Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/8–2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret

Washington, September 6, 1952—1:02 p.m.

1305. While Dept under no illusion re difficulties in path Fr ratification of EDC–Contractuals indirect ref by Schuman (and spelled out by La Tournelle and Seydoux—Embtel 1216)² to side issues raised by him at Bonn in last stages prior EDC signing in May comes as disappointment. We realize full well that these four major questions (Indochina, North Africa, OSP and “Guarantee”) constitute major worries for large sectors Fr public opinion which lags behind Eur leadership of small band under Schuman, Pleven and Monnet. As Emb and Dept have frequently noted, farsighted policies of this small group have lacked public relations backup both with Parliament and public. Regardless of lack of logic and lack of justification connecting these with EDC, we are conscious that these issues cannot be disregarded as they represent polit facts in Fr today and whether we like it or not they have a bearing on ratification problem. Our objective, however, shld be to reduce them to their proper proportions and to separate them in every way possible from the ratification action.

Re ratification problem in genl Dept is of opinion it wld be difficult to determine precise course of action until parliament reconvenes as evolution of party relationships and strengths during summer recess shld have a considerable bearing.

While it wld be vain to seek develop precise tactics now, there are certain broad strategic lines which we shld either develop or continue to pursue immed.

Most important of all appears to be renewed stress on our policy enunciated so clearly in Embtel 7991 of June 20³ by all means at our disposal we shld seek bring Fr Govt and press to propound that EDC is fulfillment of Fr policy; that EDC–NATO relationship bringing with it active US participation in def Western Eur and Fr represents achievement of goal sought by Fr foreign policy since 1919, every means at our disposal shld be used to dispel picture of US forcing a reluctant Fr to accept EDC. We are all agreed any attitude on our part indicating desire to buy this ratification cld only make matters worse by seemingly confirming impression EDC is Amer project primarily benefiting US.

With ref to four “related problem” we shld immed scotch reemerging issue of US guarantee against Ger secession from EDC incl replacement of Ger divs thereby lost. Unfortunately this looks like attempt to squeeze this old lemon even drier. What with evidence of UK good faith re Six Nation EDC–CSC combination and of desire close relationship with an entity which UK appears to have accepted, public pressure in Fr for guarantee shld, if anything, be diminishing. Likewise, fact that both candidates US elections are genuine supporters of NATO and other major Eur policies fol since war shld be reassuring to Fr with regard future US policy. Consequently, any initiative on part Fr Govt publicize this whole issue now wld be seriously misunderstood in this country. In tripartite mtg of FonMins at Bonn, as reported Bonn’s 3053,⁴ it was made clear by Secy that US assurances cld not go beyond tripartite declaration. Eden’s statements were equally categoric. If there is any doubt on this score in Fr minds or if they believe that this issue can be used once more in connection with Fr ratification of EDC Dept believes they shld be clearly and promptly disillusioned of this idea. Emb shld, therefore, discuss problem with FonOff at whatever level seems appropriate and stress that US will not permit this question to be used as part of any price to be paid for EDC.

North Af situation dealt with in Deptel 1121 Aug 30.⁵

Re two remaining problems, Indochina and OSP, we must continue to deal with them on their own merits. Grave importance we place on Indochina shld have been clearly demonstrated to Fr during Letourneau talks in June and by our concrete actions before and since then. Re OSP we are earnestly seeking every means to give every reasonable satis to Fr aspirations for vigorous and well rounded Def industry within limits of seriously reduced FY 1953 appropriations and of our other major responsibilities. In so doing we are demonstrating our realization of polit importance thereof in Fr even though this might appear slightly contradictory to gen policy of “Eur integration”.

We will continue to take these strong Fr views into account in our decisions but it wld be fundamental mistake to let them become the quid of the quo of the EDC ratification. We wld hope that Fr realize that failure or undue delay in implementing Eur policy embodied in EDC and Schuman Plan which resulted from Fr initiative of high statesmanship and which we have enthusiastically and wholeheartedly supported cld only lead to consideration of alternative courses all of which wld surely be far less desirable and even acceptable to Fr as they wld be less auspicious for West as a whole.⁶

Acheson

1. Drafted by Knight and Calhoun, cleared by Bonbright and Riddleberger, repeated to Bonn.
2. Not printed; it listed the problems enumerated below as difficulties in the path of French ratification (740.5/8–2652).
3. Supra.
4. Dated May 25, this telegram discussed contractual relations with Germany; see volume vii , chapter I.
5. Not printed.
6. Telegram 1538 from Paris, Sept. 11, reported inter alia that de Margerie had indicated that the EDC debate could not begin in the French Assembly before the end of October. De Margerie also indicated that there was a widespread skepticism in France toward EDC, some considering it the epitome of a soft policy toward Germany, others a desperate proposal designed to avoid creation of a German national army, but one that would nonetheless entail a significant loss of French sovereignty (740.5/9–1152). In a memorandum to Perkins on Sept. 13, Ambassador at Large Jessup called attention to telegram 1538 and wondered “if it wouldn’t be worthwhile considering the possibility of a statement of our president-elect just as the French parliamentary debates begin. Such a statement need not go further than what we have already said but its repetition at that time might be helpful” (740.5/9–1152).