Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/4–2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State ¹

top secret

Geneva, April 29, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulte 28. Acting Secretary from Secretary. At luncheon today Spaak gave me report on his weekend activities in Paris re democratic control of EDC along lines of Coled 230.² Spaak said agreement reached in Paris not perfect and not entirely satisfactory to Belgium and certain other EDC governments. Provision for popularly elected Assembly would probably slow down EPC and delay real economic integration of Europe. However, in final analysis this would depend on composition of Assembly and will of EDC governments to move forward in making a united Europe. Essential point was that all had to make sacrifices now to do maximum to put EDC through. In Spaak’s judgment we have two months left in which France can do this, following which it will probably not be possible.

Spaak said real problem was inability of French Government to take action. He felt reasonably certain if French Government got behind EDC and pushed it, it would pass. However, French Government had not felt able to do so. Now delays should be avoided at all costs, since they played into hands of French EDC opponents.

He said that he had been turning over in his own mind possibility of some additional form of pressure on French at an appropriate time. His thoughts not crystalized but he leaned toward declaration by five other EDC members, US and UK. Declaration would be a solemn appeal to French to ratify. It must not be couched in terms which could be construed as pressure or threat. It might review history of EDC (i.e.) fact that it was French proposals; that after signature of treaty French added additional protocols which other members agreed to; that French next insisted on prior resolution of further conditions such as US and UK declaration and Saar; that other countries had met every French request; and finally (appeal to France to take necessary steps). This was on assumption that there could be agreement on Saar which he thought possible. (He had talked to Hallstein and suggested Adenauer come forward with constructive proposals but clearly link Saar settlement to French ratification of EDC.)

Referring again to possible declaration by five EDC powers, US and UK, Spaak said he believed it would take political leaders in France, even some who favor EDC stop taking US for granted and begin to realize that if France did not ratify EDC other countries would be obliged to move without her, leaving France in isolation. The very fact that seven powers he enumerated were able to formulate common declaration without France would cause French politicos to stop and begin to think seriously, and in addition would make French public aware of situation.

I said I warmly welcomed Spaak’s arrival on EDC scene. He brought new European vigor and energy to problem and we were counting on him and would support to our best any ideas he might develop working to EDC ratification. I said US had done everything it conceivably could to bring EDC into being and did not see what more we could do on our own. Spaak said we had done everything possible and he was aware, of catastrophic effect on American opinion if Europe could not unite. He recognized we would have to make other plans, and this would be tragedy for Europe. I said it would be also a tragedy for us but one we would have to face if EDC could not be brought into being.

I then said idea of declaration seemed to have much merit but I was not quite clear how Italy could join in such declaration if it had not ratified. He replied that if Italy had not ratified it could not join declaration and declaration would have to be also aimed at Italy. This would not make France entirely isolated. I told Spaak that I too had been thinking of ways of further influencing French. One possibility was for four EDC countries which have ratified EDC³ invoking article 132 of EDC treaty which provided that if EDC has not been ratified 6 months following signature of treaty, governments which have deposited ratification instruments shall consult on measures to be taken. Four governments might invite US and UK to meet with them and then issue a declaration. The US and UK having ratified NATO–EDC protocol and German contractuals could legitimately be asked to be present, at least as observers. Spaak said this was very interesting idea and he would give immediate thought to it. It was agreed that he would keep in close touch with Bruce through Andre de Staercke. I also told him I plan to stop for dinner in Paris next Monday evening, May 3, en route to US and that if he had any ideas by that time I would be glad to receive them, either through Bruce or directly from Andre de Staercke, who could see me briefly at Dillon’s residence if this seemed best.⁴ We also agreed above possibility should be kept very confidential for moment since tactics and timing important. Spaak mentioned that he had spoken briefly to Hallstein about some form of declaration but indicated that he had not discussed it in any detail.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Paris for Bruce, to Brussels for the Ambassador, and to Bonn for Conant. Dulles was at Geneva to attend the Four-Power Conference on Korea and Indochina, Apr. 26–July 21; for documentation, see volume xvi .
2. Supra.
3. The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See the editorial note, p. 927.
4. No record of Dulles’ brief stay in Paris on May 3 has been found in Department of State files.