740.5/12–1553
Memorandum by the Minister in France (Achilles) to the Secretary of State 1
Mr. Secretary: To obtain French ratification of EDC we need to do three things:
- 1)
- Arrest and if possible reverse the present trend against it, in which the opponents have been tending to develop a band-wagon psychology and the proponents becoming increasingly disheartened and prone to consider compromises.
- 2)
- Precipitate the decisive debate and vote at the earliest practicable time, probably February or March, and
- 3)
- Clinch ratification at that time.
It is too soon to tell whether your press conference2 has arrested the unfavorable trend, but it has certainly provided food for thought and again posed clearly the issue and the urgency. After the initial violent reaction has passed the net effect may prove to be salutary. If it proves not to have reversed the unfavorable trend we will have to review the whole EDC in both the tactical and substantive aspects.
[Page 869]We must bear in mind the elementary factor that ratification is not going to be voted on its abstract merits, that it will occur only if a majority of members of the Assembly are convinced that it is in their individual interest to vote for it. The picture is complicated by the facts that the potential majority in favor of EDC does not coincide either with the present majority or, apparently, any new majority capable of agreeing on internal policy or continuing the war in Indochina, and that it is presently almost impossible to obtain a majority in the Assembly on any difficult issue.
Opposition to EDC stems primarily from three factors:
- 1)
- Nationalism. This combines patriotism, love of la belle France, nostalgia for its past military, political and cultural greatness and unwillingness to recognize the relative decline in France’s world status, preoccupation with the effect of Europeanization upon the French Union, and natural political conservatism in face of the fateful step of abandoning a large measure of sovereignty.
- 2)
- Fear of German domination of Europe. This combines deeply ingrained painful memories (“Three times in 70 years they’ve invaded us”), well-founded fears that France, even with its overseas territories, cannot match the physical, psychological, political, military or industrial vitality of even Western Germany, fear of U.S. and perhaps U.K. favoritism for Germany as against France, fear that the U.S. and U.K. will withdraw and leave France alone to cope with Germany and fear that Germany will drag Western Europe into war to regain its eastern territories.
- 3)
- Unwillingness to face the decision. In addition to the present near-paralysis of the Assembly, this involves wishful thinking that procrastination may avoid German rearmament in any form, that the U.S. will nevertheless have to support France, that the problem may evaporate through a lessening of East-West tension, or that France may secure reinsurance against Germany by improving its relations with Russia without giving up its Atlantic ties.
Different tactics are required to deal with these three factors:
- 1)
- Nationalism requires understanding and sympathetic handling. French pretensions to being a great power are unrealistic, but the answer lies in stressing that (a) France’s future depends on her influence in greater-than-national units, both European and wider, and at the same time that (b) it is inconceivable that either the EDC or the EPC could, in the absence of developments much more far-reaching than anything now contemplated, result in the loss of France’s national identity or her position in the French Union. You handled this very effectively at Bermuda and the line should be continued and developed.
- 2)
- Fear of German domination is harder to combat because it is much more realistic. We must recognize it, try to avoid inadvertently encouraging it, and seek means of allaying it which (a) do not discriminate against Germany and (b) advance our own and the general interest without running into Congressional complications. The U.S. paper on Assurances to France re EDC (NACOM D–2)3 is good, but [Page 870] we still have considerable room for maneuver on this subject. The French hope for maximum U.S. and U.K. association as assurance against German domination and German adventures to the East could be further met by additional emphasis upon the integration of EDC forces, commands and logistic system into NATO and upon the strengthening of NATO in the political field. The line of the Bermuda communiqué4 which you reemphasized here, that materialization of EDC will be the basis of durable and closer ties between the U.S. and Europe should be continued and developed as far as the Administration sees its way clear to go.
- 3)
- Unwillingness to face facts requires a measure of shock treatment, which your press conference administered. There is apparently no alternative to continuation of a hardboiled line on this, with emphasis upon the need for a clear decision and soon. How and how often this treatment is applied in the future should be carefully considered. It should definitely not be repeated in the immediate future.
It is difficult to see what further might be done until both the net result of your press conference and the French internal political situation become clearer. No final decision can be expected in any event until a Four-Power meeting has been held or proved impracticable due to Russian intransigence. We have time to study further what assurances against German domination we can give at the decisive time or what other courses should be followed.