740.5/9–1654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn1
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249. Mendes-France gives us foll summary of his talks with Eden:
German membership in NATO had always been unpopular in France and had come to be regarded as that evil which EDC was designed to avoid. Accordingly he had hoped German membership in Brussels Treaty might provide satis alternative. However, other parties to Brussels Treaty, U.S., Canada and apparently all other NATO countries disagreed and felt German membership in NATO essential. He had accordingly sought with Eden ways and means of making this palatable to French opinion and they had agreed it cld best be done thru developing Brussels Treaty.
Brussels Treaty wld be utilized primarily as a substitute for EDC; it wld have two great advantages of Brit membership and that it was not supranational. Some nondiscriminatory controls over armament were essential, voluntary renunciation by Adenauer wld carry little weight in France and NATO was not structurally designed for control. Therefore Brussels Treaty shld be used. It must not be merely paper control or window dressing but must have real substance. It must also offer hope for the development of political integration in Europe and perhaps the development of supranational features in time. There wld be no question of setting up new administrative machinery under the Brussels Treaty; there wld be political discussion and decisions by Brussels Treaty Council but NATO machinery wld be utilized to administer controls. Brussels Treaty must be presented to Assembly as substitute for EDC and as an assurance there wld be no independent Wehrmacht.
This solution wld entail no delay. German membership in NATO wld of course require approval of French Assembly and Brussels Treaty modifications wld take no longer. He and Eden had agreed that [Page 1199] experts shld be given one month to produce specific document which shld be clear, simple and not comprise more than twenty articles.
In response to question as to how tightly revised Brussels Treaty and German membership in NATO were to be linked to avoid danger of Assembly accepting one and rejecting other, he replied they wld be presented to Assembly in single document and two wld take effect simultaneously.
It had been agreed that Eden wld convoke nine-power mtg in London Sept 27 or 28 and that NAC ministerial mtg shld be held in late Oct or perhaps beginning November and that every effort wld be made to complete parliamentary action by all parliaments concerned before end of year. Mendes expressed hope this wld be satisfactory to us since action shld have been take by time Congress reconvenes.
In response to question whether he considered this solution one for which he cld wholeheartedly seek Assembly approval, he said it definitely was such a solution and that while details must still be worked out, political problems wld be difficult and he did not wish to appear too optimistic, he thought there was reasonable chance of success. He did not wish appear egotistic but felt he had better chance of getting it through than wld someone else. He said he wld need help from all concerned including U.S. He inquired whether there was any change in your plans and was advised that there had not been but that this information wld be communicated to you immed.
Before his departure for airport, Eden had time merely to tell us that he considered outcome as being as good as cld be expected and considerably better than he had anticipated yesterday.
On returning from airport Jebb gave us more detailed account which confirms that given us by Mendes. Additl points were that Eden had emphasized Gruenther’s opinion that NATO machinery cld be effectively utilized for operational and logistical control. (Gruenther cabling full account.) Mendes had repeatedly indicated sensitivity to being isolated and alone and it was only late this afternoon that his apprehension as to again being alone at nine-power mtg in London had been assuaged. Eden had agreed to use his influence with other Brussels Treaty and NATO members to bring about solution along above lines. Eden wishes to discuss this personally with you.
Your announced decision to omit Paris had had very satisfactory effect but this unexpected satisfactory outcome of Eden–Mendes talks does, we believe, change situation. In circumstances, we recommend that if possible you plan to come here tomorrow evening, even if you cld only spend an hour or two. Eden and Jebb, while reluctant to offer suggestions, believe it wld be useful if you cld stop here.
- Repeated to London and to the Department of State as telegram 1135, which is the source text.↩