Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/6–2052: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, June 20, 1952—5 p.m.

7991. Embtel 7990 gives our current estimate of prospects of Fr ratification of EDC and various factors influencing Fr public and official opinion.² Corollary problem is how US can assist Fr Govt to obtain ratification. This msg gives our thinking as of possible assistance in connection Secretary’s forthcoming discussions with Schuman and Eden.

Problem has three aspects relating respectively to Fr thinking with respect to (1) Ger, (2) USSR and (8) US.

1. Ger. On this aspect US must be careful to avoid giving basis for Fr fears that US, and particularly US mil, will in some way favor Gers over Fr in EDC. At same time, we must not permit fact to be lost from sight that German contribution to Western def is essential to fulfillment of current def plans and that is [if] it is not forthcoming through EDC, it must be sought in some other form. Naturally Fr presentation of this fact wld be far preferable to Amer. We shld also, of course, continue to seek both in France and in Ger to prevent steps in either country which wld exacerbate opinion in other as for example in relation to Saar or such statements as Blank’s referring to “Ger” decisions, etc.

2. USSR. Much Fr public opinion resembles that of US four or five years ago with respect to possibility of reaching “settlement” or détente with USSR through four-power mtg. It is difficult to say how much of this is naive wishful thinking and how much is more calculated thought that “we must leave no stone unturned” or “go through all the motions” but Schuman and cabinet attach major importance to it and we must take it into account. Unless developments in near future, and as soon as possible without interfering with Ger or US ratifications, make clear that Russ have no intention of negotiating settlement on Ger which wld be acceptable to West, we may well be faced this fall with Fr insistence on delay pending further exploration of possible settlement. We may be faced with this in any event or if four-power talks shld be in progress, we may have difficulty in preventing Russ from dragging them out indefinitely.

3. US. Fact that EDC represents fulfillment of Fr policy for which France has obtained US support has been almost entirely lost from sight. Psychological picture is of US forcing reluctant France to accept EDC which has become synonymous in Fr thinking with Ger rearmament. Result is gen impression not only among public but in govt that France is in position to demand concessions from us in connection with ratification. Flagrant example is council of republic resolution (Embtel 7827, June 14)³ which expressed view that US and UK guarantee must “go beyond simple obligation to consult” and “invited govt to pursue negotiations with its allies with view to treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance with direct ref to Art 5 of NAT”. Obvious but unmade answer of Fr. Govt shld have been that it already has “treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance” in NAT.

Unless this line of thinking is checked, it will grow worse as ratification debate nears. Developments in next few months will indicate how our line shld develop but for time being I wld strongly recommend that we avoid expressing too much interest in the matter. Less we say about it, the better. While continuing to extend maximum cooperation in working out common problems, we shld, I believe, take line whenever other requests are made to us linked with EDC ratification that EDC is Fr project which we heartily support but which we are not paying Fr to complete.

4. Fr Govt has hitherto taken defensive line which has contributed to picture of US forcing EDC on France. While it will not be easy, believe that we must quietly persuade Fr Govt to undertake active public opinion campaign to sell Fr public on this as Fr project. Absence of US pressure, coupled with US and Ger ratifications, concrete development of Schuman Plan and possible initiation of discussions or creation common pol auth will all be favorable factors.

Mental assoc of EDC and Ger rearmament has led many Fr to think or rather “feel” that alternative to EDC is no Ger rearmament. Cuerin De Beaumont, rapporteur of assembly For Affairs Comm., and others who favor ratification have been advocating it in terms of three alternatives, starting from premise that Ger contribution is essential to adequate western def. These alternatives are: (1) EDC; (2) Ger natl army or; (3) Abandonment of strategy of def in Ger and reversion to concept of peripheral conduct of war. Presented in these terms, EDC naturally has strong appeal. US argumentation along these lines at this time wld annoy Fr and possibly overfrighten them, but Fr presentation, which we can discreetly encourage, shld be very effective.⁴

Dunn

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
2. Not printed; it stated inter alia that although the EDC Treaty might be transmitted to the Assembly prior to the summer recess, the government was not likely to ask for debate until after the U.S. Senate had ratified the contractuals and the Bundestag had ratified both the contractuals and the EDC (740.5/6–2052)
3. Not printed. (740.5/6–1452)
4. In telegram 7555 to Paris, June 24, Acting Secretary Bruce endorsed the conclusions reached in telegram 7991 “especially so far as undesirability over-pressuring Fr concerned,” and regarding the “urgent necessity check Fr line of thinking that EDC US project”. Bruce added that various possibilities were being studied to remind France that EDC was its idea and the Embassy in Paris was urged to “avail itself all opportunities encourage Fr Govt take initiative depict EDC in its true light”. Bruce concluded with the endorsement of the analysis presented in telegram 7990, “especially Emb’s conclusion no outside pressures are likely speed up Assembly action. We are of course concerned stories such as NY Times June 21 (Callender) to effect ratification unlikely but conclude from Embtel 7990 Emb somewhat more optimistic” (740.5/6–2052).