740.5/9–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1
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248. For Secretary and Conant. Following message from General Gruenther:
“In noon meeting today with Eden at British Embassy, he outlined proposal made during current tour. Brussels treaty to be expanded to include Italy and Western Germany. In this way British satisfy French requirement for more firm British commitment to continent. Also there will be created nucleus of organization which may eventually develop along lines EDC. Simultaneously Germany would be admitted to NATO.
Reception from Benelux Foreign Ministers exceeded expectations. They were all enthusiastic. Adenauer personally delighted. Roberts met with Adenauer’s advisors regarding certain safeguards which might be expected of Germans and found them generally in a most cooperative mood. Meeting in Italy was also most satisfactory.
In all places however, Eden found certain lack of confidence in Mendes-France and his sincerity of purpose.
Meeting with Mendes-France has thus far been unsatisfactory. In first session Wednesday afternoon, Mendes-France presented a series of EDC type conditions to Brussels treaty so complicated that months of negotiations would be required. Eden told Mendes-France that they were unacceptable. In after-dinner meeting Wednesday night, he found Mendes-France slightly more receptive. After 11 o’clock Council meeting this morning Mendes-France told Eden that he had considered carefully all that Eden had said in two meetings yesterday. He had slept little last night, and early this morning he summoned his staff to consider matter further. He was now of opinion that it is desirable to consider admission of Germany to NATO. To get this by French Parliament, however, would be difficult matter. He needed Eden’s help in strengthening Brussels treaty set-up to present plan in favorable light. Eden was to see Mendes-France again this afternoon to continue discussions.
Eden said he felt SHAPE could make significant contribution safeguard problem. I told him that in controlling operations German forces there was considerable we could do if decision made gives us such responsibility. If manufacture of armaments, there is nothing we could contribute. As example of logistics control we might control jet fuel oil supply through pipeline system. Similarly with respect general supplies there was much we could accomplish if authority given.
I told Eden I doubted Mendes-France has consulted French military leaders on safeguard problem. I discussed matter with Juin last night and found him in liberal frame of mind. Juin thinks controls exercised over Germans need only be modest ones.
[Page 1201]Eden said it was clear to him as result of yesterday’s discussions that Mendes-France wants to build up Brussels treaty and soft pedal significance German admission to NATO. If his philosophy in this respect remains unchanged, problem will be difficult one. Eden told Mendes-France that only real control over German forces will come from having Germany in organization with United States. He will press this point further this afternoon.
Several times Eden told Mendes-France his one great fear is peripheral strategy and fortress American concept. At dinner last night Boris told Roberts there was no danger of United States withdrawal.
I asked Eden if decision is taken to hold nine-power meeting at London on September 28, what kind of advance agreement would Eden be able to get from Mendes-France re German admission NATO. Eden replied best he could expect would be Mendes-France would agree to discuss subject, I told him I thought this was not good enough, and I felt conditions Mendes-France would advocate should be thoroughly understood prior to conference. Eden said he thought this was not feasible. Object of conference would be to present such views. I replied I thought staff work had to be more thorough than that or there would be danger of conference failure. He gave impression he was willing take chance on that because he was almost certain of agreement of eight members. If French are again in minority of one, their position would be impossible one.
Eden also stated that in event French refused adopt reasonable point of view, British are willing proceed without them. Eden’s general attitude was pessimistic. Apparently he felt his success at Brussels, Bonn and Rome justified high hopes for Paris meeting and his disappointment was manifest. Several times he stated ‘isn’t it a sad situation that fate of Europe should be based on considerations such as these’.”
- Secretary Dulles was in Bonn for meetings with Adenauer Sept. 16–17. This telegram was repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1134, which is the source text.↩