and are prepared to consider them sympathetically.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Moore, Merchant, Bowie, and the Department of Defense; and sent to all NATO capitals and Bonn.
2. Ante, p. 1231.
3. Not printed; it provided Murphy with guidance concerning questions he could raise during his pending meeting with Mendès-France on Sept. 23 (740.5/9–2154). For a summary of meeting between Murphy and Mendès-France, see telegram 1254 from Paris, Sept. 24, p. 1256.