Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 2

740.5/9–1654: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

top secret
niact

Paris, September 16, 1954—10 p.m.

250. For Secretary and Conant. Foll is second message from Gen. Gruenther:

“During Eden luncheon today De Margerie said he is depressed over present situation with respect to German problem. French PriMin faces almost unsolvable difficulties. Because of bitterness which has developed in French Parliament, no solution has good chance of being approved by Parliament at this time. Because of this complication, Mendes-France considers his best strategy is to lay great emphasis on Brussels Treaty angle. This must be given extensive ‘window dressing’ far out of proportion real merit to secure parliamentary support.

“I asked him what he meant by ‘window-dressing.’ He said there wld have to be certain control organs under Brussels Treaty for insuring safeguards French Parliament considers necessary. One of these wld be control of armaments, very similar to Article 107 of EDC Treaty. He is against duplicating military mechanisms and emphasizes that in final analysis real strength of controls wld lie in NATO.

“I asked De Margerie if PriMin envisaged simultaneous admission to NATO. De Margerie said he cld not answer this question definitely but he thought PriMin wld attempt secure admission of Germany to NATO simultaneously with strengthening of Brussels Treaty. He said he thought Mendes-France wld make this a confidence issue, but he personally believed the Parliament wld reject it.

“I asked De Margerie if he thought there was anything to be gained in having a NATO organization exercise certain safeguard functions. He said this wld help but that problem of gaining popular support in Parliament wld still be major one, regardless of safeguards enacted.

“De Margerie said he saw Maurice Schumann recently and Schumann greeted him with, ‘What is this Brussels Treaty nonsense? We are going to shoot you down hard on this point.’ De Margerie answered it was largely window dressing, and Schumann replied, ‘of course it is, but we are going to shoot you down just the same.’

“De Margerie ended on a very pessimistic note expressing his low opinion of Parliament. He feels there is no solution short of new election.”

Dillon

1. Repeated to London for Aldrich and to the Department of State as priority telegram 1136, which is the source text.