611.65/5–454: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State 1
3514. Limit distribution. While Italians advised previously in firmest manner Secretary2 would not bring up Trieste question and wished to talk on broader aspects of international problems, particularly EDC, Scelba spent most of his time discussing Trieste. Following is summary of frank 2½-hour Milan discussion May 3:
Scelba in first hour brought out following points:
- 1.
- He stated wished to speak in the most friendly but frank manner on mutual problems. He pointed out absolute necessity all democratic nations stick together to fight Communist menace, that what was needed was actions not words. Stated while he had only parliamentary majority of 8, he would continue De Gasperi’s firm policy for NATO and EDC. Added Italy has done much in military field as proof of her adherence to Atlantic Community.
- 2.
- Trieste: Although Italy’s particular problems are basically small compared to others, solution of these problems would greatly help her progress toward EDC and European Community. However, [Page 954] stated unequivocally and confidentially that unless Trieste solved satisfactorily for Italian public and Parliament, would be impossible pass EDC despite government and democratic parties full realization EDC essential to Italy. Added while he had tried to divorce EDC and Trieste, this proved impossible because of internal political factors. Stated while he obliged make categoric statement re impossibility EDC without Trieste, he would not state so publicly. Scelba then said urgency re Trieste due to lack of implementation October 8,3 adding Italian public believed we could now implement October 8 and could not understand delay. Pointed up urgency Trieste solution since knew it imperative for Italy pass EDC soonest.
[Here follows an extended discussion by Scelba of Trieste, Italian economic problems, the hydrogen bomb, and the Balkan pact.]
Secretary in frank reply brought out following points:
- (1)
- He and US public opinion had received good impression of vigorous and realistic policies being followed by Scelba’s Government and his anti-Communist moves.
- (2)
- Secretary was pleased to learn views of both governments re Communist peril were similar. Threat can only be met by vigorous methods. Secretary pointed out Kremlin had formed monolithic, highly-disciplined groupings of some 800 million persons, and was trying now to expand its control, particularly in Southeast Asia. The Soviet type of enforced unity calls for vigorous efforts, for voluntary unity by others which entails voluntary sacrifices, many of which US has already made in trying to assist its friends financially and militarily since war. Unless Europe voluntarily is united, it might well be united in the Communist fashion. This, of course, would also include Italy.
- (3)
- Lack of European unit: Secretary stated he would be lacking in candor if did not state there is rising discouragement in US at lack of European unit. Our economic aid since the beginning had as its objective the unification of Europe, but many Americans now feel this aid may have been used merely subsidize old systems and maintain disunity of Europe. There are some in US who feel might bring about greater unity by stopping US aid so that force of reality and consequences would cause Europeans on their own to unity. There is great disappointment in US over slow progress EDC ratification by Italy and France. Europe facing critical situation; unless they should immediately take vigorous steps to unify, time might well pass when unification would be possible. Some countries seemed believe only reason for unity was to please US, but there are many more fundamental reasons for unity than this.
[Here follows further discussion on Trieste, economic aid, the facilities agreement, and Scelba’s request for greater cooperation in coordinating anti-Communist propaganda.]
- Repeated to London and Belgrade; transmitted in two sections. The full text of this telegram is printed in the compilation on Trieste in volume viii .↩
- Secretary Dulles was returning to Washington via Milan after attending the opening sessions of the Geneva Conference.↩
- Reference is to the Anglo-American plan for Trieste announced on Oct. 8, 1953; for documentation, see volume viii .↩